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Abstract
Species are central to biology, but there is currently no agreement on what
the adequate species concept should be, and many have adopted a pluralist
stance: different species concepts will be required for different purposes. This
thesis is a multidimensional analysis of species pluralism. First I explicate how
pluralism differs from monism and relativism. I argue that we must re-frame
the species problem, and that re-evaluating Aristotle’s role in the histories of
systematics can shed light on pluralism. Next I consider different forms of
pluralism: evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism, which differ
in their stance on evolutionary theory. I show that pluralism is more than
a debate about the species category, but a debate about which concepts are
legitimate and a claim about how they interact with one another. Following
that, I consider what sort of ontology is required for different forms of species
pluralism. I argue that pluralists who deny the unity of biology will require
a further plurality of frameworks, while those that ground their pluralism in
evolution need only one framework. Finally, I consider what pluralism means
for biological practice. I argue that species concepts are tools, and reflect on
how pluralism can illuminate the way systematists approach the discovery of
new species of yeast. Pluralism can make sense of the way species concepts
are used, and can be developed to aid researchers in thinking about how to
use the right tools for the right jobs.
Keywords: Pluralism, species, evolutionary theory, scientific unity, sys-
tematic biology, yeast, Aristotle
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When the views entertained in
this volume on the origin of
species, or when analogous
views are generally admitted, we
can dimly foresee that there will
be a considerable revolution in
natural history. Systematists
will be able to pursue their
labours as at present; but they
will not be incessantly haunted
by the shadowy doubt whether
this or that form be in essence a
species.
Darwin, Origin, 1st Ed., 484
This is a dissertation on species pluralism. As such, I will consider de-
bates about what ‘species’ means, and how species are supposed to figure in
biological theory. In this introductory chapter I will set the stage by disentan-
gling these debates from pluralism, thus introducing some of the terminology
relevant for the following chapters. I will first present the different understand-
ings of the so-called species problem, or the fact that no one seems to agree
on what ‘species’ means in biology, and some of the different solutions. The
species problem is thorny not because it is insoluble, but because it has too
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many alleged solutions. Following this, I will then highlight the importance
of distinguishing pluralism from two other approaches to the species problem:
monism and relativism. As this dissertation shows, pluralism puts an entirely
new spin on various problems that concern species, and gives us new insight
into biological theory and practice.
1.1 The Species Problem Problem
In this section I will survey several common attempts to elucidating what the
so-called species problem. This in turn will help us understand what solutions
might be required.
There are two common ways of disambiguating ‘species.’ The first disam-
biguation of ‘species’ is that it can sometimes refer to the species category,
the class to which all species taxa belong, or to the properties which make
a species a species and not a genus or some other taxonomic class of entities
higher or lower on the so-called ‘Tree of Life.’ The second disambiguation is
that ‘species’ can sometimes refer to particular species taxa, (e.g., Canis lupus
is a species, rather than a genus) or even all of them at once, without really
specifying criterion for what makes them a species, but just taking for granted
that there are such things as Castor canadensis, Lactobacillus fermentum, and
the like. This disambiguation is thought to repair a lot of confusion about how
‘species’ is used, but in fact the distinction between the species category and
species taxon problem has led to a cottage industry of formulating different
species problems, and solutions to them. This work merely skims the surface of
the very sophisticated ways that some biologists use species concepts, and talk
about particular species. This thesis aims to rectify this problem by putting
species pluralism into practice.
One might think that the two species problems are separable. That the
species category problem is something for biologists, and that the species taxon
problem is a problem for philosophers. This separation is not that simple.
Sokal (1974), one of the founders of numerical taxonomy, believes that the
species problem is two-fold. First, it is a problem of definition. Here the is-
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sue is how to define the species category. Second, it is a problem of genesis,
i.e., how to understand speciation: the many different ways new species come
into existence. Some think the species problem is just that there are differ-
ent, partly incompatible definitions of the species category (de Queiroz, 1999,
2005b). There is however another species problem that pertains to species
taxa, the things to which our binomial nomenclature is said to refer to (e.g.,
Castor canadensis, Gadus morhua, etc.). This problem concerns whether or
not species taxa are real things, as opposed to mere taxonomic conveniences
useful for human purposes. Even if we agree that they are real, it’s not clear
what sort of thing they might be, whether they are natural kinds, sets, pro-
cesses, individuals or something else. This species problem is ontological, and
concerns how species come into and go out of being.
Would taking a pluralistic stance, and allowing for multiple solutions to
these problems help in any way? In order to answer this question, we need
to first get clear about what pluralism means when it comes to species. In
the next section I will go over the sort of pluralism that is contributing to one
aspect of the species problem, i.e., the conceptual pluralism surrounding the
species category.
1.2 Conceptual Pluralism
There are now an astounding number of species concepts, and in this section I
will only go over some of the more prominent ones 1. A species concept is an
attempt to answer the following general question: “How do we adequately de-
fine what a species is?” Here we must take ‘adequate’ in the broadest possible
sense of the term: theoretically, so that it fits with our best biological theo-
ries, operationally, so that we know what operations to perform to demarcate
particular species, practically, so that it meets our overall classificatory aims,
etc. Species concepts are generally taken as definitions of the species cate-
gory. However, a careful consideration of the differences between competing
1See Mayden (1997) and references therein for a list of 22 species concepts (cf. Wilkins,
2011)
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species concepts shows that many species concepts are also saying something
about speciation. Further, though there is no universal agreement about which
species concept is the correct one, some general desiderata for species concepts
have presented themselves (cf. Wiley, 1978, 18), e.g., that a species concept be
theoretically sound, or have operational consequences, i.e., that it can provide
some actual guidelines for how to demarcate species. Part of the problem is
that not everyone agrees on which desiderata ought to be captured by a species
concept. The one desideratum that pluralists generally give up on is that a
species concept be universalizable: different species concepts will be required
for different jobs.
In this introductory chapter I will consider six ways of usefully defining
species: (1) the typological species concept (TSC), (2) the phenetic species
concept (PhSC), (3) the biological species concept (BSC), (4) the ecological
species concept (EcSC), (5) the phylogenetic species concept (PSC), and (6)
the evolutionary species concept (EvSC). There are many more species con-
cepts out there. Concepts (3-5) are perhaps the most commonly cited as
concepts applied when a new species is delineated (e.g., Mayden and Wood,
1995). Concepts (1-2) are not often referenced as decisive for marking out
species, though they may still be useful for some aspects of systematic re-
search. Concept (6) is admittedly not an operational concept, given that it
does not tell us how to pick out species in the world, and is an early progeni-
tor of modern species pluralism. I will explain how each concept characterizes
or constrains what sorts of things count as species, and why there are real
differences among each concept. As I will show in the following section, the
fact that there is conceptual pluralism about species is distinct from species
pluralism properly construed, which is the view that more than one species
concept is correct. As I will show in Chapter 3, species pluralism is a view that
must be tied to biological theory. I will also show in Chapter 5 that species
pluralism needs to be tied to biological practice.
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1.2.1 The Typological Species Concept
The typological species concept (TSC) appears in the introductory literature
to the species problem or to systematics without a clear reference to anyone
who explicitly advocates or advocated it, and in some ways used as a foil for
the other species concepts (e.g., Mayr, 1957; Slobodchikoff, 1976; Cracraft,
2000). The TSC is more like a spectre that haunts biologists from time to
time, and leads them down unscientific, non-evolutionary paths. The TSC is
commonly characterized as recognizing species by their degree of phenotypic
difference. TSCs are often conflated with the view that species have essential
properties, but biologists have a peculiar understanding of essentialism. One
way of formulating the TSC is as follows:
(TSC) ‘A typological species is an entity that differs from other
species by constant diagnostic differences, but it is subjective what
one may consider a diagnostic difference. The so-called typolog-
ical species concept is simply a biologically arbitrary means for
delimiting species taxa” (Mayr, 1982, 176).
Mayr often ties the TSC to a reliance on morphological features, though that
reliance isn’t necessary. The main point is that the TSC leads to an arbitrary
way of classifying species. However, given the tie to morphological features,
Mayr (1957, 12-14) argues that TSC fails for at least the following three em-
pirical reasons. First, the fact that we often find polymorphism within popula-
tions (e.g., the light and dark-morphs of the jaguar (Panthera onca)). Second,
because we often find geographic variation within species. Third, because of
the existence of what are called ‘sibling’ or ‘cryptic’ species. Species that have
the same phenotype, but differ in their reproductive capacities or differ genet-
ically (e.g., recent DNA analysis the Two-barred Flasher butterfly (Astraptes
fulgerator)). Applying the TSC to such populations would unnecessarily split
such groups into separate species. What this means though, is that the TSC
conflicts with sorts of classifications of organisms into species offered by some
of the following species concepts. I will discuss the relationship between the
TSC, Aristotle, and other species concepts further in Chapter 2.
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1.2.2 The Phenetic Species Concept
The phenetic species concept (PhSC) is a concept that is currently quite out
of fashion, though mostly for the ‘theoretical’ reasons driving it. This was the
concept of the numerical taxonomists, an approach to taxonomy that is also
quite out of fashion due to its attempt to provide a ‘theory-free’ approach to
taxonomy, an approach that supposedly makes no assumptions about what
forces hold species together nor about those which generate new species. In
the early days of twentieth century systematics numerical taxonomy was one
of three competing schools. The other two schools, cladistics or phylogenetic
systematics, and evolutionary taxonomy both rejected the focus on the PhSC,
but differed in the role they attributed to descent. A common definition of the
PhSC is as follows:
[T]he species level is that at which distinct phenetic clusters can
be observed (Sneath, 1976: 437).
Here “observable, distinct phenetic clusters” means that species are groups of
organisms that are delineated by how similar they are overall. Sometimes this
is taken to refer to traits that refer to a species phenotype, but other times it
can also refer to the genetic makeup of a species. Many have argued against
this species concept on the grounds that it is in essence a version of the TSC.
I will speak in more detail about the role that the TSC plays in debates about
species in the following chapter.
1.2.3 The Biological Species Concept
What is perhaps the most popular species concept, at least among zoologists, is
misleadingly referred to as the biological species concept (BSC) (Dobzhansky,
1935; Mayr, 1940, 1942, 1963, 1970; Mayr and Ashlock, 1991).2 An often cited
early definition of the BSC is as follows:
2The reason this concept was called ‘biological’ is because Mayr believed that the TSC
(or essentialist species concept) could apply to inorganic kinds, like species of molecules
or minerals (1982, 251-252;272). However, calling something ‘biological’ within biology is
uninformative at best. This would be like calling a proof method in a mathematics textbook
the ‘mathematical proof method.’ Secondly, as many have pointed out, calling this concept
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(BSC) The Biological Species Concept: “species are groups
of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which
are reproductively isolated from other such groups” (Mayr, 1942,
120)3
According to the BSC gene flow, the transfer of genes from one population
to another, keeps species together, and reproductive isolating mechanisms4
restrict gene flow and keep species apart.5 The BSC puts a great deal of
emphasis on sexual reproduction. Due to this emphasis, the BSC will be use-
ful for a zoologist6, especially with respect to the notion of “cryptic species”:
species that are very similar morphologically speaking, but fail to success-
fully interbreed. However, the BSC will not be useful for a microbiologist or
virologist who wants to sort entities that reproduce by clonal means.
‘biological’ suggests that all other concepts that biologists use are somehow ‘non-biological.’
Simpson (1951) preferred the term ‘genetical species concept’ for Mayr’s version of the BSC.
Others have called the BSC the reproductive isolation concept. Unfortunately, the name
has stuck.
3Mayr offers this definition after quoting an earlier one: “A species consists of groups of
populations which replace each other geographically or ecologically and of which the neigh-
boring ones intergrade or interbreed wherever they are in contact or which are potentially
capable of doing so (with one or more of the populations) in those cases where contact is
prevented by geographical or ecological barriers” (1940, 256).
4Mayr (1942, 247-248) gives a taxonomy of four sorts of isolating mechanisms: ecological,
ethological, mechanical, and genetic-physiological.
5See Beurton (1995) for some potential problems and a solution to the standard way of
understanding gene flow associated with the BSC. For our purposes we can take a broader
gloss on the BSC that encompasses both this and even further disagreements about how to
define this concept.
6Interestingly most of those who were behind the early development of the BSC were
zoologists. Mayr, for example was an ornithologist, and Dobzhansky worked on Drosophila.
So in a way the BSC is zoocentric. The limitations of the BSC were not unintended
by-products of a blind attempt to define species. In fact, problems with the concept were
noted even earlier than Mayr’s (1942) particular formulation. Dobzhansky, for example, in
discussing the limits of his own version of the BSC states that “Among organisms repro-
ducing exclusively by parthenogenesis or asexually, species in our sense do not exist at all.
The classification of these organisms must be based solely on the observable discontinuities
in their morphological structures and physiologies.” (1935, 355). That is, where the BSC
fails, we must use another ‘species’ concept.
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1.2.4 The Ecological Species Concept
The main claim of the ecological species concept EcSC is that species are, for
the most part, maintained ecologically, not reproductively (Van Valen, 1976,
235). According to the EcSC species are distinct because they occupy distinct
niches (what Van Valen calls “adaptive zones”), which are roughly the ecolog-
ical role played by a population with respect to some environment. On this
account of species, species can occupy distinct niches even though, in some
cases, the more inclusive group forms a ‘syngameon’: a cluster of species and
subspecies between the members of which natural hybridization occurs. This
phenomena, and limitation of the BSC, was already noticed by Simpson, who
stated that “quite extensive interbreeding may occur between adjacent pop-
ulations which nevertheless retain their own individualities, morphologically
and genetically, so clearly that any consensus of modern systematists would
call them different species” (1951, 289). Different selection regimes preserve
the stability of each group. The EcSC has been formulated in terms of the
concepts of lineage, adaptive zone, and geographical range as follows:
(EcSC) The Ecological Species Concept: A species is a lineage
(or a closely related set of lineages) which occupies an adaptive
zone minimally different from that of any other lineage in its range
and which evolves separately from all lineages outside its range
(Van Valen, 1976, 233).
In contrast with BSC the EcSC allows for cases where isolating mechanisms
are not what keep biological groups distinct. Consider some Canadian oaks
like Quercus macrocarpa and Quercus bicolor that regularly exchange genetic
material. Since these two groups readily hybridize where they co-occur, they
would be the same species according to the BSC. According to the EcSC, on
the other hand, these groups of oaks are distinct species because of the different
and distinct niches they occupy. Q. macrocarpa has a far broader range thanQ.
bicolor. Isolating mechanisms fail, but we have reason to believe that different
selection regimes, and difference in geographic range, are at work keeping the
species distinct, which also causes them to have different phenotypes.
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The issue at stake between the BSC and EcSC is what is the fundamen-
tal cause of species cohesion: reproductive isolation or ecology. Both concepts
make species cohesion explicit, thereby providing a partial account of specia-
tion. When new isolating mechanisms arise in a population, this may lead to
a new ‘biological-species.’ When new niches arise in a population, this may
lead to a new ‘ecological-species.’ Both concepts are wide-ranging and unify
a disparate array of phenomena, so it is very appealing for a species monist
to declare a winner, or find something in common between them. A species
pluralist may argue that searching for one unified account of species cohesion
is the same as pursuing a red herring.
Independently of this fundamentality issue, the EcSCmay not be useful for
classifying organisms that are manufactured or manipulated by human beings
to only exist in the laboratory. In these situations some have argued that
there may be no well-defined or stable ecological niches for sorting these sorts
of organisms, but we may still have grounds to differentiate between species
(Stanford, 1995, 76). Unless of course we take the human influence as part
of the ecological factors that keep these populations isolated and in the form
they have. If this is the case, then perhaps we would say that the ESC is
rather useful in such contexts.
1.2.5 The Phylogenetic Species Concept
The phylogenetic species concept PSC, in contradistinction to the BSC and
EcSC, leaves open what sorts of processes make species cohere. According
to one version of PSC, species are the smallest ancestor-decscendant lineages
of populations, which form monophyletic groups (groups characterized by an
ancestral species and all of its decscendants) (de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988,
1990). On this account, since species are lineages between speciation events,
they may be able to drastically change their ecological and reproductive prop-
erties depending on how we define speciation. Given enough change in these
properties within a lineage, a single species recognized by the PSC may be
counted as multiple species by the BSC or EcSC. A benefit of the PSC
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over the BSC is that it will classify asexual organisms, as long as they form
monophyletic groups.
1.2.6 Cross-Classification
What is important to note about all of this is that species concepts are not
just semantically different from one another, but lead to concrete operational
discrepancies. Different species concepts produce classifications that will cross-
classify the world’s organisms (e.g., Ereshefsky, 2001, 133). If we apply the
BSC we will get a classification different than that provided by the EcSC,
PSC, and so on. Species concepts make a difference when it comes to biodiver-
sity counts, which has implications for conservationists. An extreme example is
Cracraft’s (1992) review of the Birds-of-Paradise (Aves, Paradisaeidae), which
recognized over ninety species using his version of the PSC, whereas previous
counts, using the BSC, had only recognized about half the number of species
using the very same data.
The BSC and EcSC conflict with one another because they have different
understandings of what it is the primary cause of species cohesion. For the
BSC the reproductive properties are more salient, and for the EcSC it is the
ecological properties that we must investigate. Both of these can conflict with
the more rigid genealogical understanding imposed by the PSC. The PSC
takes species to be a special form of monophyletic groups, a group composed
of all the descendents of some common ancestor. The BSC and EcSC take
species to be genealogical entities, but not necessarily monophyletic groups.
They permit paraphyletic groups, which are groups composed of some of the
descendents of some ancestor that they share. The BSC, as noted above will
not apply to asexual organisms, but the PSC and EcSC can be used to recog-
nize species among such organisms. Furthermore, none of these concepts can
be generally applied by paleontologists. Extinct species are generally delin-
eated by using something like the PhSC. In fact, the BSC explicitly stipulates
that species are extant, and rules out the question of whether ancestral species
can survive speciation.
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Given this discordance, and given the widespread use of many different
species concepts, what stance are we to take toward this sort of conceptual
pluralism? Everyone admits there is a plurality of species concepts in biology,
but not everyone agrees that we should accept this plurality.
1.3 Pluralism, Monism and Relativism
Scientific pluralism or “the pluralist stance” (Kellert et al., 2006), is the view
that it is possible, for some domain, that there is no singular, unified account
of its phenomena. Pluralism is the denial of monism, which is the view that
for any domain all correct accounts of its phenomena can be unified. This is
not to say that a pluralist holds that there are no locally unifiable domains
in the world, just that we can’t assume that the world will be neat, tidy,
and unifiable. Pluralism in biology has been understood as the idea that one
“keep an open mind about which particular causal agent is to be invoked as
an organizing principle in any particular case” (Mishler and Brandon, 1987,
402). However, at the level of global description, it is not always clear what
scientific pluralists are being pluralists about, whether it’s about explanation,
causation, theories, concepts, models, or some further thing. Thus, the way
many understand pluralism at the global level has ridden on the backs of local,
empirical, investigations of pluralism, e.g., ‘sex,’ ‘behaviour,’ etc. (Kellert
et al., 2006). It’s not clear that Mishler and Brandon’s conception of pluralism
in biology is helpful for understanding species pluralism. The species debate
is not solely about causal explanation. This is because species concepts like
the PhSC and TSC don’t specify any causes, but demarcate species based
on principles of sameness and difference. I will return to this conception and
explore the role of causes in species pluralism in the last chapter.
In general, scientific pluralism has important consequences for how we
interpret scientific disagreement, because pluralism implies that more than
one account may be correct. The main implication for biological theory that
species pluralism generates is that there is more than one legitimate species
concept. In the past, biologists and philosophers have both tended toward
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species monism. An examination of their arguments shows that it is implicitly
assumed that one and only one species concept could be correct. One might
think that species pluralism would then just be the denial of species monism,
the view that there is no singular way of grouping organisms into species. But
this way of characterizing pluralism makes it tread awfully close to a full-blown
species relativism, which at its most extreme suggests that anything goes as far
as species concepts are concerned. There can be of course more sophisticated
versions of relativism that are constrained, the worry here is about the lack of
constraints on what counts as legitimate science that many believe pluralism
to entail. I won’t directly deal with these sorts of worries in this thesis, but
will showcase the grounds for a promising species pluralism that can suit the
needs of biological theory and practice.
As I understand it, scientific pluralism is a belief that there is something
about certain parts of the world that cry out for a pluralist interpretation.
Species pluralism, then should be understood as the view that the world is
such that there is no singular, unified way of grouping organisms into species.
This leaves it open to what it is about the world that is responsible for the
pluralism, but makes it distinguishable from relativism. In order to distinguish
species pluralism from relativism further, we need constraints on what species
concepts are admissible. This must be an auxiliary claim about why the world
is the way it is. For this claim to yield us a scientific species pluralism, it
must be supported by our best biological theory. I address the way biological
theory relates to species pluralism in my third chapter. In order to better
appreciate the differences between species pluralism, monism and relativism,
I want to briefly address how species monists come to terms with the de facto
conceptual pluralism that runs rampant in systematic biology.
1.4 The Monist Agenda
In this section I will briefly go over four different strategies for maintaining
monism in the light of conceptual pluralism.
Monists believe there is one true species concept, even if it turns out that
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we may never get at it. This has important consequences for how we resolve
conceptual pluralism. What does a monist do with all the species concepts?
Given say the BSC, EcSC, and PSC the monist considers the arguments
for each concept and selects the best. This is the first strategy, to accept one,
and show why the others would lead to illegitimate classifications of organisms
into species. If this strategy does not succeed, there are three more: reduce,
combine, or create.
G. G. Simpson’s (1951) development of the evolutionary species concept
EvSC provides one of the first instances of the reductionist strategy in the
biological literature. Simpson’s idea was to supplement Mayr’s version of the
BSC with an evolutionary criterion, one which he thought was already implicit
in Mayr’s formulation. This criterion then would make a species “a phyletic
lineage (ancestral-descendent sequence of interbreeding populations) evolving
independently of others, with its own separate and unitary evolutionary role
and tendencies” (1951, 289). In the more recent and frequently cited definition
he drops the explicit mention of interbreeding, making the evolutionary species
concept even more general:
(EvSC) A species is “a lineage (an ancestral-descendant sequence
of populations) evolving separately from others and with its own
unitary evolutionary role and tendencies” (Simpson, 1961, 153).
Simpson wanted to take interbreeding as only one factor to consider in recog-
nizing something as a species. Thus, he is reducing theBSC to the EvSC. The
move to reduce species concepts has metamorphosed in recent years. There
have been attempts to develop a hierarchy of species concepts that all reduce
to a form of Simpson’s EvSC. On this view the EvSC is the species con-
cept to which all other are concepts are mere operational variants. This view
treads very close to species pluralism (especially evolutionary species plural-
ism) (Mayden, 1997, 1999; de Queiroz, 1999; Shun-Ichiro, 2011; Kendig, 2014).
I deal with this in more detail in my second chapter. The point here is that the
reductionist strategy still preserves some of the virtues of competing species
concepts, but attempts to show that there is something more basic, further
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from the ’operational’ level, the level at which the BSC operates in connection
with other operational concepts. The EvSC, on the other hand, is guiding all,
or at least some of the available species concepts from the ‘theoretical’ level.
Michael Ruse’s consilience approach to the species problem attempts to
combine species concepts. Ruse’s approach stems from considering how mul-
tiple species concepts can be used to delineate one equi-inclusive group. On
his view, only when there’s a correspondence between reproductive groups and
morphological groups do we think that the species picked out by the BSC is
real (Ruse, 1971, 369). Consider the most famous statement of his consilience
view of species: “There are different ways of breaking organisms into groups,
and they coincide! The genetic species is the morphological species is the re-
productively isolated species is the group with common ancestor” (Ruse, 1987,
238).7 In a response that captures many general sentiments about Ruse’s sug-
gestion, Ereshefsky has said “It would be wonderful if these different types of
groups did coincide, but they do not” (2014a, 74). As already stated, there
is just too much cross-classification occurring between competing species con-
cepts for Ruse’s hope to be realistic. It’s true that there may often be a
correspondence between morphological and reproductive groups, but one may
respond to Ruse by considering, for example, the notion of a cryptic species.
Cryptic species are usually a temporary stage in speciation. A cryptic species
contains separate types of organisms that cannot interbreed, for whatever rea-
son, but all of the members of the cryptic species are individuals that are
morphologically identical to each other. According to the BSC there are in
fact two different species, because reproductive criteria are more fundamen-
tal to the nature of species than distinctive morphological traits. Due to the
fact that there are so many outliers, so many cases where the different species
concepts do not line-up, there does not seem to be a good reason to adopt
Ruse’s strategy. Despite these worries, Ruse’s take on the monist reductionist
strategy has some merit. Biologists often use more than one concept when
analyzing a particular group. For a discussion of species pluralism to be com-
plete, one must take the sophisticated ways that multiple species concepts are
7See also Ruse (1969, 111-112) and (1988, 54-55).
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applied in different contexts into account. I will return to this topic of appli-
cation in more detail in Chapter 5 when I consider the ways in which some
yeast taxonomists apply species concepts.
The combinatorial strategy need not work in isolation from the reductionist
strategy. Mayden (1997) for example, while attempting a ‘theoretical’ reduc-
tion to a slightly different formulation of Simpson’s EvSC shows how many
of the available ‘operational’ concepts amount to the same thing. That is,
even though there are over twenty different species concepts, Mayden argues
that many of them are synonymous. This might not give us monism, but it
will at least make species pluralism more constrained. Further, if the reduc-
tionist or combinatorial strategies fail, the monist may still avail herself of
her imagination and create a new species concept. Every few years the to-
tal count of species concepts seems to increase in the biological community,
with some species concepts even being developed by philosophers, e.g., the
synapomorphic species concept of Wilkins (2003).
These are then the strategies for the monist. The pluralist may avail herself
of bits and pieces of these strategies, but must be ready to graciously accept
defeat at the hands of the world. The trick is to know when, where and
why one must accept defeat. Pluralists want to have constraints on species
concepts, but these need to be objective, well grounded, and there must be a
legitimate purpose put to their use. Species pluralism, as I show in my second
chapter, is just as multifarious as species monism, but in different ways. There
is a plurality of ways of being a species pluralist.
1.5 Ontological Pluralism
Before we conclude this chapter I want to briefly touch upon a further form of
pluralism that is relevant, related, but distinct from pluralism about species
concepts: ontological pluralism. So far what we’ve discussed only directly per-
tains to resolving the the so-called species category problem, ontological plu-
ralism pertains to the species taxon problem. Species taxa are again whatever
individual species names refer to (e.g., Escherichia coli, Poecile atricapillus,
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Beroe compacta, etc.,). When it comes to discussing species taxa from a philo-
sophical point of view, this is where the question of realism most obviously
comes into play. Are species real or are they just convenient ways of classifying
organisms for purposes? If they are real, then what sort of ontological status
do they have? This is the species taxon problem.
Many different answers have been proposed to this second question. The so-
called traditional, or pre-Darwinian answer is that species are natural, rather
than artificial, kinds with fixed unchanging essences. The so-called received,
or post-Darwinian answer is that species are spatio-temporally restricted indi-
viduals with organisms for parts. In recent years many more different realist
views of species have developed, some in the wake of species pluralism.
In this thesis I will not be directly engaging in the topic of species realism,
which, as I understand it, pertains to the species taxon problem, though I deal
with this problem in Chapter 4. As I show throughout this thesis, there are
other realism related issues at play in that do not pertain to that problem. I
will question whether or not a further plurality of ontological frameworks is re-
quired for species pluralism. My view is that if one accepts a certain theoretical
unity to biology, but also accepts a certain kind of species pluralism, then one
does not require a plurality of ontological frameworks. However, if one does
not accept a certain theoretical unity to biology, but accepts a different sort of
species pluralism, then one does require a plurality of ontological frameworks.
The former sort I call evolutionary, the latter sort I call extra-evolutionary
species pluralism. These two types of pluralism are further distinguished in
Chapter 3.
1.6 Chapter Synopsis
In Chapter 2, ‘Aristotelian Species Pluralism,’ I deal with the following prob-
lem: Why has pluralism only recently been considered as a framework for
systematic biology? I show how an Aristotelian species concept was used as
a foil in part of a rhetorical strategy developed by Ernst Mayr (1940; 1942;
1957; 1963). With the prevalence of this strategy in subsequent disputes about
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species, many were too distracted by the essentialist witch-hunt that ensued
to notice whether or not anything was wrong with the assumption of monism.
The essentialism story that Mayr’s rhetorical strategy was built upon is incor-
rect, but has framed the way species concepts have been introduced in biology.
I show that we can still use Aristotle’s account of species as a foil, but as a foil
for current accounts of species pluralism given a pluralist reading of Aristotle.
Aristotelian science allows for a pluralistic approach to classification (Henry,
2011, 2014; Leunissen, 2014). From this perspective we can use Aristotle’s ap-
proach to help better understand four issues at stake between modern species
pluralists. First, pluralists need to consider the explanatory power of all tax-
onomic ranks. For Aristotle species are not necessarily the basal taxonomic
units. Modern pluralists generally do hold that they are, even if there are
different ways of conceiving of them (e.g., Mishler and Donoghue, 1982). An-
other way of saying this is that Aristotle has no fixed ranks, but since Linnaeus
there is generally a fixed hierarchy of ranks in taxonomy. Second, pluralists
must reconsider the significance of the species category in light of Aristotle’s
lack of explicit concern for providing a unitary definition of it. Third, plu-
ralists ought to consider whether intrinsic, rather than relational or historical
properties, are required to group and rank species. Modern pluralists remain
divided on this (e.g., Kitcher, 1984b; Ereshefsky, 2014b), and Aristotle gives
us a valuable means of comparison. Lastly, Aristotle can help us interpret
the “cross-cutting” metaphor endemic to the pluralist literature (e.g., Dupré,
1999; Ereshefsky, 2001). For species pluralists to truly disabuse us of our un-
warranted monistic assumptions, the essentialist story needs to be rewritten
with these four issues in mind.
In Chapter 3 ‘(Extra-)Evolutionary Species Pluralism’ I deal with the fol-
lowing problem: What sorts of arguments are there for being a species plural-
ist, and how do these arguments affect the form that species pluralism takes? I
distinguish two main types of species pluralism, and discern three implications
that follow from them. I first distinguish evolutionary from extra-evolutionary
species pluralism. The debate amongst pluralists is about whether evolution-
ary theory alone ought to dictate which conceptions of species are legitimate,
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and how we ought to interpret the relationship between biological theory and
the different species concepts. Ereshefsky’s (2001) account best showcases
what I mean by evolutionary species pluralism by grounding pluralism in the
various cross-cutting forces of evolution. Comparing his view with similar ar-
guments (Mishler and Donoghue, 1982; Mishler and Brandon, 1987; de Queiroz
and Donoghue, 1988) shows a range of interpretations of the role evolutionary
theory ought to play in grounding species pluralism. Dupré’s (1993) ‘promis-
cuous realism’ best shows what I mean by extra-evolutionary species pluralism,
by grounding species pluralism in the disunity of biology. Comparing his view
with Kitcher’s (1984b; 1984a; 1989), I argue that Dupré (1981; 1999) fills in the
needed theoretical support that Kitcher’s lacks. Following this analysis, I ex-
amine both forms of species pluralism with respect to three main implications:
(1) the nature of the species category; (2) (in-)admissible species concepts; (3)
the nature of the “cross-cutting” kinds. Much has been written about plural-
ism and the species category, but I argue that determining the implications
species pluralism has for the species category is only a first step toward devel-
oping a discerning species pluralism. The latter two implications make species
pluralism a worthwhile contribution to systematic biology. I classify plural-
ists systematically and show how they have failed to resolve their views with
respect to these two implications, and close by making some suggestions for
how pluralists might make good on these ontological commitments.
In the fourth chapter ‘Ontological Frameworks for Species Pluralism’ I deal
with the following problem: What sort of ontological framework(s) do different
forms of species pluralism require? Debates about what species are have also
been framed by monistic assumptions. Many different ontological frameworks
have been developed to explicate the nature of species taxa: (1) species as
individuals (Ghiselin, 1974; Hull, 1976), (2) species as natural kinds (Boyd,
1999a,b), (3) some mixture of both (Griffiths 1999; Millikan, 1999; Rieppel,
2013), (4) species as plural particulars (Slater, 2013; Simons, 2013), (5) species
as sets (Kitcher, 1984a,b; Valen, 1988), or (6) species as processes (Rieppel,
2009; Dupré, 2012). Most have assumed that only one ontological framework
will be correct. Contrary to this assumption, I argue that the debate is not
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about what species are, but about which properties are more important for
grouping species taxa (historical or intrinsic). On the account I develop, some
species taxa may belong to different ontological categories. Different proper-
ties, historical or intrinsic, can be more important in certain cases than they
are in others. Determining which species require which ontological category
is partly empirical, and requires determining the role evolution plays on a
group-by-group basis. Pluralism is compatible with almost any view of what
species are, but “there may be more than one.” However, in order to be dis-
tinct from relativism, pluralism must be tied to biological theory. I show that
evolutionary species pluralists favour ontological frameworks which are bet-
ter suited to capturing historical properties (e.g., Ereshefsky, 2001; Wilkins,
2003), and that extra-evolutionary species pluralists will need frameworks that
can capture intrinsic properties (e.g., Dupré, 2001).
In my final chapter ‘Species Concepts as Tools’ I deal with the follow-
ing problem: What does species pluralism imply about how we use species
concepts? I sharpen modern accounts of species pluralism by exploring the
‘species concepts as tools’ metaphor on the basis of a case study in yeast sys-
tematics. Yeast systematics provides many examples where multiple species
concepts are used together. This is important because many species plural-
ists assume that each species concept should be used separately. That is,
that there is still a one-to-one correspondence between successful applications
of species concepts and species. The case study shows that there can be a
many-to-one correspondence between species concepts and species, and that
this doesn’t necessarily imply species monism. Generalizing from this case, I
explain how the ‘species concepts as tools’ metaphor can be used to develop
a rationale for determining when a concept is being used appropriately within
a pluralistic framework by applying Waters’ (2011) account of ‘Toolbox The-
orizing.’ Waters’ distinguishes between two sorts of realists: fundamentalists
and toolbox theorists. For fundamentalists the world is made up of natural
kinds of processes, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between a token
process and its true model. For toolbox theorists there is a possibly messy
world - for a given token process, some concepts and models might be useful
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for constructing correct accounts of some aspects of this process, others for
other aspects. Species pluralism if understood along these lines can not only
make sense of the way species concepts are used, but can be developed to aid




Linnaeus and Cuvier have been
my two gods, though in very
different ways, but they were
mere schoolboys to old Aristotle.
Darwin (1882) to Ogle, on the
publication of his translation of
Aristotle’s Parts of Animals.
2.1 Introduction
Species pluralism allows for multiple species concepts. Given the overwhelming
number of such concepts (cf. Mayden, 1997; Wilkins, 2011), this seems like
an obvious interpretation of how ‘species’ is used in contemporary biology.
But why has it taken so long for this approach to be considered? I argue
that part of the reason pluralism was overlooked due to the widespread use
of a particular rhetorical strategy developed by Ernst Mayr. This strategy
provided a framework for debates about the correct conception of species.
That is, the strategy offered a means of comparing modern concepts with a
monistic-essentialist understanding of species. I ask what would happen if we
replaced this concept with Aristotle’s own pluralist-essentialist understanding
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of species. As recent scholarship shows, Aristotle’s philosophy of biology allows
for an approach to classification that is in practice highly pluralistic (Henry,
2011, 2014; Leunissen, 2014). From this new perspective we can understand
what sort of assumptions are at stake when it comes to modern forms of species
pluralism. My analysis shows that the essentialist story told by Mayr and
others left us asking the wrong questions about how to conceive of species in an
evolutionary world. Having a deeper understanding of Aristotle’s approach to
the classification of animals allows us to shift focus from the so-called species
problem in order to raise four issues that are relevant to current debates.
These are questions about: (1) the explanatory power of taxonomic ranks,
(2) the importance of the species category problem, (3) whether species are
constituted by intrinsic or extrinsic properties, and (4) how to interpret the
“cross-cutting” metaphor endemic to the pluralist literature. In order to get to
these questions, I will first explain what sort of claim species pluralism is at the
most general level, and motivate this chapter by showing how I’m enhancing
the standard interpretation of the historical shift from speci es monism to
species pluralism.
2.2 From Species Monism to Species Pluralism
The distinction between species monism and species pluralism suggests they
are contrary views. Thus, a first pass would designate species pluralism as:
(SP*) There is no singular, unified way of grouping organisms into
species
Pluralism allows for multiple, non-unified systems of classification. Monism
allows for only one true system and only one true species concept.1 Pluralism
allows for many species concepts. Holding either view dictates the way we
argue about species concepts. Monists seek general and unified criteria for
ruling out false concepts. Pluralists maintain that these criteria are too strict,
because they weed out concepts we ought to retain.
1See Sterelny (1999); Brogaard (2004); Henry (2011).
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Some worry that pluralism is dangerously close to relativism (e.g., Hull,
1999). A relativist would deny that there are principled and objective con-
straints on species concepts. If humans were to categorize species by how
they taste, or by how cute they are, then this would be a legitimate concept.
Denying relativism suggests a second pass at capturing species pluralism:
(SP) The world is such that there is no singular, unified way of
grouping organisms into species
Pluralism requires constraints on which species concepts are admissible. This
must be a claim about why the world is the way it is, which must be supported
by our best biological theory.
Two prima facie and interrelated reasons for the shift from species monism
toward species pluralism in and around the beginning of the 1980s suggest
themselves. First, species pluralism is a consequence of the rise of pluralism
in philosophy of science. Pluralism in philosophy of science is relatively re-
cent, and is partly due to concerns about the feasibility of reductionism and
unification (Suppes, 1978; Dupré, 1993). The true reasons why pluralism has
become fashionable are not important here, for this is a very complicated story.
What is important though is that it is not always clear at a global level what
pluralists are being pluralist about, whether it’s about explanation, causation,
theories, concepts, models, or some further thing. This Chapter will make im-
portant steps towards clarifying these difficult issues. However the way many
have understood pluralism at the global level has ridden on the backs of lo-
cal, empirical, investigations of pluralism (Kellert et al., 2006). Arguments for
pluralist approaches to explanations of sex (Fehr, 2001, 2006), pluralist inter-
pretations of behaviour (Longino, 2005, 2006, 2013), pluralist interpretations
of how “concept” is used in psychology (Machery, 2009), etc., have also lent
credibility to arguments for species pluralism.
Second, theorizing about species has reached conceptual overload. Monism
makes more sense when there’s only a small handful of competing species
concepts, but when the number of concepts keeps increasing (cf. Mayden, 1997;
Wilkins, 2011) there is eventually a point where pluralism becomes a more
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reasonable view. This of course isn’t itself a great argument for pluralism. A
monist has many reasons to retain their position even in the light of conceptual
pluralism. However, conceptual overload may still be part of the explanation
for why species pluralism has become a more fashionable approach to dealing
with conceptual pluralism. But, as I will now show, despite there being more
species concepts today than there were during the time of the New Synthesis
in the earlier part of the twentieth century, there was still a significant amount
of conceptual tension and conflict then.
Species monism was not questioned during the New Synthesis (e.g., Dobzhan-
sky, 1935; Mayr, 1940; Simpson, 1951), which marks the first period where
biologists were offering and debating explicit definitions of “species” as a theo-
retical entity in evolutionary biology. However, at this time it was recognized
that a monistic classification had problems: “No system of nomenclature and
no hierarchy of systematic categories is able to represent adequately the com-
plicated set of interrelationships and divergences found in nature” (Mayr, 1942,
103). This conflicted with the desideratum that a species concept should be
universalizable and general. Holding onto monism in light of these conflicts in-
volved what some have interpreted as ad hoc manoeuvres sensu Popper (e.g.,
Stanford, 1995, 76-77). One may wish to reserve one concept for ‘species,’
and have other concepts for other important biological groups. For instance,
if we favoured a concept that requires sexual reproduction and interbreeding,
then asexual organisms that reproduce by budding, binary fission, vegetative
reproduction and the like will fail to form species. Many argued just this (e.g.,
Dobzhansky, 1935, 355), and continued to argue this (e.g., Mayr, 1987). Some
have even claimed that species produced through polyploidy “have all the ear-
marks of blind alleys of evolution” (1942, 191), and some have even claimed
that asexual groups are rare in comparison with sexual groups (Mayr, 1942).
The majority of life on Earth, both in terms of the number of organisms and
the percentage of biomass, is asexual (Hull, 1988, 429).2
While some were depriving asexual organisms rights to full species-hood,
others were developing terms like ‘agamospecies’ (Cain, 1954) and ‘uniparental
2See also Templeton (1989).
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species’ (DeBach, 1969) to aid in grouping asexual organisms. These were only
pseudo-species concepts. Today many people think differently about asexual
organisms, because we now have a better understanding of the continuum
between asexual and sexual organisms, and we have reflected on the fact that
sex itself is an evolved trait. Considerations like this have lead us to restore
asexual organisms’s full rights to species-hood. But it is important to note
that this restoration has been achieved partly through the influence of species
pluralism (e.g., Wilkins, 2003).
But why not consider pluralism, rather than seeking a unified definition
of the species category? The conceptual overload story suggests a reason why
pluralism took so long to develop. Up until around thirty years ago, there
weren’t enough species concepts on hand for pluralism to be considered. The
development of pluralism in philosophy of science is certainly far more com-
plicated than I have presented it here, and though pluralism of one sort or
another can be traced back at least as far as the Vienna Circle and its crit-
ics, much of that approach to philosophy of science has taken a long while to
trickle down to debates in biology itself. However, since there are longstanding
ways of arguing that certain concepts are not real species concepts, perhaps
neither the conceptual overload story, nor the top down story from general
scientific pluralism are the whole story behind the rise of species pluralism.
There may also have been deeper reasons for holding on to species monism.
Biologists may have assumed that “species” designates a natural kind, and as
such there must be one true species concept. Though we will touch on part
of this ontological problem now, a fuller treatment will be put aside until the
fourth chapter where we consider species pluralism and the ontological status
of species.
2.3 The Rhetorical Strategy
A monist needs reasons that favour one concept. This often involves a critique
of the competition: and through critique and comparison between different
species concepts what is better on some grounds often slips into what is best
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overall 3. Mayr’s strategy was built upon a complicated and deeply misleading
story about how Aristotelian biology and evolutionary biology conflict at an
ontological level. Winsor (2003; 2006) has dubbed this story “the essentialism
story,” which she argues was developed by Mayr (e.g., 1969a), Cain (1958)
and Hull (1965a; 1965b).4 I will only focus on Mayr, because his version of
the story has set the standards for how leading biologists debate about species
concepts.
According to the story, after Darwin’s development of evolutionary theory,
species essentialism became untenable. Essentialism is roughly understood as
the view that species have fixed, distinct and unchanging essences that all and
only the members of a particular species partake in. In most versions of the
story essentialism is not clearly understood, but the point is that essences make
evolution impossible. Darwin’s work was not just to revolutionize biological
theory, but to revolutionize the very way that we conceive of species at an
ontological level. Many believe that essentialism forestalled the development
of evolutionary theory nascent in pre-Socratic biology (Simpson, 1961; Mayr,
1963; Ghiselin, 1969; Dobzhansky, 1970). Others have blamed the Aristotelian
method of definition (Popper, 1966; Hull, 1965a), or method of logical division
(Cain, 1958; Winsor, 2001). The evolutionary shift requires giving up species
essentialism, and calls out for a conception of species that allows us to keep
species real, but one that fits with the intrinsic variation demanded by evolu-
tionary theory. I’ll now show how this story provided a framework or set of
assumptions for arguing about species.
Consider the different species concepts as falling upon a line. At one end
of the line we have an essentialist species concept. Different species concepts
are placed in degrees of closeness to the essentialist species concept. An essen-
tialist concept requires a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for species
membership. On the line, species concepts would be closer to an essentialist
concept the less they modify the way a species is defined from the essentialist
3See Cracraft (2000) for an important discussion of this problem about rhetorical uses
of language in species concept debates
4But see Stamos (2005) for some problems with Winsor’s account.
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starting point. For example, an ostensively defined species (a species defined
in reference to a type, or exemplar organism) might be considered further from
essentialism than a species defined by a disjunctive definition (a species de-
fined as satisfying either this or that set of properties). If an essentialist species
concept requires that we specify a set of typical phenotypic properties, then
the more a species concept makes use of these sorts of properties the closer it
is to essentialism. There may be differing and competing orderings of species
concepts as based on different understandings of essentialism, but that there is
some single correct ordering is taken for granted. The reason I’m calling this
a rhetorical strategy, rather than Mayr’s argument, is that many other people
have picked up a similar way of arguing to Mayr, but have substituted their
preferred concept for his BSC.
Mayr’s distinction between population (non-essentialist, post-Darwinian)
and typology (essentialist, pre-Darwinian) thinking formed a basis for his re-
productively based species concept, and is one of the most common ways that
essentialism is still understood to this day in biology. On Mayr’s account,
population thinking concerns relating organisms to populations, whereas ty-
pology thinking is about relating organisms to types. According to population
thinking, an organism belongs to a certain species in virtue of it participating
in a certain population structure (gene flow) with other organisms. Accord-
ing to typology thinking, an organism belongs to a certain species in virtue
of it sharing the relevant sort of intrinsic properties with its exemplary type.
There is much to be said about the value of this distinction (e.g., Sober, 1980;
Chung, 2003), but for our purposes it is more important to focus on how ty-
pological thinking translates into a definition of what a species is. Typological
species concepts were based on species having essential properties. Though
it is rare to find an explicit formulation, one can state that the “typological
species concept,” Mayr later formulates it as follows:
(TSC) ‘A typological species is an entity that differs from other
species by constant diagnostic differences, but it is subjective what
one may consider a diagnostic difference. The so-called typolog-
ical species concept is simply a biologically arbitrary means for
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delimiting species taxa” (Mayr, 1982, 176).5
Whether or not anyone actually held a TSC, Mayr (e.g., 1996, 269-270) argues
that it fails for at least the following three reasons. First, because of polymor-
phism within populations (e.g., light and dark-morphs of the jaguar [Panthera
onca]). Second, because of geographic variation within species. Third, be-
cause of ‘sibling’ or ‘cryptic’ species: species with the same phenotype, but
different reproductive capacities or genetic difference (e.g., recent DNA anal-
ysis the Two-barred Flasher butterfly [Astraptes fulgerator ]). This story of
how the TSC fails in the light of such and similar reasons is quite common
in much of the introductory systematic literature even today (Winsor, 2006).
Following this, Mayr then sets up the biological species concept (BSC) as
the non-essentialist, post-Darwinian species concept that can account for the
failures of TSC, which he formulates as follows:
(BSC) “species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding
natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from other
such groups” (Mayr, 1942).
The BSC is better, because it can be used in explaining why there is a real
boundary between species when the TSC cannot. To a certain extent poly-
morphic species, species with geographic differences, and cryptic species can
be further understood by considering the reproductive, and thereby genetic
connections that exist between them. Many people who do not adhere to the
BSC will still set the problem of finding a post-Darwinian species concept in
this very same way.
A further aspect of this strategy is to argue that any species concept that
resembled a TSC can, and should be ruled out. A phenetic species concept,
that uses an analysis of overall similarity, rather than the more constrained set
of diagnostic features required by the TSC, fails for the same three reasons
the TSC fails, and so we can label it “typological.” This is definitely an
oversimplification, but it shows the general structure of the species concept
dialectic.
5See Mayr (2000) and Lennox (2001).
29
In sum, on Mayr’s understanding, essentialism and monism were linked,
and with the widespread adoption of his strategy, many were too distracted
by the essentialist witch-hunt to notice whether or not anything was wrong
with monism. I will now explicate Aristotle’s account of species, in order to
show how we should interpret species in a pluralistic context.
2.4 Aristotelian Species Pluralism
Traditionally Aristotle is viewed as an essentialist species monist. On this
view, Aristotle would allow for only discrete, non-overlapping natural kinds.
However, a close examination of the ways he carves up animals into kinds
makes pluralism a more likely interpretation. Aristotle offers multiple, over-
lapping classifications of animals. Each classification he offers appears useful
for understanding some causal aspect of the animal world. Single organisms
are often described along multiple lines. Henry’s (2011; 2014) recent work
on Aristotle, following Pellegrin (1982), shows that essentialism and monism
about species are not necessarily connected, despite what Mayr’s essentialism
story indicates (see also Balme, 1962; Lennox, 2001). In this section I will
show why that is the case through a brief explication of Aristotle’s approach
to classification.
First, Aristotle has two relative terms for natural kinds: εἰδός and γένος.
They have standardly been translated as ‘species’ (εἰδός) and ‘genus’ (γένος)
via the Latin, into English. When applied to a group of animals, an εἰδός is
almost always some further specification of a γένος, and a γένος isn’t what it
is without having different εἰδή (Metaph. ζ. 12: 1036a6-9).6 Both terms are
used at all levels of biological organization, and a particular γένοςmay be itself
an εἰδός of some higher order γένος. Since these terms do not indicate fixed
ranks in a hierarchy in the way that genus and species do for post-Linnaeans,
recent Aristotelian scholars have offered ‘form’ (εἰδός) and ‘kind’ (γένος) as
more appropriate equivalents (Lennox, 2001). I will follow this translation of




Second, Aristotle seeks definitions of kinds and forms at various levels of
generality, but explanations must be at the right level. For example, the reason
an isosceles triangle’s interior angles are equal to two right angles, is because
isosceles triangle belongs to the kind triangle, not because having interior
angles equal to two right angles belongs to the kind isosceles triangle. The
isosceles triangle is a form of triangle, and many of the properties isosceles
triangles have, they have because of belonging to the kind we call ‘triangle.’
In the biological case Aristotle presents an aporia. He asks about the proper
level at which an investigation should be organized. Should we either start with
each substantial being on its own, and by this he seems to mean something
like the infimae species or ἄτομα εἰδή (indivisible species), or should we start
with the more general kinds first (PA I. 1 639a15-19)?7 Though the answer
Aristotle seems to give is that it depends on what we hope to achieve.
Further, even if we lack a name for a kind we still need to seek the right level
for the explanation. Aristotle gives an example that involves considering how
proportion (or ratio) alternates in the same way for numbers, lines, solids, and
times (APo. Α. 5 74a19-25). Though we didn’t see the commonality between
these four kinds of things at first, as we investigated ratio we came to recognize
this new real kind: ‘proportionate things.’ In the biological case, Aristotle was
willing to invent new kind terms (e.g., ‘cephalopods,’ ‘selachians,’ ‘entoma’),
if they revealed the common nature that pertained to such organisms.
According to Aristotle, we get at the nature of a kind by acquiring a defini-
tion of it. Definitions are reached through division. Aristotle takes great pains
to show why Plato’s method for seeking definition through bifurcating division
(e.g., in the Sophist), which separates kinds by means of a single difference,
fails to uncover true kinds. Aristotle urges that we ought to group important
forms together with their respective kinds, and that bifurcating division “tears
kinds apart,” because there cannot be many differences under a single dichoto-
mous division (PA. 1 3 644a1-11). For example, there are many distinct forms
of bird and fish, and we ought to follow the common people, and recognize
7cf. APo. Β 13 98a1-19.
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birds and fish as genuine kinds of animals (PA I. 3 6439-16). Though some
birds are water-dwellers, and being a water-dweller can explain some things
about those birds, we would lose something if we failed to recognize birds as
its own kind. Nor should we combine water-dwellers and flying animals into
one kind, because some water-dwellers are not birds. For Aristotle, the true
mark of a natural kind is that it differs by degree and what he calls “the-more-
and-the-less” (Lennox, 1980, 2001; Henry, 2014). Bird forms differ by degree
because they either have short or long feathers (PA IV. 12. 692b3-9), whereas
birds and fish differ from each other by analogy because one has feathers and
one has scales to fulfill analogous functions (PA I. 4. 644a12-23) (cf. Lennox,
2001). On Henry’s reading of Aristotle “a genuine kind is a group of individ-
uals sharing a “common nature” . . . a nexus of correlations underwritten by a
set of causally basic features (the kind’s real essence)” (2011, 201). There is
something causally basic about being a bird that causes birds to have things
like feathers and beaks that differ in different environments, which are there
used for different purposes.
According to Henry, Aristotle offers a realist and pluralistic, cross-cutting
approach to classification (2011, 200).8 At the core of each ‘cross-cutting’
kind, there is an essence, which corresponds to a cause (aitia) (2011, 201).
He presents two reasons for viewing Aristotle as a pluralist about biological
kinds. The first involves considering the relationship between Aristotle’s four
different major divisions of animals: by mode of reproduction, locomotion,
mode of cooling, and the Greatest Kinds. The second involves the ‘dualizers’
(ἐpiαμφοτερεῖς), organisms that straddle different forms. Both show that Aris-
totle is open to cross-cutting classifications of organisms, and that he is thus a
pluralist. The first example shows this with respect to kinds, and the second
with respect to forms themselves.
8There is some debate on how to understand Aristotle’s biological classification (Balme,
1962; Balme, 1987; Pellegrin, 1982; Lennox, 2001). Henry understands ‘classification’ as
‘the systematic arrangement of organisms into a hierarchy of kinds on the basis of shared
similarities and differences.’ If that’s all we mean, surely Aristotle classifies animals. Other
interpreters think that a classification of animals must be in some sense universal, and
monistic in nature, but this assumption is certainly imposed upon our reading of Aristotle.
32
The first division is by mode of reproduction: live-bearers, egg-layers, larva-
producers, and animals that are spontaneously generated (GA II. 1, 732a26-
733a1). This classifies lizards, turtles, fish, birds and snakes as egg-layers;
cetaceans, humans, elephants, and bats together as live-bearers; some of the
insects as larva-producers; some of the insects and some of the testacea as
spontaneously generated animals. The second division is by mode of locomo-
tion (IA; HA I 1, 5). First, by their type of locomotion (IA III): jumpers,
walkers, swimmers and fliers (HA I 1, 487b14-32; GA I 1, 715a28; III 1,
749a15). Lizards, turtles, humans, elephants, and crabs are classified as walk-
ers; cetaceans, fish, water snakes, and crustaceans as swimmers; birds, bats,
and (some) insects as fliers. Second, by the parts used for locomotion: bipeds,
quadrupeds, polypods, and footless animals. This classifies birds and hu-
mans as bipeds; elephants, lions, lizards and crocodiles as quadrupeds; in-
sects as polypods; cetaceans, fish and snakes as footless animals. The third
division is by means of their mode of cooling (On Resp): lung-possessors,
gill-possessors, and membrane-possessors. This gives us cetaceans, lizards,
humans, and birds as lung-possessors; fish, cephalopods, and other marine
animals as gill-possessors; insects as membrane possessors.
These different divisions cross-classify one another. None of differentiae
of one division explain those of the other (GA II 1, 732b15-27). Having a
certain number of feet doesn’t help explain how an animal reproduces. What
explains reproduction is the material nature of the organism. Live-bearers
are hot and moist, and egg-bearers are cold and dry. Mode of reproduction
also cuts across the division Aristotle makes according to an animal’s type of
locomotion and the division by an animal’s mode of cooling. The egg-layers
and live-bearers cross-cut the lung-bearers and gill possessors. Some egg-layers
are lung-possessors (e.g., birds, lizards, turtles, all snakes except the viper), but
some are gill-possessors (e.g., bony fish). Some live-bearers are lung-possessors
(e.g., humans, cetaceans, horses, vipers), but some are gill-possessors (e.g.,
some sharks and rays). Mode of cooling cuts across the parts an animal uses
for locomotion (On Resp. 476a5). The lung-possessors cut across the different
divisions according to parts used for locomotion. Some lung-possessors are
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bipeds (humans and birds), some are quadrupeds (e.g. horses, oxen), but some
are footless (e.g. whales and dolphins). Some gill-possessors are footless (e.g.,
fish), but some are quadrupeds (e.g. the water newt). The four divisions also
cut across the Great Kinds: the blooded animals: birds, fish, cetaceans, and
the bloodless animals: the hard-shelled animals, soft-shelled animals, mollusks,
and insects. Thus, Aristotle has no single unified classificatory scheme of
animals.
The second reason for viewing Aristotle as a pluralist concerns his treat-
ment of the ἐpiαμφοτερεῖς (‘dualizers’). For these animals more than one form
is needed to explain why a particular organism is the way it is. The ἐpiαμ-
φοτερεῖς show how even the bottommost forms (the infimae species) can, in
some cases, cross-cut one another at the organismal level. I will discuss the
following examples of animal forms that fall into this category: the Libyan
ostrich, ape, seal, and bat.
First, the Libyan ostrich. This animal is both a bird (its lower parts are
covered in feathers and it’s two-footed) and a live-bearing quadruped (its upper
parts are covered in hair and it’s hoofed) (PA IV 14, 697b13–28). It doesn’t fly,
and its feathers are not useful for flight. Aristotle calls these feathers “hair-like”
(τριχώδη). The general size of the animal corresponds to that of a quadruped,
and this is partly why it doesn’t fly. Second, apes, monkeys, and baboons
can be classified both as bipeds (human-like) and as quadrupeds, since they
share in the essential properties of both kinds (HA II 8-9. 502a16–24). The
ape is both a biped and a quadruped: “The ape, because it is intermediate
between the two (ἐpiαμφοτερίζειν) with respect to its form, and because it
is neither and both, has neither a tail nor haunches: as a biped it lacks a
tail, and as a quadruped it lacks haunches” (PA IV 10, 689b32–4). This
explains why apes have hairy bellies and backs. Third, consider seals and
bats (PA IV 13, 697b1-12). Seals are both land-dwellers and water-dwellers
(the same for the cetaceans), because they have feet and fins (and their teeth
are razor sharp). Bats are both flyers and land-dwellers, because they have
feet, but lack tail and rump, and they lack tails because they are flyers, and
have no rump because they are land-dwellers. Bats are membranous-winged,
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and nothing has a rump unless it is split-feathered. Being split-feathered is
what causes certain organisms to have rumps. Clearly, by his treatment of
the ἐpiαμφοτερεῖς, Aristotle takes a pluralistic approach, and recognizes that in
some cases multiple classification schemes are required to explain the features
of one organism.
In sum, these two sorts of cases, the higher order kinds, and the ἐpiαμφοτε-
ρεῖς (‘dualizers’) clearly show Aristotle’s pluralism at work. However, before
I conclude this section, there are a couple of concerns to flag, because they
call into the question the relationship between reading Aristotle as a plural-
ist and accepting his doctrine of essentialism. I will suggest that Aristotle’s
approach can help us understand what is at stake between modern forms of
species pluralism.
First, one might worry that this reading will lead us to the view that a
particular organism may have more than one essence. Henry argues that a
particular kind (or form) on this account will still have only one essence: “The
single essence of the Libyan ostrich will thus be defined by a single complex
of multiple attributes, some of which are characteristic of birds and others
characteristic of quadrupeds” (2011, 206). On this reading of Aristotle, the
essences just are in the individual organisms and nowhere else. If this is correct,
it still remains to spell out in more detail how Aristotelian kinds cross-cut the
world, and not just each other. This is important to work out, because many
scholars that want to bring Aristotle back into modern biology argue that he is
not building a taxonomy, though they have a certain monistic understanding
of taxonomy and classification (Walsh, 2006; Witt, 2011) I will gesture towards
one way of working this out in the final section of this Chapter.
A second worry concerns how Aristotle held two seemingly opposed views.
First, the view that forms of a kind differ only in the relative magnitudes
of their structures (PA IV.5.681a12-15; HA VIII.1.5888b4-22). Second, that
there are complete discontinuities between one form or kind and all others.
Lennox’s solution to this problem hinges on how we understand ‘the more and
the less.’ His position is that: “For two individuals to differ in degree, they
must both be the same general sort of thing. With respect to that sort they do
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not differ in degree. But the general sort is constituted of features with range
– any sub-kind may have these features exemplified by different specifications
of that range” (Lennox, 2001, 167). This solution seems to involve being
careful about the level of differentiation Aristotle is talking about when he
uses ‘the more and the less.’ Thus, we must ask if he’s talking about some
individual black-capped Chickadee as some form of bird, or as belonging to
the kind bird. Henry’s (2014) alternative solution to this problem focuses on
Aristotle’s conception of analogy. On this reading, kinds are distinct because
they have parts that fulfil analogous roles (e.g., birds and fish are distinct
because one has feathers while the other has scales). Now, whichever solution
to this problem we opt for, we get a clearer understanding of how Aristotle’s
hierarchy of kinds works, which is further complicated by his use of only two
relational terms ‘form’ and ‘kind,’ as discussed above. This issue has some
bearing on the explanatory nature of higher taxa, which I will raise in its
proper context in the following section.
2.5 Rethinking the Rhetorical Strategy
I have argued that Mayr’s strategy allowed for the use of a particular un-
derstanding of an essentialist species concept to shape disputes about post-
Darwinian species concepts. This still shapes the way species concepts are
introduced today. In order for species pluralism to truly supplant monism we
need to update our foil from the naive traditional to a comparison with the
rich and sophisticated ways Aristotle treats species. Pluralists can also use a
version of the rhetorical strategy that Mayr developed in order to introduce
different versions of species pluralism. We can keep the comparison with Aris-
totle’s classification schema, but we can lose essentialism as the main point
of comparison. Though we should again note that Mayr and Aristotle mean
entirely different things by essentialism. In closing, what I want to suggest
is that having a deeper understanding of Aristotle’s pluralistic approach to
biology allows us raise at least the following four points of comparison: (1)
the explanatory power of taxonomic ranks, (2) the importance of the species
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category problem, (3) the question of intrinsicalism, and (4) how to interpret
the “cross-cutting” metaphor endemic to the pluralist literature.
First, Aristotle doesn’t have a fixed hierarchy of definable ranks: “His ap-
proach to classification does not involve an attempt to pigeonhole animals into
the fixed ranks of some predetermined taxonomic hierarchy” (Henry, 2011,
217). Aristotle’s greater kinds, e.g., bird, fish, land-dweller, lung-possessor,
etc., are real. That is, they have a mind-independent existence and are ex-
planatory. We want to know why certain things have certain features. All
animals have certain features because they are animals, and other features be-
cause they are certain kinds of animals. The work of the biologist is to explain
each feature at the right level of biological organization (APo. β 14 98a9-19).
Modern pluralists generally do follow Aristotle in arguing that we retain species
concepts that are real. However, modern pluralism raises questions about the
nature and usefulness of taxonomic ranks. Some species pluralists have ar-
gued that we ought to abolish the Linnean system of taxonomy (Ereshefsky,
2001), and others have argued that species are not real in any distinct sense
when compared with higher order taxa (Mishler and Brandon, 1987). Those
behind the development of the PhyloCode, a new classification scheme that
is meant to be more general than existing codes of nomenclature (e.g., the
International Code of Botanical Nomenclature), have found no use for a hier-
archical system (cf. Rieppel, 2006; Ereshefsky, 2007), though this may be due
to an preoccupation that exists amongst some biologists with the search for
clades or monophyletic taxa (taxa that include a common ancestor and all of
its descendants). With this in mind, one question Aristotle’s pluralism allows
us to ask is whether or not there is something real about bigger paraphyletic
groups (e.g., Reptiles, Gymnosperms), taxa that include a common ancestor
but not all of its descendents. The fact that these groups cross-classify doesn’t
make them any less real, and this is an option that modern pluralists should
still consider, rather than only recognizing monophyletic groups. I address the
role the concept of monophyly plays for different forms species pluralism in
the remaining chapters.
Second, Aristotle has no definition of the species category. Quite often a
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‘species concept’ is thought to be a way of defining the species category. By
providing a definition of what it is to be a species, whether it’s the TSC, the
BSC or something else, we provide a way of putting things into the species
category. But, as we have seen, Mayr understood essentialism as a failed way
of doing this. Aristotle has no hard and fast rules for what counts as a species
and what does not. His approach usually involves starting at the widest ex-
planatory kinds and working down to the narrowest. Aristotle also works up
by grouping together previously unrecognized kinds, e.g., cephalopods, and
follows the many in recognizing kinds that are differentiated by multiple fac-
tors, e.g., birds and fish. But sometimes, as in the case of humans, we need
not seek a wider kind to explain most of the features the thing has. For these
reasons, Aristotle’s approach to kinds and forms clearly doesn’t fit the earlier
model developed by Mayr. Aristotle mainly uses his classifications of animals
to explain why organisms have the various parts they have. However, this does
not mean there are no constraints on what it is to be a form for Aristotle. A
minimal condition is that a form is one of at least two ways of differentiating
a kind. But the other key thing is that there are many different ways of satis-
fying this condition. Species pluralism in the modern context may also imply
that we do not have a well-defined “species category” as many have pointed
out (e.g., Ereshefsky, 1992), but we still need constraints on what is to count
as a legitimate species concept. Aristotle presents constraints in terms of how
forms relate to their respective higher order kinds, whether cross-cutting or
not. Whether or not there should be any analogous sort of hierarchical con-
straint on species concepts for modern forms of pluralism is a question that
needs to be raised. I address the relationship between species pluralism and
the species category further in Chapter 3.
The third issue Aristotle helps us address, though certainly not solve, is
the question of intrinsicalism. There are many modern debates about whether
species are relational entities, or whether there is something intrinsic to each
organism that makes it a member of a particular species. Many seem to argue
that a kind’s essence is limited solely to intrinsic, micro-level properties. Un-
fortunately, the issue of intrinsicalism is not entirely clear even in Aristotelian
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scholarship. Are essences just sets of intrinsic properties, or is there something
more resembling relational properties that might be present in the essence of
a particular form? Aristotle does say that animals differ from one another
in their modes of subsistence, in their actions, in their habits, and in their
parts (HA I. 1 487a11). If this is the case, Aristotle can provide a way for an
essentialist view of species to move beyond the intrinsic properties of organ-
isms. More work needs to be done to understand Aristotle’s view on this issue,
because in the modern context the debate over intrinsicalism is alive and well.
We still want to know the degree to which the properties of the organisms
themselves determine their species status. I discuss the issue of intrinsicalism
in more detail in Chapter 4.
Lastly, Aristotle’s pluralism allows for cross-cutting kinds. His higher divi-
sions of animals cross-cut one another, and the ἐpiαμφοτερεῖς fail to fall under
one uncuttable form, though they still retain a complex essence. Aristotle al-
lows for kinds and organisms cross-cut one another. Modern pluralists might
require that populations and lineages be cross-cut, or even something further
than that. There may be ways of cross-cutting for modern pluralists that ac-
cord with Aristotle’s account. This is a metaphor that needs to be sorted out,
and I will make further progress on this question in Chapter 3.
In sum, the importance of these questions to the modern species literature,
especially when it comes to pluralist approaches to species, shows the impor-
tance of revisiting Aristotle’s approach to biology, in particular, his approach
to classification. I have here only begun to sketch the connections we can
draw. The important part of this chapter is to note that there is much more
to the essentialism story than what we find in textbooks, and much more that
we ought to be putting in new textbooks. Mayr and others have assumed that
essentialism must be a form of monism, but looking carefully at Aristotle, the
archetypal essentialist, shows that this is not the case. I’m not suggesting that
revisiting Aristotle will help clarify everything that is going on in modern sys-
tematic biology, for in many ways there is not a strong Aristotelian tradition
for us to draw on (Lennox, 1994). What I am suggesting is that revisiting
Aristotle’s work on classification can help us raise more questions and hope-
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fully disabuse us of some of the assumptions that plague contemporary debates
about species concepts and the ontological status of species taxa. Mayr’s in-
terpretation of the history of biology before Darwin has set the standard for
comparison among species concepts for far too long. A new, more pluralistic,
essentialism story of pre-Darwinian taxonomy needs to be told, especially if





Nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution.
Theodosius Dobzhansky, 1973
Introduction
In this chapter I show how taking on different assumptions about the theoret-
ical role that species ought to play in biology will lead to different forms of
species pluralism. There are two main kinds of species pluralism: evolution-
ary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism, with many different forms falling
under each of these two kinds. Species pluralism raises three questions: (1)
What sorts of things get to count as species? (2) How do the different sorts of
species relate to one another? (3) What does species pluralism imply about
the nature of the species category? This third question has been raised largely
in relation to distinguishing pluralism from monism. The former two concern
how to distinguish pluralism from relativism. To distinguish pluralism from
relativism we need reasonable constraints on what sorts of species concepts are
admissible. These constraints come from biological theory. I will argue that
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just as species concepts constrain what sorts of biological entities can count as
species, so species pluralism constrains what sorts of concepts count as species
concepts.
The first section of this chapter will explicate the difference between evo-
lutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism1, and will develop a tax-
onomy of positions falling under these two views. Both forms of pluralism
are constrained by biological theory, but they differ in whether they accept
evolutionary theory as the fundamental theory that pertains to ‘species.’ Evo-
lutionary species pluralists differ amongst themselves in the way they interpret
the different evolutionary forces that produce, shape and maintain species, but
agree that species are important evolutionary lineages (Mishler and Donoghue,
1982; Mishler and Brandon, 1987; de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988; Ereshef-
sky, 2001). Extra-evolutionary species pluralists agree in denying that species
must all be lineages, but differ in the sorts of non-evolutionary relationships
that are recognized as important for how we think of species (Dupré, 1981,
1993, 1999; Kitcher, 1984b,a, 1989).
The second section will make explicit the ontological implications of each
form of species pluralism with respect to: (1) the nature of the species category ;
(2) the species concepts that each reject; (3) ‘cross-cutting’. I overview four
different accounts of the relationship between species pluralism and the species
category, and show that this requires distinguishing pluralism from monism.
The second implication concerns distinguishing pluralism from relativism, and
the third from both relativism and monism.
3.1 Two Forms of Species Pluralism
One of the important debates amongst pluralists is about which theory or the-
ories ought to dictate which conceptions of species are legitimate, and how we
ought to interpret the relationship between theory or theories and the different
species concepts. On my analysis, there are two main forms of species plu-
1For a similar distinction between two different sources of species pluralism see Reydon
(2003, 50-51).
42
ralism: evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism. Evolutionists
think that species must be what evolutionary theory tell us they are, whereas
extra-evolutionists disagree.
In order to streamline the argument of this chapter, I will re-introduce the
distinction from cladistics between monophyly, paraphyly, and polyphyly. A
monophyletic group is a group composed of a collection of organisms, which
includes the most recent common ancestor of all those organisms and all the
descendants of that most recent common ancestor. A paraphyletic group is
like a monophyletic group, but does not include all the descendants of that
most recent common ancestor, merely some of them. A polyphyletic taxon
does not include the most recent common ancestor of all members of the
taxon. Cladists focus on delineating monophyletic groups. Despite the fact
that this terminology is tied to cladistics, one of the three major schools of
taxonomy, and that not all pluralists follow the dictates of the cladistic school
of taxonomy, it will prove economical for discussing the implications of a wide
range of views referred to as species pluralism.
3.1.1 Evolutionary Species Pluralism
Evolutionary species pluralists make explicit appeals to evolutionary theory in
the way they formulate pluralism. For example, “Species pluralism, according
to current evolutionary theory, is a real feature of the world and not merely
a feature of our lack of information about the world” (Ereshefsky, 2001, 139).
Evolutionary species pluralism is the view that:
There are multiple, non-unified ways of grouping organisms into
species, and evolution is the single cause of these different (‘cross-
cutting’) species.
This view involves a commitment to fundamentalism about evolutionary the-
ory with respect to species. Species on this view are considered to be important
entities that evolve as a unit.2 In this section I review three different arguments
2Evolutionary species pluralism bears many affinities with the species as individuals
hypothesis offered by Hull and Ghiselin. I will return to this relationship in the following
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for variants of this thesis.
Monophyletic Pluralism
Mishler and Donoghue (1982) offer perhaps the earliest argument for a form
of evolutionary species pluralism, which is elaborated by Mishler and Brandon
(1987).3 Though this sort of view is pluralistic, it is also a pluralism ruled by
an interpretation of one particular species concept, the phylogenetic species
concept, by way of its requirement that all species be monophyletic groups.
Thus, it is in this way that the view is really quasi-pluralistic. Mishler and
Donoghue’s (1982) argument for species pluralism requires denying that species
are the unique basal evolutionary unit. This makes the argument rest on a
denial of monism. The assumption that species, whatever else they are, are
evolutionary units, is what makes this an argument of evolutionary species
pluralism. It can be formulated as follows:
1. Species are evolutionary units.
2. There are many evolutionary (genealogical) units within any given lin-
eage that can temporally and spatially overlap.
3. If there are many evolutionary (genealogical) units within any given lin-
eage that can temporally and spatially overlap, then there is no unique
basal evolutionary unit
4. If there is no unique basal evolutionary unit, there is no reason to pick
out any particular group as the species.
5. If there is no reason to pick out any particular group as the species,
species pluralism.
∴ Species pluralism.4
The key premise here is the third. Species are typically thought of as the
basal unit in taxonomy, and higher order taxa are simply groups of species. In
chapter
3See (Hennig, 1966, 5-7) for a similar suggestion. See Ghiselin (1989) for an early criticism
of their view and defense of a monistic interpretation of the BSC. See Mishler and Brandon
(1989) for a reply.
4See Dupré’s (1999, 11-12) discussion for a similar formulation of their argument.
44
support of (3) they say that “in the search to find the evolutionary unit, one is
on a very “slippery slope” indeed. Units all along this slope may be of interest
to evolutionists, depending on the level of focus of the particular investigator.
These units do require some sort of designation in order to be studied, but a
formal, hierarchical Linnaean name is not necessary” (Mishler and Donoghue,
1982, 498). It is thus a slightly arbitrary decision as to which of these evolu-
tionary groups should be considered species. There are many sorts of spatially
and temporally overlapping units, though, according to this view, all of the
units we recognize are more or less inclusive monophyletic groups. The other
units they wish to exclude from consideration as species may be monophyletic,
but too large or too small, so they should be recognized as either higher-order
taxa (e.g., genera, orders, etc.), or sub-specific taxa (e.g., varieties). There
are also evolutionary units that may be paraphyletic, but these, according
to this view, should not be counted as species, nor as higher-order taxa or
sub-specific taxa. In different situations, different biological properties will be
required to rank a monophyletic group as a species apart from the higher and
lower taxa. But these properties must always be consistent with monophyly,
because for them, evolutionary units in general must be monophyletic. This
claim is contentious, and as we will see, it is not one that many pluralists hold.
Monophyly and Interbreeding
A second argument for a form of evolutionary species pluralism comes from
considering debates about the primacy of interbreeding versus monophyly for
defining the species category.5 Some biologists want to focus on relationships
of descent, and some consider interbreeding groups to play a special role in
the evolutionary process. De Queiroz and Donoghue (1988) argue that descent
and interbreeding are real processes that can hold species together jointly or
separately. We should allow species concepts based on either to count, because
neither one can meet the needs of all biologists. Either way, evolutionary
theory has bearing on these two different sorts of species concepts. With this
5They are arguing that we should use both the BSC and the PSC. See the Introduction
for more details.
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in mind, we can formulate their argument as follows:
1. Species concepts make either interbreeding or monophyly the most im-
portant criteria for demarcating species.
2. These two criteria sometimes cross-classify.
3. If neither sort of species concept can meet all the needs of all comparative
biologists and these two criteria sometimes cross-classify, then species
pluralism.
4. Neither sort of species concept can meet all the needs of all comparative
biologists.
∴ Species pluralism.
The second premise marks a key difference between this and the last argument
for pluralism, but I will leave spelling out what it means for two or more
concepts to cross-classify in detail until we have all the positions on the table.
One of the problems with many explications of pluralism is that it is not clear
what it means to cross-classify, just as it is not clear what it means for a
natural kind to ‘carve nature at its joints.’ What is also interesting about this
argument is that it pays heed to the needs of different biologists. Thus, even
though this form of pluralism is governed by evolutionary theory there still is
a certain sense of disunity amongst the different sorts of research that different
evolutionary biologists pursue. Both concepts are retained because they help
us answer different sorts of questions about species.
Multiple Evolutionary Forces
Ereshefsky offers a more general argument for species pluralism, which he
grounds in several forces of evolution, “[G]iven what current evolutionary the-
ory tells us, the forces of evolution segment the tree of life into varying and
opposing classifications. Species pluralism is the result of a fecundity of bio-
logical forces rather than a paucity of scientific information” (2001, 140). The
forces of evolution create and maintain different, sometimes overlapping, lin-
eages that we may all legitimately call ‘species.’ I have sketched what Ereshef-
sky (2001, 139-140) calls his metaphysical argument for species pluralism as
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follows:
1. There are multiple species concepts that group and rank on the basis of
evolutionary forces
2. There are multiple evolutionary forces that make and maintain different
sorts of species
3. The different sorts of species cross-cut the Tree of Life
∴ Species pluralism.
According to this view, it is not the needs of different evolutionary biologists
that are relevant, but it is the different forces of evolution (interbreeding,
natural selection, genetic homeostasis, common descent, and developmental
canalization, among other things (cf. Templeton, 1989)), which are the funda-
mental causes of species pluralism.
According to evolutionary species pluralism, it is something about evo-
lution, or the needs of evolutionary biologists, that is ultimately responsible
for all the different approaches to species. This may be because (1) there is
a plurality of processes that make the monophyletic groups that are species,
(2) there is a need for considering monophyletic groups and groups bound by
interbreeding, or (3) there are many different groups shaped by the forces of
evolution. In the final half of this chapter we will see in more detail what’s
at stake between these different forms. For now, we will turn to a radically
different sort of species pluralism.
3.1.2 Extra-Evolutionary Species Pluralism
Some pluralists deny that species always need to be thought of as evolutionary
units. According to this view, there are legitimate ways of conceiving of species
that do not make reference to the role that species play in evolutionary theory.
Thus, extra-evolutionary species pluralism is the view that:
There are multiple, non-unified ways of grouping organisms into
species, and evolution is not the single cause of the different ‘cross-
cutting’ species
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I’m using ‘cause’ here in a very loose sense. The point is that those who hold
this view reject fundamentalism about evolutionary theory. They point out
that there is more to biology than just evolution (Dupré, 1999, 13). Biology is
in an important sense disunified, which means that the entities different areas
of biology require different ontologies. As we will see in Chapter 4, this may
entail ontologicial framework pluralism. What is key to extra-evolutionary
species pluralism, and what separates it from evolutionary species pluralism,
is the claim that there is no fundamental science that governs the classification
of species. The argument requires a similar intra-biological conflict to some
of the forms of evolutionary species pluralism, but one that is wider in scope.
I will now review and compare Kitcher and Dupré’s different arguments for
extra-evolutionary species pluralism.
Two Set Pluralism
Kitcher (1984b), most criticized for his view that species are sets (see Sober,
1984), offers a pluralism radically different from those so far considered. He
argues that there are many different sorts of species, but there are two main
types: “The species category is heterogeneous because there are two main
approaches to the demarcation of species taxa . . . One approach is to group
organisms by structural similarities . . . The other approach is to group organ-
isms by their phylogenetic relationships” (Kitcher, 1984b, 309). By the latter,
he means that species are a sort of lineage. We can roughly formulate Kitcher’s
(1984b) argument as follows:
1. Species are sets of organisms related to one another by complicated,
biologically interesting relations
2. There are many such relations, none of them are fundamental
3. These relations lead to different cross-classifications of species.
∴ Species pluralism
There are ultimately two main types of species for Kitcher, though there are
many sub-types that fall under them. The main criticism of his view that
48
comes from evolutionary species pluralists stems from the structural prop-
erties that he allows to define species. Classifying species according to the
structural properties they bear would involve no reference to the evolutionary
explanations of those structures, but would involve a measure of similarity and
difference of structure. Further, it is not clear that defining species in this way
explicates any aspect of contemporary biological practice. One might respond
to this sort of criticism by appealing to approaches like phenetics or numerical
taxonomy that have collapsed for reasons that I won’t get into here. However,
resting this sort of extra-evolutionary species pluralism on such a ‘theory-free’
approach to biological classification is dubious at best (see Sober, 1984). Evo-
lutionists dominate discussions of species within biology, and it is no surprise
that this is reflected in many forms of species pluralism. Kitcher’s view is thus
significantly out of touch with mainstream biology as compared with the last
three forms of species pluralism. Despite these sorts of worries, there is an in
principle argument for extra-evolutionary pluralism even in Kitcher’s account
that becomes much clearer in Dupré’s work.
Promiscuous Pluralism
Dupré (1981; 1993; 1999; 2001) has developed a related argument for species
pluralism, which rests on the potential conflict between different classificatory
practices in biology. Dupré (2001) focuses on defending the claim that species
are units of classification, and that this doesn’t mean that they are units of
evolution. The general strategy that he has exploited is to display the ways
in which all sorts of different scientific and folk practices govern our use of
‘species,’ and that if this is the case, then surely it cannot follow that evolu-
tionary theory has exclusive rights to the term. For Dupré, all of these uses of
‘species’ pick out genuine real entities, and lead to conflicting classifications of
the biological world. At his most radical, the way a cook classifies organisms
is just as legitimate in Dupré’s eyes as the way an evolutionary biologist does.
Dupré’s (1993; 1996; 1999) argument for species pluralism has been given a
great deal of criticism, partly because his attack on the claim that species are
evolutionary units involves an advocacy for the legitimacy of folk taxonomy
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or taxonomy based on the interests of non-biologists. Ereshefsky (2010) has
argued against Dupré’s promiscuous pluralism, on the grounds of an analogy
with the concept of ‘work’ as used in physics. In order to understand what
‘work’ in physics means, we don’t analyze ordinary sentences like “He’s a real
piece of work.” Likewise, for Ereshefsky, the term ‘species’ is a theoretical
term. To understand what ‘species’ means we don’t analyze the way it is
used outside of that theoretical context, which for Ereshefsky means outside
of evolutionary biology. The relationship between ordinary language classifi-
cation and scientific classification is certainly a complicated issue with respect
to ‘species,’ but this is where some of the debate has gone.
With this in mind, it is perhaps more promising if we sidestep this aspect
of promiscuous pluralism. Let’s consider Dupré’s strategy as only pertaining
to a more developed biological science, or at least one that could be potentially
as developed as evolutionary theory. The claim then becomes about what sort
of explanatory interests are at stake when we choose to develop a scientific
classification scheme. For example, the interests of ecologists may differ sub-
stantially from those of evolutionists, and this may need to be reflected in a
classificatory practice that involves a radically different conception of species.
As Dupré claims, “Ecology may . . . in principle at least, require either coarser
or finer classifications than evolution, and it may need to appeal to classifica-
tions that crosscut phyletic taxa” (Dupré, 1999, 14). This would then allow
us to formulate his argument as follows, though many different versions that
exploit different biological practices are possible.
1. Evolutionary theory classifies species one way
2. Ecology classifies species another way
3. Neither science is fundamental in its classification of species
4. If two non-fundamental approaches cross-classify the organic world along
the lines of species, species pluralism
∴ Species pluralism
Here it is nothing internal to any particular theory that is at fault. It is a
problem with the broader unity of biology, and this is what makes this a form
of extra-evolutionary species pluralism.
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If we take this sort of view one way, it may mean monism for each sub-
biological science. If we are being pluralists about the different classificatory
practices in ecology and evolutionary biology, this may mean monism for the
‘evo-species’ and monism for ‘eco-species.’ To put the point another way,
when we do ecology, we will use one system of organizing species, and for
evolutionists, we will use another. I will deal with the problem of how these
two more radically different understandings of species might relate to one
another in what follows.
In sum, there clearly are a variety of ways of being a species pluralist. If we
gloss over pluralism as a mere denial of monism, we lose this variety. All forms
deny that there is one unitary, and fundamental way of conceiving of species.
Evolutionary species pluralists argue that there are many, non-unifiable ways
of considering species as evolutionary units. These sorts of pluralists, as we will
see in more detail below, will sometimes allow for a plurality of classificatory
schemes, and sometimes not. Extra-evolutionary species pluralists agree that
there are many, non-unifiable ways of conceiving of species, but that these need
not make any reference to evolutionary theory. These sorts of pluralists differ
in what sorts of other theories ’species’ may be interpreted in, for example,
ecology or a theory of structural relationships.
3.2 Discerning Pluralism
We may have noticed that in the first half of this chapter we have several
different arguments for species pluralism, but not one of them actually spells
out what they are arguing for. They are all framed in a way to argue that
species monism is false. But there is more to pluralism than just a denial of
monism. In this half of the chapter I will analyze (1) what species pluralism
in general implies about the nature of the species category : the category to
which all species taxa belong; (2) what the distinctive rationale is for eliminat-
ing concepts provided by each form of species pluralism; (3) what it means for
multiple species concepts to ‘cross-cut’ each other and the organic world. The
first issue has generated the most discussion in the literature, and serves to
51
distinguish the different ways of understanding the difference between plural-
ism and monism in general. However, this is not enough to help us distinguish
between different forms of species pluralism. The latter two issues do, and this
is why they need to be answered for us to develop a species pluralism that is
more discerning about species concepts. The second issue pertains to distin-
guishing pluralism from relativism, and the third, as we will see, is caught up
in distinguishing pluralism from both monism and relativism.
3.2.1 The Species Category
We have grown accustomed to the disambiguation of ‘species’ into the species
category and species taxa. Species taxa are whatever different species names
refer to, e.g., Castor canadensis, but the species category is the class to which
all the different species taxa belong. When we ask about the species category,
we want to know what makes species different from genera, kingdoms, etc.,
When we ask about the species taxa, we want to know what sort of entity
a beaver is, as opposed to that beaver over there. However, it’s not clear
how profitable making this distinction explicit has been, or if anyone working
on these matters has been confused by the ambiguity. Due in part to this
disambiguation, there is now a huge body of literature devoted to species
pluralism and the species category. Monists take one species concept, and allow
it to define the species category, but pluralists must avail themselves of other
resources. There are four general solutions to the species category problem
that pluralists have posed: (1) Eliminativism (Ereshefsky, 1992, 2001); (2)
Disjunctivism (Pigliucci, 2003, 2005); (3) Minimalism (de Queiroz, 1998, 1999,
2005a, 2007); (4) Pragmatism (de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988; Dupré, 1999;
Ereshefsky, 2014a).
Eliminativism
Eliminativists argue that if species pluralism is true, then it implies that the
species category is empty. If the species category is empty, then we ought
to eliminate it from scientific discourse. Ereshefsky (1992; 2001) provides
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what he calls the heterogeneity argument, which shows that species pluralism
implies that the species category should be eliminated (but see Brigandt, 2003):
“Despite philosopher’s best efforts, the biological world is uncooperative when
it comes to unifying the species category” (Ereshefsky, 2014a, 80). We may
formulate his heterogeneity argument as follows:
1. Species pluralism.
2. If the different concepts that compose a plurality share nothing in com-
mon with each other that distinguishes them from concepts outside the
plurality, then we should eliminate the concept that governs the plurality.
3. The different species concepts are heterogeneous.
∴ Eliminativism.
So if this argument is convincing, instead of retaining the species category,
we should have several other categories, e.g., phylospecies, biospecies, and
ecospecies.
An initial worry with this solution is that it is not sensu strictu repre-
sentative of a pluralistic approach. If Ereshefsky is right, we are left with
monistic approaches to the remaining categories. That is, we are monists
about ‘biospecies,’ ‘phylospecies,’ and ‘ecospecies,’ for there is one clear defi-
nition of each of these categories, but nihilists about ‘species,’ because there is
nothing to which species, as a theoretical term, refers to. So what then are we
being pluralists about? One might respond that this a just a semantic issue
with how to understand ‘pluralism.’ This, however, is not the biggest problem
with eliminativism.
The main problem with eliminativism, is that it fails to capture something
very important about biological practice, which is noted in de Queiroz and
Donoghue’s (1988) version of evolutionary species pluralism. Two competing
species concepts, e.g., in their case species demarcated by either interbreeding
or monophyly, can sometimes classify the same organisms in the same way, and
sometimes they can cross-classify. This is the main reason that we should reject
eliminativism. Given situations where two species concepts yield equi-inclusive
groups, it seems odd to say that we have two (or more) things, say a ‘biospecies’
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and a ‘phylospecies’ that include the very same organisms, even though there
are many situations where different criteria fail to yield equi-inclusive groups.
Many species are named as such by way of congruence between many species
concepts. Some have interpreted this use of species concepts as reason to
conclude that different species concepts, by way of consilience, will ultimately
classify organisms in a single way (Ruse, 1987). This claim is taken up in the
final chapter, where I argue against both Ereshefsky and Ruse
Disjunctivism
Some argue that species pluralism only implies that the species category is
undefinable in the traditional sense, by offering a set of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions, and that we should treat the category either as a family-
resemblance concept (Pigliucci, 2003, 2005), polythetic concept or cluster con-
cept (Scriven, 1959; Hull, 1965a).6 Consider Hull’s (1965b, 13) disjunctive
definition of the species category: something is a species just in case it is a
population that either:
1. Consistently interbreeds producing a reasonably large proportion of rea-
sonably fertile offspring, or
2. Consistently serially interbreeds with synchronic populations producing
a reasonably large proportion of reasonably fertile offspring, or
3. Does not fulfil either (1) or (2), but have not diverged appreciably from
a common ancestry which did fulfil either (1) or (2),
6The traditional sense is often taken as an essentialist or Aristotelian approach to defi-
nition, but we shouldn’t take this as a serious attempt to describe Aristotle’s own view on
the matter. Hull, for example, claims that
[W]hat Aristotle was advocating in modern terms is definition by properties
connected conjunctively which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient.
For example, being a three-sided plane closed figure is necessary and sufficient
for being a triangle. Such a mode of definition is eminently suited for defining
eternal Forms. It is not very well suited for defining the names of evolving
species or for ’species’ itself.(1965a, 318)
First, Aristotle is not the eternal Forms guy, that is Plato. Second, as we saw in Chapter 2,
Aristotle’s own view on the matter is far subtler. Despite Aristotle’s search for the essences
of species taxa, he does not have appear to have offered an essentialist definition of the
species category.
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4. Does not fulfil any of (1), (2), or (3), because they do not apply but are
analogous to populations which do fulfil at least one of (1), (2), or (3).
Fulfilling any one of these conditions would be sufficient for something to be
a species, and fulfilling at least one would be a necessary condition. The
problem here, similar to the problem with eliminativism, is that these sorts
of definitions often say nothing about what happens when something satisfies
multiple conditions. That is, whether or not this lends more support to claims
about whether or not this or that group is a species. I will address this problem
in detail in the final chapter.
Piggluci’s (2003; 2005) suggestion that species pluralism implies that the
species category is a family resemblance concept makes some first moves to get-
ting around this problem. The term ‘species,’ on Pigliucci’s view, “is a family
resemblance concept whose underpinning is to be found in a series of char-
acteristics such as phylogenetic relationships, genetic similarity, reproductive
compatibility and ecological characteristics” (2003, 601).7 Pigliucci unfortu-
nately does not develop the approach any further. What needs to be sorted
out is how the different family members, i.e., species concepts, cross-cut each
other and the world, and even before that, which ones are excluded or in-
cluded. Sorting this out would actually make a difference to the way biologists
apply species concepts. As it stands, such a disjunctive definition of the species
category does nothing other than combine the available species concepts in a
disjunctive fashion. And what may be worse is that “Rather than resolving
the incompatibilities among alternative definitions of the species category, this
interpretation encourages different authors to adopt incompatible definitions,
thus perpetuating the current disagreements” (de Queiroz, 2005a, 1266).
7This view of species is meant to be close to Templeton’s (1989) cohesion species con-
cept. Templeton defines species as “the most inclusive population of individuals having
the potential for phenotypic cohesion through intrinsic cohesion mechanisms” (1989, 12).
Cohesion mechanisms, for Templeton, include natural selection, developmental constraints,
interbreeding, ecological similarity and common ancestry. Different mechanisms are thought
to be important in different specific situations.
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Minimalism
Minimalists give up on the quest for a operationalizeable definition of the
species category, one where the definition gives us useful means of knowing
how to determine whether we put this or that taxa into the species category,
but require that it be universal and unified (de Queiroz, 1998, 1999, 2005a,c,
2007; Mayden, 1997, 1999; Shun-Ichiro, 2011; Kendig, 2014). Minimalism is
thus sensu strictu a sophisticated monism. However, minimalism should be
still considered in an examination of pluralism, because it constitutes a view
that puts the pluralism somewhere else, as we will shortly see.8 de Queiroz
(1998; 1999; 2005a; 2005c; 2007) argues that species pluralism implies not that
we eliminate the species category, nor that we ought to treat it as a cluster
concept, but that we ought to reconceive the species category more minimalis-
tically (see also Kendig, 2014), but be pluralistic about certain aspects of the
definition. I will refer to this view as minimalism about the species category.
De Queiroz (2005a) argues that we can still have a unified conception of the
species category if we adopt his general lineage conception of species (GLC),9
which is a more sophisticated version of Simpson’s (1951; 1961; 1978; 1981)
evolutionary species concept.10 Species, according to the GLC, are defined by
a single necessary and sufficient property: something is a species, if and only if,
it is a separately evolving metapopulation lineage (de Queiroz, 2005a, 1264).
He argues that according to all (modern) species concepts, a species just is
a separately evolving metapopulation lineage. In fact, he even goes so far
to say that “any definition that is inconsistent with this general evolutionary
concept of species is probably sufficiently removed from the mainstream of
contemporary biology that it need be considered no further” (de Queiroz, 1998,
62).
8Whether or not a view should be called pluralism or monism is not really the issue. As
Hull has pointed out for slightly different reasons, “One problem unfortunately characteristic
of such contrasts as monism versus pluralism is that the apparent differences between them
tend to disappear under analysis. Numerous senses of monism blend imperceptibly into just
as many senses of pluralism” (1999).
9He also calls this a ‘general metapopulation lineage concept of species’ (de Queiroz,
2005b, 6602).
10See the Introduction for more on EvSC.
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De Queiroz also draws on the fact that many modern species concepts
explicitly mention that species are some kind of lineage in their very definition.
Others, he notes, equate species with populations in the definitions or in the
associated discussions. Populations are really just short segments of lineages.
His strategy for subordinating all species concepts to his own, is to show
that all of the different concepts either (1) describe the GLC itself (e.g., the
evolutionary species concept), (2) describe criteria for delimiting species taxa
(e.g., the reproductive isolation version of the biological species concept), or
(3) some do both (e.g., the ecological species concept). Those that describe
criteria for delimiting species taxa also give defining properties of subcategories
of the general species category (de Queiroz, 2005a, 1264).
But if there is only one species concept, then where is the pluralism in all
of this? De Queiroz suggests in response to Pigliucci (2003) that “in agreement
with the cluster concept proposal, the idea of a metapopulation lineage may
itself be best interpreted as a family resemblance or cluster concept” (2005a,
1267). In this way, he is suggesting that disjunctivism and minimalism are
highly compatible with one another. The difference is that they put the plu-
ralism, as interpreted disjunctively and not eliminatively, in different places.
Ereshefsky (2014a) and others (Pigliucci, 2003, 598) object that de Queiroz’
view is too permissive. According to the GLC ‘species’ applies to all separately
evolving metapopulation lineages. One might agree with part of this, namely
that yes, all biologists agree that species are metapopulation lineages, but
disagree with the GLC, because not all metapopulation lineages are species.
The disagreement over species concepts just is a disagreement about what
kind of metapopulation lineage species are supposed to be. Thus, what were
called sub-species, species, superspecies, and even demes would now also be
considered species if they satisfy his definition. This is not very conservative!
What sort of change in biological practice would this bring about? De Queiroz
chooses to bite the bullet on this point, and offers an argument by analogy in
support of his view, which I will now turn to.
De Queiroz (1998; 1999) argues for an analogy between the traditional
notion of species and the GLC with organism and adult. The species cate-
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gory should be treated as analogous to the organism category, rather than to
the adult category. He grounds his analogical argument in a more abstract
claim: “If the species category is to be truly analogous to the categories cell
and organism and of similar general theoretical significance, then the species
category must be the most general category at its particular level of biologi-
cal organization. It cannot be a less general subset of this general category”
(de Queiroz, 2005b, 6603). As usual, the analogy is based on an assumption of
monism. We want a concept that covers all stages in the life cycle of a species.
We may formulate his argument as follows:
1. If we choose any particular stage in either process (population lineage di-
vergence or organismal development) as a necessary condition for species
or organism, then the other stages where the condition is absent will be
left in limbo.
2. We do not want these stages left in limbo.
3. So we should not choose any particular stage in either process.
4. If for organisms we do not want stages in limbo, we should talk about
the entire life-cycle of an organism.
5. Likewise, if for species we do not want stages in limbo, we should talk
about the species life-cycle.
∴ We should talk about species life-cycle.
With respect to (1), in the past “adults,” or “males” were privileged, over other
stages. This focus was harmful to our overall understanding of organisms and
the organism life-cycle. Thus focusing on species as anything more than this
minimal view is also harmful to our overall understanding of species, and the
species life-cycle. Even if we accept his arguments, it is hard to say how de
Queiroz’s view would affect biological practice, though there have been some
attempts to apply his general lineage conception of species. The point being
that if we adopt his conception, we might be forced to classify many things as
species that aren’t currently classified as species by most practicing biologists.
This is just to show how seriously the effects of pluralism on our current
taxonomic practice are taken by systematists themselves. Worry about these
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effects has led many to a more pragmatic pluralism, which we will now turn
to.
Pragmatism
Many have argued for putting the following pragmatic constraint on species
pluralism: if species pluralism is true, ‘species’ should still be preserved in
much the same way as it has been historically (de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988;
Dupré, 1999; Ereshefsky, 2014a). A common problem with all three solutions
thus far considered concerns the extent to which they would, if implemented,
effect biological practice. Reflecting on this has caused many pluralists to
gravitate toward a sort of pragmatism from their initial, more revolutionary
positions on the species category.
One way pluralism might affect biological practice is as follows. Some
(Ghiselin, 1969, 1997; Hull, 1987, 1989a) have claimed that pluralism will
‘lead to Babel.’ This is also known as the communication objection to plu-
ralism (Ereshefsky, 1992, 680-681). According to this objection, having mul-
tiple species concepts will make biologists unable to communicate with one
another, just like having many languages caused the people of Shinar to aban-
don building their city. Following Ereshefsky (1992, 681), we can formulate
this argument as follows:
1. Species pluralism entails that the term “species” is ambiguous.
2. If the term “species” is ambiguous, then confusion will set in when bi-
ologists discuss the nature of species, for biologists will mean different
things by “species.”
3. But, we should avoid such confusion.
∴ Species pluralism should be avoided.
Typically speaking, pluralists have responded by denying the second premise
(e.g., Kitcher, 1984b; Ereshefsky, 1992, 2014a). That is, monists are exagger-
ating the consequences of accepting pluralism. Pluralists have just suggested
that biologists attempt to be clear about what sense they might be taking up in
their particular uses of species. Kitcher, thinks an analogy can be drawn with
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how biologists discuss the concept ‘gene.’ According to him, “Biologists have
already learned to be responsible in discussions of genes. The same responsi-
bility can be attained in the case of species. To allow pluralism about species
and to deny the need for a “general reference system” in biology is not to unlock
the doors of Babel” (Kitcher, 1984b, 327) However, though his analogy seems
correct, it is far too simple a formulation of the problem. Even if the needs
of academic biology take precedence, we must consider other uses of the term
‘species,’ though we needn’t quite go as far as Dupré into accepting a promis-
cuous pluralism. Ereshefsky, the staunchest advocate of eliminative species
pluralism, has more recently argued, on pragmatic grounds, that we cannot
eliminate ‘species’ because that would just be too hard: “The word ‘species’
is firmly entrenched in scientific discourse. It occurs in biology textbooks,
field guides, and systematic studies. It is also entrenched in non-scientific dis-
course, for example, in governmental laws. Eliminating ‘species’ from biology
and elsewhere would be an arduous task” (2014a, 81). The word plays too
many roles in too many disciplines for it to be changed in any significant way,
let alone eliminated from discourse.
Dupré (1999), has also has defended the reservation of the term ‘species’
for a general taxonomy on pragmatic grounds. According to Dupré we need
a general, all-purpose taxonomy, and we can reserve the term species for the
base units in such a taxonomy: “it would be best to reserve the term species
. . . for the base-level categories of this general, pragmatic, taxonomy” (1999,
4). Though he admits that more specialized taxonomies will also be required
for particular purposes.
What I am calling pragmatism is much weaker than either minimalism or
disjunctivism. That is, even if we reject such cluster approaches to preserving
the species category, we can always resort to this third option if we want
to oppose eliminativism. However, as this position is weak, it really tells us
nothing about what to do with the conceptual pluralism that has run rampant
in biology, other than that we should just keep on trucking. In effect, it is
rather worrisome, because it, of all the positions so far considered, is closest
to relativism. Though perhaps it is not a relativism where anything goes, but
60
one closer to Kitcher’s description of cynicism: “The most accurate definition
of ’species’ is the cynic’s. Species are those groups of organisms which are
recognized as species by competent taxonomists. Competent taxonomists, of
course, are those who can recognize the true species” (1984b, 308).
Further, pragmatism about the species category is compatible with all the
different forms of pluralism we have already considered. This again is the
general problem with species pluralists solely focusing on the species category
problem. In the next two sections I will explicate what is really important
about distinguishing pluralism from relativism. We need to ask two questions.
First, which species concepts are admitted as legitimate and which are elim-
inated from biology? Second, how do those that remain work in relation to
one another? I will explore the ways in which the different forms of species
pluralism answer these two questions, especially focusing on the distinction
between evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism.
3.2.2 Which Species Concepts Are Legitimate?
I will now examine what sort of species concepts are rejected and which are per-
mitted by evolutionary (ESP) and extra-evolutionary species pluralism (XSP)
(Table 1). This is important, because it shows an important way in which
pluralism makes a difference to taxonomic practice. For a monist there’s one
right species concept, for a relativist anything goes, but for a pluralist many
things go. Further, the different assumptions that different pluralists make
change the relationship between pluralism and biological practice. As will be-
come clear, these consequences are largely independent of how we treat the
species category. I will begin by describing the sorts of concepts eliminated by
the three forms of evolutionary species pluralism discussed in the first section
of this chapter. I will also compare these with the general lineage conception.
Following this I will do the same for the two different forms extra-evolutionary
species pluralism.
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Table 1: Legitimate Species Concepts
ESP XSP
Monophyletic Historical & Structural
Monophyletic & Interbreeding Evolutionary & Ecological
Evolutionary
Evolutionists
Though it is a slight oversimplification of some of the subtle differences between
the views, we can say that what evolutionary species pluralists have in common
is that they rule out species concepts that do not treat species as evolutionary
units. However, what is at stake between these evolutionists, is that there
are different ways of interpreting what counts as a species sized evolutionary
unit: (1) monophyletic groups, (2) either monophyletic groups or interbreeding
groups (or groups that are both), (3) any lineage of a certain size, maintained
by various crisscrossing forces of evolution, (4) the general lineage conception
of species.
Mishler and Donoghue (1982) and Mishler and Brandon (1987) require
that species taxa are monophyletic groups (assemblages of populations). This
requirement rules out any species concept that does not require species taxa
to form monophyletic groups. Since monophyly is one way of specifying the
phylogenetic species concept, this in a sense is just a disjunctive version of
that concept. They are thus monists about how species are grouped: they
are grouped according to monophyly, but pluralists (disjunctivists) about how
they are ranked. On their view, genera, and other higher-order taxa are also
monophyletic, and so may be legitimate lower order groups, like sub-species
and varieties. Thus, ranking criteria are needed to distinguish species from
these other taxonomic ranks, both above and below.
de Queiroz and Donoghue (1988) accept that species may be held together
by common descent (monophyly), but they argue that species can also be
held together by interbreeding. They also argue that these monophyly and
interbreeding can come apart. They are thus disjunctivists about the species
category, though they admit that the two senses sometimes overlap. On this
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account, any species concept other than these two is excluded.
According to Ereshefsky’s account, evolutionary theory requires that species
are some sort of lineage. Lineages, and thus species, can either be mono-
phyletic or paraphyletic groups, but cannot be polyphyletic, because these
sorts of groups lack spatiotemporal continuity (2001, 133-135). This form of
evolutionary pluralism is thus more permissive, but still excludes any species
concept that would allow us to consider a polyphyletic group (a group that
fails to form a continuous lineage) a species. It is important to note that
Ereshefsky’s argument for pluralism can be made distinct from his argument
for eliminativism, which is why I have separated them here (c.f. Brigandt,
2003).
According to de Queiroz’s general lineage conception of species there is
only one species concept allowed, but what of the competing approaches re-
mains? These he claims we can either treat as synonymous with his concept,
or we can interpret them as criteria for telling us what a separately evolv-
ing metapopulation lineage is (or they do both). The more criteria we have,
given that they are compatible, the surer we are that we are talking about a
species. However, a problem with this view is that it is nowhere explicit about
exactly what his approach rules out. According to de Queiroz, “[A]lmost all
modern biologists have the same general concept of species” (1998, 57). This
is highly contentious, but if it is true, then this would at least rule out any pre-
Darwinian conception of species. But would it rule out polyphyletic groups?
These, for example, seem to be recognizable by the phenetic species concept,
and de Queiroz is explicit in his ability to subsume such a concept. With re-
spect to this he says “The fact that lineages can be paraphyletic or polyphyletic
does not mean that the same is true for . . . species; some species definitions
permit paraphyly and polyphyly while others require monophyly” (1998, 60).
Elsewhere he is very clear that species recognized by his concept do not have
to be monophyletic: “metapopulation lineages do not have to be phenetically
distinguishable, or diagnosable, or monophyletic, or reproductively isolated,
or ecologically divergent, to be species” (de Queiroz, 2005b, 6605).
From this discussion we see that, even among evolutionary species plu-
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ralists, there are significant discrepancies about what are legitimate species
concepts. Everyone tries to incorporate some portion of the wisdom found in
the species concepts they rule out, but different concepts will play more promi-
nent roles in different pluralities. We will also see how there are discrepancies
between evolutionists about how these different concepts will be used to create
(cross-)classifications of organisms. Before we get to that we will turn to the
differences between different forms of extra-evolutionary species pluralism.
Extra-Evolutionists
Denying that evolutionary theory plays the ultimate role as arbiter among
species concepts has been generally tied to the acceptance of more concepts
than any of the pluralists just surveyed, though in principle it need not. Again,
though neither Dupré nor Kitcher hold this view, an extra-evolutionary species
pluralist could hold that there is one ‘evo-species’ concept and one ‘eco-species’
concept. But given that extra-evolutionary species pluralism is not meant to
be a relativistic position, so what sorts of concepts are ruled out?
According to Kitcher’s two set pluralism, there are two sorts of species
concepts: historical and structural. Evolutionists have argued against his
recognition of structural concepts, so it is safe to say that he admits that the
historical concepts fall under similar considerations as those the evolutionists
favour, that is, they must pick out a certain sort of lineage. However, it is not
clear whether he has a restriction to monophyletic groups or not. With regard
to his structural species concepts, the main criticism has been that these do
not correspond to any recognizable way that biologists classify organisms, so
it’s not clear what theory he might be invoking here.
A moderate reading of Dupré’s account suggests that he rejects Ereshef-
sky’s claim that all post-Darwinian species concepts must import evolutionary
theory to explain what makes a species a species. Ignoring what Dupré has to
say about the legitimacy of folk taxonomy, this means that other areas of bio-
logical inquiry may provide equally legitimate frameworks for conceptualizing




Most pluralists argue for a plurality of species concepts that ‘cross-classify’ one
another. This is taken to be self-explanatory. It isn’t. Different pluralists use
it in different ways. In this section I will explicate the ways in which pluralists
might understand this metaphor.
Pluralists use the terms ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘cross-classification’ to suggest
an important modification of the ‘carve nature at its joints’ metaphor used to
describe whatever natural kinds are supposed to be.11 This terminology is even
used by Aristotelian scholars to explain his pluralism, but even there it is not
clear what is cross-classifying what.12 Pluralists, as far as the metaphor goes,
make bad butchers. As far as I have been able to discern, minimally cross-
classification means that an organism can belong to more than one un-nested
group. Monists can allow organisms to belong to multiple groups, but these
groups must be nested, and/or form some sort of hierarchy (e.g., Burt is both
a beaver and a rodent, because all beavers are rodents). Cross-classification of
organisms is not uncommon in biology. For example, a particular bacterium
can belong to the species Bacteroides fragilis and the ecological community
that resides in some particular human colon. A monist can allow for this, but
could interpret belonging to Bacteroides fragilis as more fundamental than
belonging to any particular ecological community, though it isn’t exactly clear
how we interpret this notion of fundamentality. It is certainly fundamental
to my existence that I have organisms like this in my gut. Thus, for species
concepts to cross-classify we need there to at least be different types of species,
none of which are fundamental.
Due to the extant obscurity of the use of the ‘cross-classifying’ metaphor
in the literature, I will maintain that a pluralist must provide answers to two
related questions. First, what is it that is being cross-cut? Answers to this
question range from cohesive entities/individuals, to lineages/populations, to
organisms, to structural space vs. evolutionary space (the tree of life). Sec-
ond, how are these things being cross-cut? If we are cross-cutting evolutionary
11This latter metaphor has a long pedigree, which dates to Plato’s Phaedrus.
12See Chapter 2.
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space, it is helpful to use cladistic terminology. One might ask whether we can
have monophyletic, paraphyletic, and/or polyphyletic groups cross-cutting one
another here. As we will see, depending on what is being cross-cut, classifica-
tions of organisms into species may occur at various levels of organization.
Evolutionists
In this section I will consider the different sorts of evolutionary species plu-
ralism thus considered: (1) monophyletic pluralism, (2) monophyly and inter-
breeding, (3) plurality of evolutionary forces, (4) the general lineage species
concept.
Although monophyletic pluralism is not a full-blown pluralism, because it
does not entail some form of cross-classification, it is worth considering as a
foil for other forms of evolutionary species pluralism. The view is in a way
not a true form of pluralism, for “Mishler and Donoghue’s (1982) brand of plu-
ralism implies that a single, optimal general-purpose classification exists for
each particular situation, but that the criteria applied in each situation may
well be different” (Mishler and Brandon, 1987, 403). This means there is no
‘cross-cutting’ between the different conceptions of species. Different processes
are important for maintaining different species, but any given organism can
belong to one, and only one species. According to monophyletic pluralism, it
is a necessary condition for species taxa to be monophyletic groups, as are all
super- and subspecific taxa, but there are a plurality of processes responsible
for the existence of species taxa: “A species is the least inclusive taxon recog-
nized in a classification, into which organisms are grouped because of evidence
of monophyly . . . that is ranked as a species because it is the smallest
“important” lineage deemed worthy of formal recognition, where “important”
refers to the action of those processes that are dominant in producing and
maintaining lineages in a particular case” (Mishler and Brandon, 1987, 406).
Thus, this view offers a monistic approach to how we group biological taxa,
but a pluralistic approach to how to rank them.
What is important to note about this form of pluralism is that species are
not treated as special taxonomic units. It is not that they are suggesting that
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species do not exist, they are suggesting that they are not significantly different
from any other taxa, whether super- or sub-specific. However, they do argue in
favour of the proposal that we “[a]pply species names at about the same level
as we have in the past, and decouple the basal taxonomic unit from notions
of “basic” evolutionary units”(Mishler and Donoghue, 1982, 497). This thus
constitutes a form of pragmatism about the species category, since it attempts
to retain most of the species names at the same level as we have had in the
past, but it is modified by the requirement that species form monophyetic
groups.
The key difference between de Queiroz and Donoghue’s position and mon-
phyletic pluralism is the interpretation of the conflict between species concepts
that focus on either monophyly or interbreeding. As they put the case them-
selves:
[T]he tension surrounding species concepts results from there being
different kinds of real biological entities. Some of these entities
exist as an outcome of a process conferring cohesion, while others
exist as an outcome of descent from a common ancestor. And
sometimes an entity that exists as the consequence of one of these
processes happens to correspond exactly with one that exists as a
consequence of the other (de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988, 325).
Cases of exact correspondence between these two (and further) sorts of pro-
cesses have not been followed up on in the literature on species pluralism. It is
not clear from this quotation whether they are suggesting that there are two
real biological entities, which sometimes overlap, or whether there are three.
The point for de Queiroz and Donoghue is simply that we should abandon the
attempt to achieve a single general-purpose taxonomy:
[N]either populations nor monophyletic groups are generally more
real or significant than the other; instead, their relative significance
varies with the particular theoretical context. We therefore agree
with the tenet that “there is no unique relation which is privileged
in that the species taxa it generates will answer to the needs of all
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biologists and will be applicable to all organisms” (Kitcher, 1984:
309). Nevertheless, we reject the brand of pluralism that applies
different criteria or even different combinations of criteria on a case
by case (group by group) basis in an attempt to achieve a single,
optimal, general-purpose taxonomy (de Queiroz and Donoghue,
1988, 334).
They are here exactly decrying the form of pluralism offered by Mishler et al.,
and also, it should be noted, rejecting pragmatism about the species category.
On this account of evolutionary species pluralism, species are significant, and
distinguishable from other taxa. It is just that there are (at least) two sorts
of species, and that each species concept, taken by itself, will have different
consequences. They unfortunately fail to explore cases where we take species
concepts together.
As we have discussed, Ereshefsky’s argument for species pluralism leans
heavily on the fact that different legitimate species concepts can cross-classify
the Tree of Life. On his view we have “one taxonomy consisting of inter-
breeding units, another consisting of ecological units, and a third consisting of
monophyletic taxa” (Ereshefsky, 1992, 681). Helping pick out these different
lineages is what the different legitimate species concepts are in the business of
doing. However, according to Ereshefsky (2001, 134), there are only two sorts
of ways that these approaches can cross-classify the world’s organisms:
1. An organism may belong to two lineages with one lineage properly con-
tained in another
2. An organism may belong to two lineages that are disjoint
This is the most explicit statement I have found of what someone means by
‘cross-classify,’ but even this is somewhat unclear. With regard to the first
way, this would not be terribly different from how species and genera cut up
the world. It just means that species can form nested groups. With regard to
the second case, it is not exactly clear what he means by ‘disjoint,’ because in
the toy example he provides to illustrate this type of case the two species have
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member organisms in common. However, what I take him to mean by the
second point is that we can have un-nested groups, which becomes clear from
his explicit rejection of Mishler et al.’s (1982; 1987) monophyletic pluralism.
As I see it, and to put this in cladistic terms, Ereshefsky is arguing that
species can be either monophyletic or paraphyletic groups, and that these can
be bigger and smaller than one another depending on the evolutionary process
highlighted by a particular species concept. In contrast, according to Mishler
et al.’s monophyletic pluralism, species must be monophyletic groups, but a
species cannot be a monophyletic group that includes a smaller monophyletic
group that is also a species. If I’m reading this right, this is a very important
difference.
What sort of cross-cutting does Ereshefsky’s account rule out? Well, to
use cladistic terms again, we cannot have polyphyletic groups. This is because
polyphyletic groups do not form lineages in the proper sense. They are not
spatiotemporally connected. This, as we will see when we get to the extra-
evolutionary species pluralists, is one way of distinguishing the two forms of
species pluralism.
When it comes to cross-cutting, de Queiroz’s (1998; 1999; 2005a; 2007)
general lineage conception of species is far more difficult to evaluate than the
other evolutionary views considered, because he is nowhere explicit about how
his definition would resolve situations where there is conflict between different
species concepts (what he calls species criteria).
On one reading, he comes out more permissive than even Ereshefsky, in
that he will allow for monophyletic, paraphyletic and polyphyletic groups to
all count as species. This is because he says that: “The fact that lineages can
be paraphyletic or polyphyletic does not mean that the same is true for . . .
species; some species definitions permit paraphyly and polyphyly while others
require monophyly” (de Queiroz, 1998, 60). One species definition that permits
paraphyly is a phenetic species concept, which just requires that members of a
species be more similar to each other than they are to any members of the out
group. This is probably quite rare, but depending on what metric we use this
could happen by convergent evolution. However, he also states that “[A]lmost
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all modern biologists have the same general concept of species” (de Queiroz,
1998, 57).13 Further, he does claim that the phenetic species concept is sub-
sumable under his general lineage conception of species (de Queiroz, 1998,
63). However, he does seems to later take it that phenetic similarity should
be used merely as a diagnostic criterion for picking out a lineage (de Queiroz,
2005a, 2007). Still one might ask, is it possible for a polyphyletic “lineage” to
evolve separately from all other lineages? This might not satisfy the minimal-
ist definition of the species category he provides. However, if the answer is yes,
then this would allow for this sort of cross-cutting, and would thus partially
grade the distinction between the evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species
pluralists. If the answer is no, then we are left with a form of evolutionary
species pluralism not much different than Ereshefsky’s, save their respective
stances on the species category problem. If this reconstruction is obscure, the
take-home point is that de Queiroz’ GLC lacks clarity in this regard.
However, on a second reading of de Queiroz’s other work on the PhyloCode,
a new system of taxonomy that incorporates monophyly as a requirement for
recognizable entities, his understanding of the GLC might be closer to that of
monophyletic pluralism. Like them he has a variety of ranking criteria, but
his grouping criteria is a separately evolving metapopulation lineage. At any
rate, for him to give a complete account, we need to know what happens when
species concepts conflict.
Extra-Evolutionists
I will now examine the different ways extra-evolutionary species pluralists may
interpret the ‘cross-cutting’ metaphor. To save space, I take it that an extra-
evolutionary species pluralist could admit all the sorts of cross-cutting that
the evolutionary species pluralist might, but will go further. One way of
seeing this is that the extra-evolutionary species pluralist does not rule out
species concepts that pick out polyphyletic groups. But we may also see (1)
a distinction between evolutionary and structural space, or (2) a distinction
13See also (de Queiroz, 2005b, 6602).
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between the Tree of Life and the Web of Life. These are very different ways
of conceiving of cross-classification.
Kitcher’s account may be interpreted as offering a distinction between evo-
lutionary and structural space. Filling in some more of the details of his
account, his distinction between different types of species is based on Mayr’s
similar distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations. Roughly
speaking, proximate explanations are structural, functional, or teleological in
nature. Ultimate explanations are evolutionary explanations of the proximate
explanations provided by structural, functional and teleological explanations.
Kitcher removes the requirement that his structural properties are subordi-
nate to the historical properties, though there is of course some relationship
between the two. Some evolutionary path could lead to a novel structural
group. For example, a monophyletic species could have developed a new type
of wing, distinct in origin from the wings of bats, birds, and bugs. That is, it
seems possible that a structural and a historical species concept could pick out
equi-inclusive groups. However, it does not seem that in this case we would
want to say we have the same sort of species, as we might in the case of two
historical (evolutionary) species concepts picking out the same group. This is
because, even though these groups are equi-inclusive now, it could be the case
that something else also independently develops the same sort of structure
(making that structure a homoplasy).
Thus, if it’s right to say that even when Kitcher’s structural and historical
species concepts pick out the same group of organisms they do not pick out
the same species, then what is it that these concepts are cross-cutting? If we
keep things at the metaphorical level, the historical concepts are carving up
something like the Tree of Life, or what we might call evolutionary space. Like-
wise, the structural concepts are carving up something like structural space.
Thus, given that, for Kitcher, there are two radically different sorts of species
concepts, these two sorts will correspond to two different structural spaces:
evolutionary and structural.
When it comes to explicating what is meant by cross-cutting, Dupré him-
self gives limited suggestions. His work is mostly aimed at demonstrating and
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defending what he calls “promiscuous realism”: “The realism derives from the
fact that there are many sameness relations that serve to distinguish classes
of organisms in ways that are relevant to various concerns; the promiscuity
derives from the fact that none of these relations is privileged” (Dupré, 1981,
82). According to Dupré’s anti-reductive approach to natural kinds in gen-
eral: “there are many different kinds of things in the world, from physically
simple things like electrons or quarks, to very complex things such as planets,
elephants, or armies. Many or all these things, in my view, have equal claims
to reality” (2008, 12). All of these things are real, because they have causal
powers not reducible to the powers of their constituent ‘parts.’ The details of
how this form of realism applies to biology, and to species in particular, are
not always clear.
When it comes to a distinction like Kitcher’s, Dupré claims that “There is
no doubt at all that interesting structural or physiological properties crosscut
any possible phylogenetically based classification” (Dupré, 1999, 13). How-
ever, what is clear from his discussion of folk taxonomy, the taxonomy of gas-
tronomes (e.g., the distinction between garlic and onions), and biology proper
is that different classifications are based on different interests: “Even within bi-
ology different interests call for the emphasis of different distinctions” (Dupré,
1981, 83). Further, “there is no uniquely correct way of classifying organisms:
different investigative interests dictate different and often cross-cutting modes
of classification” (Dupré, 2008, 17). This might suggest that what it is that is
being cross-cut is, in fact, our interests, which would thus suggest that he is
advocating for a sophisticated form of relativism, and not pluralism. However,
he does also note that the existence of species can be seen as a map of individ-
ual organisms into clusters and bumps on a multidimensional quality space.
This would suggest something more akin to reading Kitcher as suggesting that
there is something like a structural space. Given Dupré’s focus on ecology, it
might also be useful to employ something like the web of life metaphor as a
contrast to tree of life metaphor. In fact, he says as much when discussing
problems in determining the phylogenies of microbial life forms: “the genetic
relations between microbes do not really form a unique tree at all, but rather
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a web. It may be useful for particular purposes to represent the evolutionary
relations between microbes in the form of a tree, but we must remember that
this is an abstraction from a much more complex reality. The web of life and
the tree of life itself would be two different ways of cutting up the world”
(Dupré, 2008, 21). Species, perhaps, would correspond to either strands of the
web or branches on the tree.
Another possibility that comes from considering Dupré’s more recent work
on developing a process ontology for biology. Though it is difficult to distill
anything useful for the matter at hand from that work, given the blurriness
that a process ontology is supposed to reflect, perhaps viewing species as pro-
cesses suggests that these underlying biological spaces, to use the metaphor
just developed, are not as discontinuous from one another as the extra-evolutionary
species pluralist might suggest. Thus, not only is it not that case that “Nothing
in biology makes sense except in the light of evolutionary theory,” but what
does make sense in biology is not easily compartmentalized into discrete cate-
gories like Kitcher’s structural and historical properties. We might not easily
be able to separate biology itself into distinct domains governed by different
theories. Developing a coherent form of extra-evolutionary species pluralism
will of course require much more work than evolutionary species pluralism, this
is meant only as a suggestion of how to go forward. If we are species plural-
ists because our best biological theories are disunified, then we need to know
what sort of disunity we are talking about, and whether there would then be
anything more than a common name to the different senses of ‘species.’ Evo-
lutionary pluralists, who at least retain a certain unity of biology, can always
appeal to evolutionary theory to show what is common to the different senses
of ‘species.’ What should be at least clear is that it is far more intellectu-
ally fruitful to ask these sorts of questions of pluralists, questions about what
concepts they rule out, about the reasons they rule them out, and questions
about how the concepts they admit relate to one another, rather than asking
them what their stance is on the species category.
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3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that focusing on what species pluralism implies
about the species category problem drastically oversimplifies what is at stake
for biological practice when it comes to the different forms of species pluralism
that we have to choose from. One main distinction we need to make is between
evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism. However, there are
different forms of these two different kinds of species pluralism. In order to
distinguish between those forms, we need to ask two questions. First, what
concepts, and on what basis, does each form of species pluralism allow for?
Second, how do the admissible concepts (cross-)cut up the biological world?
These questions are separate from what pluralism entails about the species
category, and they are separate from each other, because we can allow for
multiple species concepts, but not allow for any sort of cross-classification.
Failure to give explicit answers to these two questions has blurred and will
continue to blur important distinctions between the different forms of species
pluralism.
Further, on any resolution of the species category problem for pluralism, we
also (1) still need to come to a further ontological decision about what species
taxa are, and (2) a pragmatic decision about when, where, and how to use the
species concepts that we accept as legitimate. These two issues are intimately
connected with asking pluralists about (1) which concepts are legitimate, and
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This chapter concerns the relationship between species pluralism and the
species taxa problem. Species taxa are the sorts of entities that our Linnean
binomials refer to, e.g., Castor canadensis, Alopex lagopus, Branta canadensis,
etc. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the essentialism story tells us that the tradi-
tional approach treated species taxa as natural kinds with fixed essences. From
the standpoint of modern evolutionary theory this approach has been widely
deemed unacceptable. There are now numerous alternatives to the traditional
approach: species as (1) individuals (Ghiselin, 1974; Hull, 1976), (2) natural
cluster kinds (Boyd, 1999a,b), (3) some mixture of both individuals and kinds
(Griffiths, 1999; Millikan, 1999; Rieppel, 2013), (4) plural particulars (Slater,
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2013; Simons, 2013), (5) sets (Kitcher, 1984a,b; Valen, 1988), or (6) processes
(Rieppel, 2009; Dupré, 2012). Deciding between these ontological frameworks,
and getting clearer about what’s at stake between them, is the species taxon
problem. I will not be providing reasons for choosing one framework over the
others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways in which species
pluralism changes the ways in which the species taxon problem is resolved.
I reconsider the two main forms of species pluralism that were developed
in the last chapter: evolutionary and extra-evolutionary species pluralism. As
we saw there, the various forms of species pluralism differ both in terms of
what theory or theories they take to be central to species, and also in the ways
they allow different species concepts to cross-classify one another. Thus, in
this chapter, I evaluate what species pluralism implies about the species taxon
problem by considering the following questions.
First, to what extent are forms of species pluralism and solutions to the
species taxon problem emphasizing the significance of the same sorts of prop-
erties? As we saw in Chapter 3, both modern forms of species pluralism are
at least partially grounded in evolutionary theory to avoid collapsing into rel-
ativism. From a pluralist perspective, this gives us reason to attribute some
historical properties to some species, since both views recognize the legitimacy
of species concepts that group species on the basis of their relational, historical
properties, rather than on the basis of shared intrinsic similarities that obtain,
for the most part, amongst the individual member organisms. I’m focusing on
this aspect of species pluralism, because it tracks well with what is at stake be-
tween different ontological accounts of species, and with the essentialism story
that was discussed in Chapter 2. Further, there is a growing consensus that
certain ontological frameworks are better at emphasizing historical properties
(e.g., Ereshefsky, 2001; Wilkins, 2003), while others are better at emphasizing
the intrinsic similarities (cf. Sterelny, 1994; Dupré, 2001; Ereshefsky, 2014b).
Focusing on this feature of ontological frameworks will give us some means for
finding the right framework for the different forms of pluralism. This is an im-
portant move to make, because many species pluralists, as we saw in Chapter
3, have focused on what pluralism implies about the nature of the species cat-
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egory, and have not always been explicit about what pluralism implies about
the nature of species taxa. Here I will show that evolutionary species plu-
ralists are going to require frameworks that emphasize historical properties,
while extra-evolutionary species pluralists may be better off accepting some
form of ontological framework pluralism. Second, to what extent are different
solutions to the species taxon problem compatible with the cross-classification
required by most forms of species pluralism? As we saw in Chapter 2 and
3, there are many ways to understand the cross-cutting metaphor endemic to
pluralism. Though not all pluralists accept cross-classification, it is worth con-
sidering whether or not the different ontological frameworks that have been
proposed for species can handle this demand. If they can, then there is a way
to be a species pluralist, but an ontological framework monist.
This investigation will help us understand the implications species plural-
ism has for species ontology, and in turn help us further understand what is at
stake between different forms of species pluralism. What is at issue is whether
or not a particular form of species pluralism will imply a further sort of plu-
ralism: ontological framework pluralism. In order to address this problem,
I will first explain the difference between species pluralism and ontological
framework pluralism.
4.1 Species Pluralism and Species Concepts
Many people have thought that the debate about species taxa and the debate
about species concepts amount to the same thing, though perhaps from dif-
ferent angles. This thought is underwritten by a tacit assumption of species
monism. Many have thought that different species concepts imply different
ontological views of species, e.g., that a phenetic species concept implies that
species are types and that an evolutionary or that the biological species con-
cept implies that species are individuals. Monists assume that if we have the
right species concept, we can read the ontology off it, or, alternatively, and as
we saw in Chapter 2, monists can use views about the ontological status of
species to argue against particular species concepts. If you are a monist, there
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is one true species concept, one ideal system of biological classification, and
one ontological account of species.
For a pluralist, species concepts may also be seen to have ontological impli-
cations. However, it is difficult to fully determine the implications pluralism
for species because the different solutions to the species taxa problem are also
trying to tell us what species are: individuals, natural kinds, sets, etc., but
in a different way than the way species concepts do. Debates about species
concepts, the species category and species taxa have all been caught up with
about monism, pluralism and relativism. Thus, answering our question about
the relationship between pluralism and the nature of species taxa requires (1)
understanding the constraints different forms of pluralism place on the species
concepts they take to be legitimate, and (2) an understanding of how to apply
the constraints in a way that gives us a clear sense of the required ontological
framework to ground the reality of species.
Species pluralists at minimum admit more than one ‘best’ concept, but
there are still constraints upon which concepts get recognized. Constraints
may stem from interpretations of biological theory or from understanding how
concepts are used in practice. As we saw in the last chapter, accounts of species
pluralism are largely informed by what we think biological theory implies about
species, and that theory is usually evolutionary theory.1 In Chapter 5 I will
look at the relationship between pluralism and biological practice.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the main factor that divides pluralists into
separate camps concerns their stance on evolution. Evolutionary species plu-
ralists interpret evolutionary theory as fundamental to our understanding of
‘species,’ and extra-evolutionary species pluralists believe there is more to
species than their role in evolution. This means that for evolutionary species
pluralists all legitimate species concepts must be compatible with evolutionary
theory, though there are different ways of satisfying this demand. Some have
argued that species are not special entities distinct from other taxa, and that
1Many have argued for a long time that the ontological status of species taxa is theory-
dependent (e.g., Hull, 1976). This thesis is an extended argument for the view that species
pluralism depends on biological theory and practice.
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all recognized entities must form monophyletic groups (Mishler and Donoghue,
1982; Mishler and Brandon, 1987, 1989). Some have argued that species are
special, and that they may either be monophyletic groups or interbreeding
groups (de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988, 1990). Some have also argued that
there are several types of species, some of which we may not yet recognize, and
that all are shaped by the different cross-cutting forces of evolution (Ereshef-
sky, 1992, 2001). According to extra-evolutionary species pluralism, on the
other hand, some admissible species concepts will ultimately explain what a
species is by way of evolutionary theory, and some will not. Again, there are
different ways of being this type of pluralist. Some have argued that we need to
recognize species that share structural similarities in addition to the historical
entities evolutionary theory requires us to recognize (Kitcher, 1984a,b, 1989).
Some have argued that we need to recognize species that are governed by eco-
logical, or other biological theory, in addition to those evolutionary entities
that we recognize (Dupré, 1993, 1996, 1999). Since no reasonable species plu-
ralist denies that evolutionary theory has some bearing on species, we should
start by considering the implications evolutionary theory has for species on-
tology. This path is well-trodden.
The key implication evolutionary theory has for the species taxon debate
lies in the notion of a ‘lineage,’ which is an ancestor-descendant sequence. A
lineage is a spatio-temporally continuous entity (cf. Ereshefsky, 1991, 87). For
evolutionists, species are special types of lineages, as many prominent species
concepts suggest. Thus, species must be spatio-temporally continuous enti-
ties that are created by speciation events and destroyed by extinction. The
argument for this lineage-centric view of species is referred to as the ‘evolu-
tionary unit’ argument (Hull, 1976, 180-181). I have formulated the argument
below to show how it could apply to both forms of species pluralism. The
evolutionists will require all species to form spatio-temporally continuous lin-
eages, the extra-evolutionists will only require that some species form lineages.
Evolutionary monists can also accept this argument as formulated:
1. (Some) species are entities capable of evolution by natural selection
2. Entities capable of evolution by natural selection are lineages
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3. Lineages are spatiotemporally continuous
∴ (Some) species are spatiotemporally continuous entities.2
Pluralists accept this argument, but argue that there are different types of
lineages that ought to be recognized as species. Evolutionists must accept that
all of the different types of species form different sorts of lineages, but there
will be room for disagreement about whether they must all be monophyletic.
Polyphyletic groups do not constitute lineages, and will not be recognized
by these sorts of pluralists. If this sort of pluralist only wants to recognize
monophyletic groups as species, then there is no need to worry about cross-
classification, because there will still be a single, optimal classification of life
into species. Extra-evolutionary species pluralists, on the other hand will
accept the argument, but argue that the first premise, and thus the conclusion,
is true for only some species. That is, these sorts of pluralists will recognize
that some species form polyphyletic groups. The difference between these
forms of species pluralism is the scope and the degree to which evolutionary
theory, or other biological theory, governs which sort of species concepts we
accept as legitimate.
In sum, species pluralists invoke aspects of biological theory to wade through
the swamp of species concepts, but they disagree about which aspects are rel-
evant. In this sense extra-evolutionary species pluralists have less constraints
than their evolutionary counterparts, because they are willing to point out that
there is more to biology than just evolution (Dupré, 1999, 13). Most pluralists
use accepted biological theory to rule out, or at least reinterpret, typological
and phenetic species concepts, as both fail to be grounded in evolutionary
theory, or some other well-formed biological theory.3 However, in many cases,
phenetic species will match other species concepts, including the BSC, PSC,
and ESC. The upshot is that on either form of species pluralism we are going
to need an ontological framework that captures the spatio-temporally contin-
uous nature of (some) species. But a more general question we need to ask




before we look at the differences between solutions to the species taxon prob-
lem is how many ontological frameworks does a species pluralist need? Again,
monism has been assumed in the species taxon debates just as much as it has
been in the species concept debates.
4.2 Ontological Framework Pluralism
Species pluralism is most straightforwardly a view about species concepts, but
it has implications for our ontological understanding of species taxa. As we will
see in the following section, the species taxon debate has resolved itself into
a dialectic between viewing species as individuals or natural kinds, although
there are alternative views of species that attempt to get around problems
with both views. Different species pluralists will require different ontological
frameworks, and some pluralists will require multiple frameworks. In this
section I will argue that if you are an extra-evolutionary species pluralist, then
you have good reason to accept ontological framework pluralism.
Kitcher’s (1984b) two-set pluralism represents a clear enough instance of
ontological framework pluralism, except for the fact that all species are sets.
On his account, there are two very different sorts of properties, structural
and historical, which are taken to be constitutive of two very different sorts
of species. Structural and historical properties are used in different sorts of
explanations, and neither sort of explanation is reducible to the other. Some
examples of structural explanations are: the mechanical accounts of normal
and abnormal meiosis, of respiration and digestion, of details of physiological
functioning. Some examples of historical explanations are: those that iden-
tify the evolutionary forces which shaped morphology, behaviour, ecology, and
distribution of organisms. Species are grouped as such for explanatory rea-
sons, but there are two distinct, non-unifiable reasons for grouping organisms
together as a species.
If we disregard Kitcher’s focus on sets4, but retain the general notion that
there are two very different sorts of species, historical and structural, we may
4See Sober (1984) and Brogaard (2004) for some problems with viewing species as sets.
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want to have one ontological framework for each. This would be an instance
of ontological framework pluralism. There are many ways we could combine
ontological frameworks. For example, we might hold that some species are
individuals, some are processes, some are pluralities, and some something else.
But what justifies, or stands in the way of, the inference from species pluralism
to ontological framework pluralism? Hull, a staunch supporter of the view that
species are individuals (SAI), a view we will see more of shortly, has objected
to ontological framework pluralism on the grounds that it would violate the
unity of science:
From the point of view of some other theory or from a future version
of evolutionary theory, anything is possible. However, I believe
sufficiently in the unity of science to maintain that eventually all
scientific theories must be compatible. If one theory requires that
species be spatiotemporally restricted and another that they be
spatiotemporally unrestricted, at least one of these theories must
be false (1976, 189-190).
If Hull is correct about this, then reading extra-evolutionary species pluralism
as implying ontological framework pluralism means that we must deny such
a ‘unity of science’ thesis. This, however, is exactly what extra-evolutionary
species pluralists are arguing for! Thus, holding a unity thesis about the theory
that governs species will stand in the way of ontological framework pluralism.
But does holding onto Hull’s unity of science thesis imply species monism?
As we will see, evolutionary species pluralism can be made compatible with
ontological framework monism. Aristotle, as we saw in Chapter 2, is a pluralist
about species, but a monist about frameworks, as he allows for a certain type
of cross-classification and holds a version of species essentialism. Many forms
of species pluralism do not conflict with Hull’s thesis. In the next section I
will also consider whether one can be an ontological framework monist while
denying Hull’s thesis.
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4.3 Species Pluralism and Species Taxa
The species taxon problem has been framed by the essentialism story in a way
similar to the way debates about species concepts were. In both cases we have
widespread agreement that the traditional approach to species has failed. For
species concepts, the story tells us that the typological species concept fails
to fit with evolution. For species taxa, species can no longer be thought of as
paradigmatic natural kinds with fixed essences, because species evolve. The
dialectic that has ensued in the species taxon debate was largely set by Hull
who presented us with a disjunction, species are either classes or individuals:
“By “individuals” I mean spatiotemporally localized cohesive and continuous
entities (historical entities). By “classes” I intend spatiotemporal unrestricted
classes, the sorts of things which can function in traditionally-defined laws of
nature” (Hull, 1978, 336). For example, an organism, a chunk of gold, and the
CN tower, are all individuals. Gold, water, and electron, are all classes. As
we will see, much has been disputed about the status of Hull’s disjunction and
the “true” status of species.
Species pluralists recognize the need to incorporate evolutionary under-
standings of species. Thus, some of the species concepts requiring an ontolog-
ical framework will involve recognizing lineages, which are spatio-temporally
continuous entities. These sorts of species concepts will differ in whether they
specify that organisms of the same species must share a common niche, evo-
lutionary fate, geographic location, etc., If a species pluralist wants to be an
ontological framework monist, the so-called traditional approach will be ruled
out, e.g., a full-blown intrinsic essentialism, where species are solely consti-
tuted by their intrinsic properties (their genetic makeup), regardless of what
historical properties they may bear. I will now review some of the remaining
frameworks that pluralists have available to them.
4.3.1 Species as Individuals
Species as individuals (SAI) is the view that species are concrete, spatio-
temporally restricted objects, namely lineages, which have organisms for parts
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(Ghiselin, 1966, 1969, 1974, 1987, 1989, 1995, 1997, 1999; Hull, 1974, 1975,
1976, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1989b). One way of understanding this view comes
from considering species as analogous to individual organisms. As a mosquito’s
wing is part of its body, so is the mosquito biting my arm part of Culex tarsalis
(Hull, 1976, 181). The analogy isn’t perfect, individual organisms still pos-
sess a fixed genetic makeup that doesn’t change much over the course of their
existence, whereas the genetic makeup of a species is not like this. This is
presented as the first novel approach to species, and is argued for as an alter-
native to the traditional approach: the view that species are spatiotemporally
unrestricted classes of organisms. SAI is perhaps the most popular framework
among biologists (e.g., Mayr, 1978, 52) and the received view in philosophy of
biology. It is a testament to its popularity that some have even argued that
compatibility with SAI is a means of ruling out illegitimate species concepts
(Mayden, 1999, 97). This itself goes to show how well people believe SAI fits
with evolutionary theory, and the historical properties it requires.
Hull’s disjunction, species are either spatiotemporally unrestricted classes
(e.g., gold, water) or they are spatiotemporally restricted individuals (e.g.,
organisms, organs), has set a certain dialectic. One argues for one view on
the basis of the other being false, or having arguments against it. Typically
SAI is argued for on the basis of species not being classes, because they are
spatiotemporally restricted, and can be formulated roughly as follows:
1. If species were spatio-temporally unrestricted classes, then species could
be historically disconnected
2. No species can be historically disconnected
∴ Species are not spatio-temporally unrestricted classes (cf. Kitcher, 1984b)
Evolutionary theory is brought in to support the second premise, since it
demands a certain spatio-temporal connection between organisms that belong
to the same species. SAI is offered as a viable alternative that succeeds in
capturing this connection where the traditional view fails. This argument isn’t
the only one for SAI, there are of course some positive reasons in favour of
the view. Friends of SAI have argued that their view explains why species are
named ostensively. In practice, biologists provide definitions of species in the
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form of type specimens, but this is not meant to be a real definition. A type
specimen can actually be quite a typical in comparison with its conspecifics. A
type specimen is more of a reference to which the name is anchored. Defenders
of SAI suggest that this should be thought of as ostensively pointing to a part
of the species, i.e., that type specimen of Lynx canadensis there in the museum,
in order to define the group to which it belongs. Advocates of SAI have argued
that their view also explains why a particular species do not figure in any laws
of nature. These are some of the points in favour of the view. Many have
disputed the reasons in favour of SAI, but the way this argument for SAI
sets the dialectic for debates about species taxa is important for us to grasp.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to point out the most important part
of evolutionary theory that the SAI thesis is designed to capture. On this
view, a certain sort of spatio-temporal connectivity is necessary for a group of
organisms to be considered a species. A certain cohesiveness is required (cf.
Brogaard, 2004), one that is due to causal relations between the organisms
(e.g., Ereshefsky and Pedroso, 2013). The main ontological implication of
SAI seems to be that two organisms may be very similar in many respects,
but unless they belong to the same spatio-temporally continuous lineage, they
are not of the same species. These properties are extrinsic to each organism,
and they determine which species an organism belongs to independently of the
intrinsic differences that organisms of the same species may have. The genetic
makeup of individual members of L. canadensis may vary a great deal over
the history of that species’s existence, but each lynx will be part of the same
spatio-temporally continuous lineage. This means that a polyphyletic lineage
cannot form a species.
4.3.2 Species as Natural Kinds
Even if we accept Hull’s dichotomy and the same essentialism story, we might
reach a different conclusion from the one he reached. That is, we might con-
clude that the fact that species evolve does not imply that species are not
natural kinds. All it implies is that we must rethink what it means to be a
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natural kind. We might hold that species are still natural kinds, but they
lack fixed essences. On this view, there is no set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for species membership. The most promising view is that species
are cluster kinds defined by the common possession of some range of theoreti-
cally important property or set of properties. Organisms are still members of
species, not parts of species, but it can be indeterminate whether an organism
belongs to a particular species. This view is designed to explain why we still
make generalizations about particular species, e.g., all lynx have white fur on
their chest. This sort of view can also be made consistent with the denial
that there are laws in the sense of spatio-temporally unrestricted, true gen-
eralizations that apply to particular species, e.g., something could be a lynx
and white fur on its chest, but if we had to bet whether or not some arbitrary
lynx had white fur, it would be a good bet to make. This doesn’t mean it is
impossible for a typical lynx to have chest hair of another colour, just that it
is improbable. Even though species lack fixed essences, belonging to a species
plays an important explanatory role, and thus species should still be thought
of as natural kinds. Knowing that Banjo is a cat, gives me good reason to
think that she is a pet and that she has cat-like reflexes. I could be wrong
about this, Smudge is also a cat who is a pet, but he lacks cat-like reflexes.
There are many further reasons for viewing species as natural kinds, but the
way proponents of this view have responded to negative argument for SAI is
what is crucial.
Consider the evolutionary objection to viewing species as natural kinds:
“Organisms are members of natural kinds, not in virtue of heredity relations,
but in virtue of intrinsic properties. But the evolution of a species taxon
requires that hereditary relations join together the organisms of the taxon”
(Brogaard, 2004, 224). That is, species are not natural kinds, because ground-
ing the “essence” of a species in intrinsic properties is incompatible with the
evolutionary explanation of how a species came to be historically and how it
will change over time. In response to this sort of objection, natural kind the-
orists have tried to accommodate these properties into the kind’s definition.
On this view, belonging to a species is partially determined by the histori-
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cal relations that obtain amongst the individual member organisms, and not
wholly by whatever cluster of intrinsic properties the individual members of a
species have (e.g., Millikan, 1999). However, viewing species as natural kinds
is still primarily a similarity approach to species ontology, because these sorts
of views focus on the mechanisms responsible for different similarities that
obtain amongst members of the same species, e.g., stability, homeostasis, or
common descent. Common descent is not taken as a primary defining property
of species, since it is just one of many causes of similarity.
Again, just because traditional “intrinsic species essentialism” fails, we are
not forced to adopt SAI, we can also reconsider the way we think of similar-
ity. Essentialism is one way of spelling out why the members of a species are
similar, because they share intrinsic essences, but there are alternatives. An
important view to consider is Boyd’s (1989; 1991; 1999a; 1999b; 2010) home-
ostatic property cluster kinds (HPC-kinds) approach. This account of natural
kinds has undergone numerous changes over the years, and not everyone who
advocates it has the same thing in mind. Here I will briefly go over those
which pertain to species.
According to the HPC-kinds approach, species still have something like an
‘essence.’ That is, a discoverable, causally important objective set of proper-
ties that distinguishes a particular species from other species and other taxa.
However, the way we define this underlying ‘essence’ is rather loose and fluid.
On this view, homeostatic mechanisms bring about the co-occurrence of the
properties in the cluster that defines a species. According to Boyd,
The appropriateness of any particular biological species for in-
duction and explanation in biology depends upon the imperfectly
shared and homeostatically related morphological, physiological
and behavioral features which characterize its members. The defi-
nitional role of mechanisms of homeostasis is reflected in the role of
interbreeding in the modern species concept; for sexually reproduc-
ing species, the exchange of genetic material between populations
is thought to be essential to the homeostatic unity of the other
properties characteristic of the species and it is thus reflected in
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species definitions (1991, 142).
As initially formulated, this account of species taxa appears biased in favour
of the biological species concept, which is only one of the concepts that most
pluralists accept. Interbreeding should thus be construed as only one sort of
homeostatic mechanism. Indeed, as the HPC-kind view has developed, Boyd
and others have hedged their bets about which homeostatic mechanisms are
crucial to our understanding of species. This is partly due to the fact that
HPC-kind theory is developing against a certain backdrop: the essentialism
story. This means that most explications of this view focus on how it can
capture what we may want from the so-called traditional approach, by hav-
ing a more nuanced understanding of natural kinds. Though, the vagueness
about which mechanisms are relevant also constitutes a wariness about making
an explicit decision about which species concepts are legitimate. As we saw
in Chapter 1, many species concepts are fairly explicit about what makes a
species come into and go out of existence. The important point here is that
species on this view are apt for induction. We can predict with better than
chance accuracy that a particular cat will have cat-like reflexes, yet this does
not require that there are necessary and sufficient properties for being a cat.
But how does this sort of view account for the spatio-temporal restricted-
ness that many think evolution forces upon our understanding of species, the
requirement that species form continuous lineages?
According to Millikan’s (1999) account, HPC-kinds should be thought of
as historical kinds. Millikan points out that for species the reference to in-
terbreeding, which Boyd accepts, restricts particular species to some actual
historical location. Historical properties are an important part of what the
biological species concept and similar species concepts capture. In a similar
fashion, the reference to ‘lineage’ in many other species concepts (e.g., the
ecological, phylogenetic or evolutionary species concept) also should incline us
toward explicitly historicizing HPC-kinds. Though if we were using only a
phenetic species concept, a concept she seems to reject, we would not require
that the kind be historicized. Thus, Millikan concludes: “Biological kinds are
defined by reference to historical relations among the members, not, in the first
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instance, by reference to properties. Biological kinds are, as such, historical
kinds” (1999, 54). On her account, there is a certain historical link between
the members of the kind that causes them to resemble one another. Two sorts
of things function to preserve this link. First, something akin to reproduction
or copying has produced all the various kind members from one another or
from the same models. This way of stating the case doesn’t rely solely on the
biological species concept, which, as we saw in the first two chapters, refuses
to recognize asexual species as real species. Second, the various kind mem-
bers have been produced in or in response to the very same ongoing historical
environment.5
In a response to Millikan (1999), Boyd agrees with her that HPC-kinds are
always historical kinds, and argues that the members of some given species:
1. are like one another, not because of a shared eternal essences,
but because of historical relations between them;
2. exhibit the properties of the kind because the other members
exhibit them;
3. support induction because such inductions are ‘grounded’ be-
cause there is a certain kind of historical link between the
members, for which reason the members are like one another;
and
4. are modally, spatially and historically delimited so that, for
example, Homo sapiens could not occur on Twin Earth. (Boyd,
1999b, 68)
With this development in view, HPC-kind theory looks a lot more like the
SAI thesis, aside from the emphasis on the HPC-kind being explanatory, or
supporting inductive inferences. Of course some differences remain to be ex-
plored. According to SAI we ought to think of organisms as parts of species,
5She also has some objections to Hull’s claim that because SAI is true, species do not
function in scientific laws. On her view, a valid scientific law is just a true, well-grounded
generalization. However, these historical kinds are unlikely to ground true exceptionless
generalizations, which, for what it’s worth, is what Hull takes a law of nature to be.
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and on the HPC view organisms are still members of species. Though there is
a lot of debate about the differences between these views, it is not clear what
is at stake here. For our purposes, differences like this aren’t really telling in
favour of one view over another, especially when both seemingly accept the
same sorts of historical claims about species, e.g., that Homo sapiens cannot
occur on Twin Earth.
In my view, as this dialectic has progressed, the two sides have become
closer and closer to one another. On the difference between SAI and his
own view, Boyd says that “Once we get the metaphysics and epistemology
of natural kinds right, we can see that, even if biological species are, in the
relevant sense, historical individuals, their constituent populations constitute
natural kinds nonetheless. So much for analytic metaphysics!” (Boyd, 1999b,
72). Boyd has also stated that “the distinction between kinds and individuals
is much less important that it might seem” (Boyd, 1999b, 73). It is these sorts
of statements that make the species taxon debate seem like a frustrating waste
of intellectual resources.
I will argue that species pluralists can avail themselves of either ontological
framework, SAI or species as HPC-kinds, but that they need a framework
that places the same restrictions on species as those made by their particular
brand of pluralism. Evolutionary species pluralists range from allowing only
monophyletic groups to also including paraphyletic groups as species. Extra-
evolutionary species pluralists accept polyphyletic groups as species. SAI can
fit with evolutionary species pluralism, because these sorts of pluralists rule out
polyphyletic groups and so does the SAI thesis. But what does the HPC-kind
view have to say about such restrictions?
Ereshefsky (2007, 296) argues against viewing species as HPC-kinds, be-
cause doing so emphasizes similarity to the detriment of phylogenetic ap-
proaches to taxonomy. I show that this objection is not raised against the
HPC-kind approach per se, but against Boyd’s formulation of it. Phyloge-
netic approaches to taxonomy prohibit taxa, species included, from being pa-
raphyletic or polyphyletic groups. As we’ve seen in Chapter 3, Ereshefsky
advocates a form of evolutionary species pluralism that restricts species to
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lineages, but he allows species to be paraphyletic and monophyletic lineages.
Boyd suggests that species do not need to form continuous lineages, albeit
on the basis of cases where species formed by hybridization events evolve, go
extinct, and then re-evolve again. Thus, he allows even polyphyletic groups
to constitute HPC-kinds (1999b, 80; 82). When it comes to his own interpre-
tation of HPC-kind theory, Boyd himself says: “I do not, for better or worse,
hold that HPC kinds are defined by reference to historical relations among
members, rather than by reference to shared properties” (1999b, 80). Boyd’s
view of HPC-kinds then allows similarities to win out over historical proper-
ties. Ereshefsky, I think, puts the point a bit too strongly by suggesting that
HPC-theory “allows taxa to be nongenealogical and hence non-historical enti-
ties” (2007, 296). The point is rather that if we let this version of HPC-theory
rule the day, we will be allowing for more species concepts than what a cer-
tain evolutionary understanding of species concepts (especially phylogenetic
theory) dictates. There are many other approaches to classification in biology.
However, we shouldn’t accept an ontological framework more permissive that
is warranted by a particular brand of species pluralism. The constraints on
species concepts should match.
In sum, an evolutionary species pluralist can accept either SAI or some-
thing like Millikan’s account of HPC-kinds, because these frameworks impose
the same restrictions as evolutionary species pluralism, but not Boyd’s ac-
count of HPC-kinds which accepts polyphyletic groups as species. Millikan’s
account, on the other hand, does not accept that such groups may form species.
According to SAI, species are restricted so that they cannot go in and out of
existence. For the HPC-kind account to fit with evolutionary species plural-
ism, given that it overcomes the other problems with a traditional essentialist
approach to species, a similar restriction needs to be adopted. This however
doesn’t mean that Boyd’s version of HPC-kinds wouldn’t fit with a version of
extra-evolutionary species pluralism. But before we determine whether or not




As we have seen, there is a fairly worn-out dialectic between friends of SAI
and friends of species as natural kinds, especially the HPC-kind view. In
this section I will examine some views that attempt to escape certain aspects
of this debate by denying the dichotomy. Some have held that species are
both individuals and natural kinds, or that species are neither individuals nor
natural kinds, but something else. I argue here that the only alternative to
accepting one side or the other of the disjunction worth considering is onto-
logical framework pluralism, and that this is the main upshot of looking at
the species taxon debate from the perspective of species pluralism. Species
pluralists either restrict species to continuous lineages, or they do not. If a
pluralist restricts some species to continuous lineages, but allows some others
to be unrestricted, then this should be understood as ontological framework
pluralism.
One way of denying the dichotomy is to hold that each species is both an
individual and a natural kind. Rieppel’s (2007; 2013) ‘one of a kind’ view,
tries to combine SAI with the HPC view of natural kinds (cf. Boyd, 1999b;
LaPorte, 2004; Brigandt, 2009; Reydon, 2009). On this view a species is an
individual with organisms for parts, but it is also a ‘one of a kind’ natural
kind. The problem with Rieppel’s one of a kind view, is that it is unclear
what is instantiating the kind. Is it the species as a whole or the organisms
that constitute the whole that instantiate the natural kind? For species to be
natural kinds there must be a certain degree of explanatory power that being
a member of a kind carries. If I say to you that you are one of a kind, I might
as well be saying that you are unique. If I say to you that you are a human
being, then I am implying that you are not unique, and that you share cer-
tain characteristics with other human beings. One would think, that on any
version of species as natural kinds it should be the member organisms that
each individually instantiate the kind to a greater or lesser degree. Rieppel
himself claims that “species are spatiotemporally located complex wholes (in-
dividuals), that are composed of (i.e., include) causally interdependent parts,
which collectively also instantiate a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) nat-
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ural kind” (Rieppel, 2013). It’s not really clear what explanatory power this
sort of one of a kind natural kind would carry. This view is in a way saying
what Boyd already said earlier about there being no real difference between
viewing species as kinds or individuals. In short, this particular way of blurring
the lines between individuals and classes, and getting around the disjunction
seems unprofitable.
However, there are other ways of holding that species are individuals and
natural kinds (or classes in Hull’s sense, rather than according to the HPC-kind
view). For example, one could hold that some species are individuals, some
natural kinds, but no species is both a natural kind and an individual. Perhaps
the species according to the BSC are natural kinds, and all the asexual species
are individuals. Kitcher’s (1984b; 1984a; 1989) “two-set” pluralism is worth
considering in this context. People often argue against viewing species as sets,
classes or kinds on the grounds that these views of species do not preserve the
historical or genealogical criterion that evolutionary theory places on species
ontology (see Crane, 2004). In response to this sort of argument, Kitcher
argues that claims about species as individuals can be translated into talk
about sets. We just need to specify some sort of historical or genealogical
connection as our criterion for set inclusion.6 As we saw in Chapter 3, Kitcher
(1984b; 1984a) argues for a form of extra-evolutionary species pluralism where
species can be either historical or structural sets of organisms. Thus, species
are sets, but, as we noted above, there are just two radically different kinds
of sets. On his view it is not whether species are individuals or natural kinds.
Species are sets that can be grouped on the basis of shared history, or on the
basis of shared structure. However, one might think that this translation move
between individuals and sets cannot be made so easily:
The problem with historical sets, as with all sets, is that sets are ab-
stractions. Sets do not preserve the order and location their mem-
bers have outside the set. In Kitcher’s case historical/genealogical
relations are used as a criterion to determine which organisms are
6See Hull (1978, 336-337) for a similar discussion.
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members of the same set. But the set does not represent or capture
these historical/genealogical relations (Brogaard, 2004, 229).
This might be a very weak objection to viewing species as sets, if we allow
that sets can preserve some of the structure. Sets, according to Brogaard,
just ‘represent’ the concrete aggregation of organisms, but they are not the
same things as the concrete aggregation of organisms. But if we are going to
be such sticklers about sets, one might also wonder whether or not species as
individuals, where individuals are interpreted as mereological sums, as they
are in the dark corners of analytic metaphysics, suffers a similar problem.
On this view of individuals, a sum may preserve order and location, but not
the causal relations between the organisms. As we’ve seen, this is not what
Hull, or anyone else means by SAI. What is clear from this debate is that it
is not a question about whether individuals, or sets, or classes, are the best
ontological frameworks for species, it’s whether they support the requisite
historical properties. And these properties, as far as pluralists are concerned
are varying degrees of restrictions on what sort of historical connectivity is
required for a group to be a species or not. The key thing about Kitcher’s
view is that he recognizes this and tries to keep the two different sorts of
species distinct. Thus, although this view holds that all species are sets, it is
still a form of ontological framework pluralism.
Another way of denying the dichotomy is to accept a view of species as be-
longing to an ontological category distinct from individuals and classes, e.g.,
the view that species are processes (Dupré, 2012; Rieppel, 2009). The impli-
cations of a process ontology for species have yet to be fully worked out, but
this view does seem to capture the contingent, historical nature of species that
evolutionary accounts of species focus on. Further, process ontologies are often
associated with the standard metaphysical accounts of SAI, where species are
understood as perduring, four-dimensional objects, or “space-time worms” (cf.
Reydon, 2008). Boyd, however, interestingly says about his own view that “the
property cluster and homeostatic mechanisms which define a species must be
individuated non-extensionally as a process-like historical entity” (1989, 18).
This raises the same suggestion that viewing the distinction between kinds and
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individuals as merely syntactic does. That is, from some ways of looking at it,
different ontological frameworks all seem to blend into one another.7 But as
we’ve seen with Boyd’s account, the key difference concerns the sorts of histori-
cal groups he is willing to recognize as species (paraphyletic and polyphyletic).
An advocate of SAI would not recognize polyphyletic groups. The debate is
not about the name by which one should call the correct ontological framework
for species. Similar to what we saw in Chapter 3, this is an issue of how evolu-
tionary theory bears on species, and this is what is at stake between different
forms of species pluralism. Further, viewing species as processes seems to fit
with either side of the individuals versus natural kinds controversy on what
sort of groups can be recognized as species.
However, as Dupré develops the process account of species, it is perhaps
not limited by a certain evolutionary understanding of species that fits both
with species as individuals and evolutionary species pluralism. Dupré argues
that the thesis that species are individuals: “is linked to the idea that species
are branches of the evolutionary tree and therefore inherits the limitations
of that idea” (Dupré, 2008, 23). By this, he means the requirement that
species form continuous lineages. Dupré, as we have seen in Chapter 3, has
argued that it may be useful to think of species not just as branches in the
evolutionary process, but also as strands in the web of life. This is all very
metaphorical. However, if we want to view species as playing different roles
in both of these metaphors for the structure of life, then perhaps it is better
to think of species as processes, rather than as individuals. Would this work?
One could argue that there would still be radically different kinds of processes,
one akin to SAI, which fits the evolutionary tree understanding of species, and
one not so strictly limited by space and time. As I understand it, viewing
7Thanks to Matt Barker for this suggestion. There are many views here I’m glossing
over. A more recent contender is species as plural particulars (SPP), which is the view that
a species is just a plurality of organisms (Slater, 2013; Simons, 2013). Simons’s even refers to
SPP as a “thorough-going nominalist” stance, where the base entities are organisms. Slater’s
(2013) defense of SPP also involves an attempt to break down the realism-antirealism
dichotomy about species. Reydon (2015) quite rightly calls this a ‘very light sort’ of realism,
one that comes dangerously close to nominalism. As it stands, SPP seems a rather dubious
ontological framework for species.
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species as processes has yet to be developed fully. Most of Dupré’s work on
developing a process ontology for biology has been done on whether or not
this a viable ontology for other biological ‘individuals,’ like cells, organisms
and viruses. If viewing species as processes is going to be a viable solution to
the species taxon problem, it will have to be on grounds other than those used
to argue for species pluralism. The restriction that species pluralism puts on
this solution to the species taxon problem is the same as that placed on SAI
or the HPC-kind view. If a pluralist restricts species to continuous lineages,
then this restriction needs to be placed on species as processes. As I see it,
the constraints coming from viewing species as processes are unclear.
In sum, the way of denying the dichotomy that works, the way that fits with
extra-evolutionary species pluralism, is ontological framework pluralism. The
other ways of denying the dichotomy either fail to make sense, like Rieppel’s
“one of a kind” view, or collapse into SAI or something like the HPC-kind
view. Species monists have only so many options when they engage in the
species taxon debate. They must choose one side. Holding species pluralism
adds another option to the debate: ontological framework pluralism. But does
a species pluralist need to be committed to ontological framework pluralism,
or can she be an ontological framework monist?
4.4 Cross-Classification
If species pluralism is to be made compatible with ontological framework
monism, we need a framework that can make sense of cross-classification.
This is a further way of spelling out the varying degrees of spatiotemporal
restrictedness that different species pluralists accept. Most accounts of species
pluralism, save monophyletic pluralism (Mishler and Donoghue, 1982; Mish-
ler and Brandon, 1987), and sophisticated forms of quasi-pluralistic monism
(de Queiroz, 1998, 1999, 2005a,c, 2007; Mayden, 1997, 1999; Shun-Ichiro, 2011;
Kendig, 2014), require an ontological framework(s) that will allow for some
overlap between species. But there are different restrictions on what sort of
overlap is permissible. As we saw in Chapter 2, evolutionary species pluralists
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minimize how much cross-classification occurs by restricting species to differ-
ent sorts of continuous lineages. On this view, one organism can belong to
multiple sorts of lineage, but no polyphyletic groups would be recognized as
species. A particular tree could belong to one species that is a monophyletic
group, but could also belong to another species that is a more or less inclusive
polyphyletic group. Extra-evolutionists, on the other hand, are much less re-
strictive in the ways species can overlap one another. Here we might see even
different biological spaces, e.g., historical vs. structural space, cross-classifying
one another. On the evolutionary view, we could map this on to one messy
branching Tree of Life. According to the extra-evolutionary view, we can’t set-
tle with one messy map, we need something more than the Tree of Life. This,
in many ways is similar to Aristotle’s pluralistic approach, as discussed in
Chapter 2, though extra-evolutionary species pluralists are mainly concerned
with the basal group, species, being explanatory, and not all biological groups.
How can the different solutions to the species taxon problem accommodate
these restrictions on cross-classification?
One way of accommodating cross-classification would be to have a differ-
ent framework for every species concept, e.g., ecospecies could be individuals,
phenospecies could be natural kinds with fixed essences, and biospecies could
be Millikan-style HPC-kinds. This is interesting because many people think
that certain species concepts entail certain resolutions to the species taxon
problem. Some have argued that there are differences between modern species
concepts, in that some entail SAI, while others entail that species are natural
kinds (Reydon, 2003; Crane, 2004). Once we determine what sort of species
concepts a pluralist will allow for, we can then read the ontological frame-
work(s) right off those species concepts. If there are straightforward ways of
interpreting what species concepts entail for species ontology, this approach
would make things easy. However, the level of abstraction that solutions to
the species taxon problem operate on is far too general to favour singular
species concepts. The different solutions to the species taxon problem all
fit with multiple species concepts. For SAI, differences in species concepts
can correspond to differences in understanding how the parts of an individual
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species causally interact. That is, SAI as an ontological framework allows for
a plurality of ways of understanding how species causally interact. For the
HPC-kind view, differences in species concepts correspond to differences in
understanding which homeostatic mechanisms are relevant in which particular
case. Here there is also an implicit pluralism about homeostatic mechanisms.
Thus, for the most part solutions to the species taxon problem don’t pick a
winner to the species concept debate. From a pluralist perspective this is a
good thing, because there is no single winner to the species concept debate.
For our purposes we need to look at cross-classification through the way we
developed it in Chapter 3, according to what types of cross-classification are
permitted by different forms of species pluralism. If a solution to the species
taxon problem permits the cross-classification required by a particular form
of species pluralism, then that form of species pluralism is compatible with
ontological framework monism.
Now before we talk about cross-classification any further, let’s consider an
actual example that would fit with the demands of evolutionary species plu-
ralism. Consider some Canadian oaks like Quercus macrocarpa and Quercus
bicolor. Given the biological species concept, and the fact that there is a good
deal of gene flow between members of these groups form hybrids where they
occur together in the wild, these would be considered one species, because
they are not reproductively isolated from one another. Given the ecological
species concept, and the fact that these groups occupy different niches, and
have done so for a very long time, they would be considered two species. In
this case the two species concepts fail to pick out the same groups. Now let’s
consider what solutions to the species taxon problem would say about such a
case.
Can SAI accommodate this form of cross-classification? According to SAI,
some given oak may be both part of the individual Quercus macrocarpa, and
the individual composed of Quercus macrocarpa and Quercus bicolor. Thus,
species pluralism seems perfectly and easily interpretable in terms of indi-
viduals. In fact, some have even argued that SAI entails a form of species
pluralism (Brogaard, 2004, 236-240). This is because there are many processes,
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not just gene-flow as in the biological species concept, that may preserve or
cause species to have cohesion (see Ereshefsky‘s Forces Argument in Chapter
3). The crude notion of SAI fits with multiple lineage based species concepts,
and these fail to yield a single, unified classification of organisms in to species.
Rather, they will yield multiple overlapping mereological sums. This, however,
rests on the back of an assumption that viewing species as natural kinds would
yield a single, unified classification of organisms, but as we have seen this is
not true even for someone as anti-evolutionary thinking as Aristotle.
Can species as natural kinds accommodate the cross-classification demands
of evolutionary species pluralism? Natural kind theory seems highly amenable
to the monist assumption that there is one true system of classification. This
comes from reflecting on the ‘carve nature at its joints’ metaphor endemic to
natural kind literature. Brogaard, for example, argues that viewing species
as natural kinds wouldn’t fit with species pluralism (Brogaard, 2004, 236),
because it cannot accommodate cross-classification. However, on the basis of
the essentialism story, most modern natural kind theorists are more than will-
ing to be a little flexible in how well-defined these ‘joints’ are. It may take
some work to develop an account of natural kinds that ‘butchers nature’ in the
appropriate sense, and so this account, though compatible with species plu-
ralism, may be harder to develop and motivate. One might argue that we are
discovering that nature itself has way more joints than we thought. As we have
discussed in Chapter 2 we have a cross-classifying theory of natural kinds that
goes back as far as Aristotle, and is tied to his rejection of Platonic bifurcating
division. But do we have an account of natural kinds that allows us to say
that a given oak may be a member of the EcSC-kind Quercus macrocarpa,
and the BSC-kind composed of Quercus macrocarpa and Quercus bicolor?
On the HPC-kind account, the differences between these sorts of overlapping
species would amount to differences in homeostatic mechanisms, like gene-flow
and selection pressures, but the general overlap would be explained by way of
common descent.
What about the cross-classification demands of extra-evolutionary species
pluralists? As I argued in Chapter 3, for these to be successful they need to be
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grounded in biological theory that does not reduce to evolutionary theory. The
cross-classificatory demands of evolutionary species pluralists can be grounded
in differing conceptions of how to divide up segments of the tree of life, but
those of extra-evolutionary species pluralism will require a different, separate
structure, and this underlying structure is what constitutes ontological frame-
work pluralism.
Dupré (2001) has suggested that his form of extra-evolutionary species
pluralism is compatible with viewing species as a certain sort of natural kind.
However, he hasn’t been precise about the nature of these sorts of natural
kinds. Dupré’s form of pluralism involves divorcing the units of biological
classification from the units of evolution. He agrees that the units of evolution
are lineages: “Lineages in general are sequences of entities related by ancestry
and descent. The relevant entities in this case are populations, or groups of
interconnected populations. Populations are themselves, I take it, individuals,
and they are the temporal parts of other individuals, lineages” (Dupré, 2001,
213). He thus allows Hull’s evolutionary unit argument to go through, but
maintains that only units of evolution are individuals. The term ‘species,’
according to this view, should not merely refer to a sort of evolutionary unit.
The term ‘species’ should be used as a classificatory unit, and thus, evolution
does not require that all species must be individuals. We should note that
Dupré, for the most part, holds that natural kinds can’t evolve, and claims
that if we are focusing on the lineages, or individuals, that evolve, then this
won’t be good enough to meet all of our taxonomic needs: “many different
concerns, both theoretical and practical, generate an interest in the classifica-
tion of organisms. But unlike the situation generally supposed to obtain in
chemistry, there is no uniform theoretical perspective that will generate such
a classification” (2001, 215-216). Thus on this view, “some species are real
natural kinds, but many are not” (2001, 217). In a footnote he suggests that
Boyd’s HPC-kind theory may be able to support the sorts of kinds required
by his promiscuous realism. However, given that he recognizes the theoreti-
cal, but non-fundamental, importance of understanding species as individuals,
it seems that his view would profit from making this distinction explicit at
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an ontological level. Given that extra-evolutionary species pluralism is based
in theoretical pluralism, ontological framework pluralism seems like the way
to go here. This doesn’t mean that an extra-evolutionary species pluralist
is forced to accept SAI in even the limited sense that Dupré does here, but
that they must accept an ontological framework that is restricted in the way
evolutionary theory demands, and one that is not. Both frameworks could be
versions of the HPC-kind account, both could be versions of species as pro-
cesses, but given the clear separation of restrictions on species coming from
extra-evolutionary species pluralism, this view implies ontological framework
pluralism. But, given that SAI is clearly developed to meet the restrictions of
evolutionary theory only, it won’t be sufficient to meet the cross-classificatory
demands of extra-evolutionary species pluralism.
In sum, all of these ontological frameworks seem at least partly compatible
with cross-classification. That is, they can be developed so as to allow for
cross-classification, even though here I’ve only suggested how this may work.
It may not be as easy for some ontological frameworks as it is for others. For
natural kinds, it seems difficult, due to the way that these are tied to the
‘carve nature at its joints’ metaphor many have taken natural kind theory to
be consistent with monism, and not pluralism. However, for a natural kind
theorist to admit of cross-classification, a more relaxed account of kinds may
allow some overlap, because this is a different sort of cross-classification than
what an essentialist like Aristotle admits. For SAI cross-classification at first
seems less problematic, but this is partly due to the much looser and scattered
cohesion that species are thought to have, if interpreted as individuals, over
something even more cohesive, like an individual organism. However, given
the similar spatio-temporal restrictions that evolutionary species pluralism and
SAI put on species, SAI is a poor choice for the cross-classificatory demands
of extra-evolutionary species pluralism. Thus, there is nothing about cross-
classification in and of itself that leads us to ontological framework pluralism.
The theoretical pluralism advocated by extra-evolutionary species pluralists
requires ontological framework pluralism.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the relationship between species pluralism
and the species taxon problem. The short version is that species pluralism
does not resolve the debate. But given that species pluralism doesn’t tell us
that one species concept is correct (it tells us that some are) this isn’t sur-
prising. In similar fashion, some ontological frameworks may be suitable from
a pluralist perspective. This is not uninformative, because monism tells us
absolutely nothing about what species are, only that we need to seek a unified
concept and ontological framework for species. Species pluralism, however is
compatible with multiple species concepts, but in order to be distinct from
relativism, pluralism must be tied to biological theory. It is this tie to theory
that is important. Extra-evolutionary species pluralism fits with ontological
frameworks that can capture both ‘intrinsic’ and historical properties. Evo-
lutionary species pluralism minimally requires an ontological framework that
captures historical properties. However, we still need to be clear about the na-
ture of these historical properties, for example, if species are path-dependent
entities, rather than entities with merely essential origins, then this will have
implications for the sorts of ontological frameworks suitable for species plural-
ism (Ereshefsky, 2014b). On this view, it is not the origin that is important to
species, but the entire path they follow as they evolve from other species until
their extinction or speciation into new species. I will leave this for another
time. In the next and final chapter, I will put species pluralism into practice.
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Chapter 5
Species Concepts as Tools




On the basis of the forms of species pluralism discussed in the last two chap-
ters, I develop species pluralism so that it can explain and guide biological
practice. Hitherto the focus for pluralists and many monists has largely been
on conceptual and ontological issues. This chapter makes a novel contribution
to the literature by putting species pluralism into practice. I offer an approach
to what we may call the ‘species concept application’ problem, which I argue
is distinct from the so-called ‘species-taxon’ and ‘species-category’ problems.
I sharpen the different forms of species pluralism by exploring the ‘species
concepts as tools’ metaphor on the basis of a case study in yeast systematics.
As shown in Chapter 3, a pluralist may rule out certain species concepts as
unsuitable tools for systematic work by the lights of biological theory, but my
aim is to be more discerning. Pluralists have suggested that different concepts
work well for different areas of biology, but what this means remains under-
explored. Rather than ask on what grounds a concept is legitimate by the
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lights of biological theory, one can ask on what grounds concepts are legiti-
mately applied. As we saw in Chapter 2, part of the reason species pluralism
has become defensible is that there are so many different species concepts cur-
rently in use. Pluralists need to develop an account of how a species concept
can be used well or misused, which remains an under-explored topic. The aim
of this present Chapter is to explore how different concepts can be applied
adequately in a given context of inquiry.
Pluralists are in some sense splitters. They wish to split up the concept
‘species’ or the species category into many, related and similarly governed sub-
concepts (e.g., ecospecies, biospecies, etc.). But they are not relativists, and
do not want to go on splitting indefinitely or arbitrarily. Partly because of
this felt need for constraints, most pluralists have allowed for overlap between
different sorts of species concepts.1 The different types of permissible overlap
are spoken of generically, as we have seen in previous chapters, by the term
“cross-classification.” When it comes to application, being explicit about what
sort of cross-classification are permissible helps us learn about when a partic-
ular species concept is appropriate. There may be domains where a certain
sort of species concept is always inappropriate, for example, the traditional
account of the biological species concept, where species are reproductively iso-
lated populations, seems wholly inappropriate for talking about groups of any
asexual form of life. A monist who noted such a failure of universality in their
preferred concept, could accept that asexual forms of life fail to form species.
A pluralist can note this as a limitation in the applicability of one concept
among many. Each concept has its limitations, for there are many different
ways of producing and maintaining species.
Most species pluralists often stress the separation of legitimate species
concepts, rather than the extent to which they might be integrated. This
non-integrative approach to pluralism suggests that each species concept will
present us with a different classification of life that is suited for an entirely dif-
ferent purpose. Separating species concepts in this way might give us multiple
1Though as we saw in Chapter 3 monophyletic pluralism is not a form of pluralism that
allows for overlap.
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true trees of life. This implies a one-to-one correspondence between success-
ful applications of a species concept and a species, which means we cannot
use two or more species concepts together to delineate one species. However,
close attention to the way concepts are applied in the midst of the conceptual
pluralism suggests otherwise.
Even though multiple species concepts are often used together to delineate
a single species, it is still true that in general these species concepts sometimes
do not isolate the same groups. Delineating a new species involves a diverse
array of data, molecular, biogeographical, morphological, etc. (e.g., Lachance
and Fedor, 2014). And different species concepts will make use of this data
in different ways. A form of pluralism that allows species concepts to be
used together as tools to extract taxonomic information from such data is
called for. Given this sort of research, a pluralist will need a rationale to
determine whether or not a species concept is being used well or not in a
particular area. In order to elucidate the species as tools metaphor, I provide
a case study on how concepts are used by yeast taxonomists studying the
large-spored Metschnikowia clade. On the basis of this study, I argue that:
(1) there can be a many-to-one correspondence between species concepts and
species; (2) despite two sorts of arguments from consilience for species monism
(Ruse, 1987; Richards, 2010), this fact is acceptable to the species pluralist.
As we have seen in Chapter 3, most accounts of species pluralism that
focus on reading pluralism off of biological theory do not say much about how
species concepts interact. On an uncharitable reading, this means that even
when different species concepts pick out equi-inclusive groups of organisms by
way of different biological properties, we have two different co-located entities.
For example, if I use a biological species concept on some birds and pick
out the black-capped chickadees from the Carolina chickadees because they
don’t interbreed, and I also separate them from each other according to a
morphological species concept by the greyness of their napes, I don’t thereby
have four different species! Ruse is correct in this case, where these features
align we have more reason to mark these populations as two separate species.
This is a puzzle that pluralists need to address. I will address this puzzle by
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applying toolbox theorizing to species pluralism, and by looking at how species
concepts are used by biologists attempting to discover new species.
5.1 Toolbox Theorizing
The toolbox metaphor has floated around for a while in discussions of scientific
pluralism. Chang, for example notes that “pluralism in science is just as natural
as wanting to have various types of tools in our toolbox, or having different
types of shoes in our cabinet to suit different occasions” (2012, 273). This way
of talking about the toolbox is largely put to a pedagogical use in explaining
what pluralism is. Though this aspect is important, it offers us very little
guidance for how pluralism fits with scientific practice. Brigandt (Brigandt,
2006, 2011, 2012) has developed a nuanced account of scientific concepts as
tools in terms of their reference, inferential role, and the epistemic goal pursued
by a concept’s use. Brigandt’s framework has been applied to concepts like
homology, gene, and evolutionary novelty, though his framework has yet to be
applied in detail to species. I will develop the toolbox metaphor for species
further by examining Waters’ (2011) account of toolbox theorizing for the
Price Equation, and then Stanford’s use of the toolbox metaphor in evaluating
Kitcher’s brand of extra-evolutionary species pluralism.
Waters’ (2011) account of toolbox theorizing offers perhaps the most useful
way to interpret the purposes to which we put theories, concepts and mod-
els. The basic idea comes from a distinction he makes between two different
sorts of realists: fundamentalists and toolbox theorists. For fundamentalists
the world is made up of natural kinds of processes, and there is a one-to-one
correspondence between a token process and its true model. For toolbox the-
orists there is a possibly messy world, because for a given token process, some
concepts and models might be useful for constructing correct accounts of some
aspects of this process, others for other aspects. For species pluralists however,
the same entities, species, will often be accounted for using different models,
species concepts.
In order to elucidate what he means by toolbox theorizing, Waters argues
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that different versions of the Price equation (a covariance equation that deter-
mines the change in allele frequency of a population), or ‘tools in a box,’ are
needed. Neither version is fundamentally correct. Rather, the appropriateness
of the ‘tool’ depends on the question. If biologists want to know what would
happen if selection were eliminated by changing the environment, one version
will suffice. If we want to know what would happen if transmission bias were
increased, another version will suffice. Both versions provide informative, par-
tial causal decompositions. The causal landscape is complex, and there are
many legitimate ways of providing a ‘parsing of causes.’ However, applying
Waters’ strategy here to species concepts is not a straightforward procedure.
I will now make some suggestions about how to apply Waters’ strategy in the
case of species.
One problem with applying toolbox theorizing to species concerns the no-
tion of a ‘parsing of causes’ (cf. Kellert et al., 2006). This comes about in the
context of the Price equation for good reason, but with species we might be
more concerned to talk about a ‘parsing of objects.’ Most pluralists (and even
some monists) will accept that certain aspects of our classificatory practices
do not attempt to uncover the causal structure of the world (e.g., consider the
use of a phenetic species concept as discussed in Chapter 1). Thus, we are
going to need an account of toolbox theorizing that fits with the fact that we
have species concepts in our toolbox that are not (directly) in the business
of getting at the causal structure of the world. Having these species concepts
in our toolbox might then lend some credence to a form of extra-evolutionary
species pluralism (though not necessarily Dupré or Kitcher’s version). Let me
further spell out three related reasons why having a causal restriction on what
gets to go in the toolbox will be inadequate.
First, taxonomists often distinguish between different stages of taxonomy,
for example, α, β, and γ-taxonomy (e.g., Mayr et al., 1953, 17-19), or we
might take to be a discovery and justification stage of taxonomy (Colless,
2006). The idea behind these distinctions, is that different stages of taxonomy
require different sorts of tools, that is, different sorts of species concepts. The
first stage, α-taxonomy, or the discovery stage of taxonomy, does not involve
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parsing any causes. This stage requires the use of a species concept, which was
once typically based on morphological criteria (Mayr, 1969b, 15). Thus, we
might use morphology to tell the black and blue butterflies apart from all the
other butterflies. Further stages of taxonomy will use this initial classification
to go further. For example, we might use DNA analysis to tell the different
types of black and blue butterflies apart from each other. In response to this
practice, one might argue that these preliminary classifications are ultimately
going to be discarded, and that the real tools of systematics only come in
during later stages of taxonomy. That is, perhaps we have two drastically
different toolboxes in play here. However, as the case study below will show,
taxonomy doesn’t always proceed from one stage to the next. It is hard to
make a clear-cut distinction between a discovery and justification stage of
taxonomy, because the same species concepts can be used in both stages.
Second, phenetic, morphological, or typological species concepts can play
an important role in many areas of systematics, even if they are not the ulti-
mate arbiters of what gets to count as a species. These species concepts are
non-causal, the information used by these concepts to delineate species does
not get used to explain why a species is the way it is. That is, there is not
a direct connection between the species concept and how we understand spe-
ciation. The biological species concept, on the other hand, is causal, because
gene-flow and reproductive isolation explain, at least to a certain extent, why
species are distinct from each other. A biological species has at some point
acquired reproductive isolation mechanisms that maintain, to a certain ex-
tent, its separation from other species. Now, not only do non-causal species
concepts get used in the preliminary stages of taxonomy, but they get used
to help justify the claims being made in the later stages. That is, there is a
sort of back and forth here that would make the notion of two different tool-
boxes seem inadequate. This is especially clear when we consider how such a
concept is used to corroborate the hypotheses of other species concepts when
they pick out equi-inclusive groups. However, when they do not, as in the case
of cryptic or sibling species (species that look the same, but have significant
genetic differences, or are reproductively isolated from one another, or occupy
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significantly different niches), we need a different rationale. This may spawn
further research into why something like morphology and other biologically
significant properties come apart in a given study. When they come together,
generally one should say that the same species has been delineated through
two methods, or species concepts, and when they come apart, one may want
to suggest that one is a real species and that the other is perhaps an artifact of
speciation. Thus, we will need to make use of these sorts of non-causal species
concepts, or those that pick out the pattern and not the process to justify our
claims about the process.
Third, if we adopt some form of extra-evolutionary species pluralism, this
may allow for non-causal species concepts to pick out genuine groups, even if
we think these groups are not tied together by the forces of evolution. As it
stands, how this would work is for the moment unclear. There are no extant
species concepts that are quite like the ones that Kitcher and Dupré advocate
for. The point is merely that a species concept based on Kitcher’s structural
properties or Dupré’s notion of a systematic ecology may not always involve
the use of species concepts that say anything about the causes that contribute
to speciation.
Another problem, already partially broached, comes from considering when
we might want to use different tools to do the same job. This pertains to how
two different causal concepts work together. Given pluralism, it does not
seem correct to say that when two species concepts make the same delineation
that we have two different species. As my case study shows, this is not how
species concepts are applied. Further, Waters’ ‘Toolbox Theorizing’ does not
account for this because there is still a one-to-one correspondence between dif-
ferent formulations of the Price Equation and different causal parsings. Even
though many pluralists admit of cross-classification, this doesn’t mean that ev-
ery species concept they recognize will always cross-classify every other species
concept.
Despite these two difficulties, ‘Toolbox Theorizing’ can be sufficiently mod-
ified so that it reflects the ways biologists use multiple species concepts. What
I hope to make clear through this case study is the sort of complex tool that
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species concepts are, and the sort of messy world that these tools attempt to
work with. A particular species concept is not going to play the same role
in every investigation. What I do want to retain from Waters’ account is the
distinction between toolbox theorizing and fundamentalism. Before we get to
this, I first want to look at how the toolbox metaphor has been used in relation
to species concepts.
Stanford (1995) uses the metaphor in arguing for a pluralist, but anti-realist
stance toward species. This comes out when he characterizes Kitcher’s version
of species pluralism. According to Stanford, we should reflect on whether or
not there is redundancy in the different tools we put in our box. As he puts
it, “The question is whether Kitcher’s tool box is filled with various wrenches,
pliers, and screwdrivers or merely with nine hammers” (1995, 72). In the end,
Stanford concludes that “While his toolbox might turn out to contain a spare
wrench or pliers, Kitcher’s tools are plausibly heterogeneous and his demand
for pluralism well-founded” (1995, 76). Stanford may be viewed as suggesting
that we should not have tools that are redundant. Although redundancy
is a concern when it comes to distinguishing pluralism from relativism, this
might not be a problem for Stanford, since he argues for a relativistic form of
pluralism. The problem with this way of understanding the toolbox metaphor
though is that it still suggests that different concepts are used for different
jobs. A hammer will be used for nails, a screwdriver for screws, etc. However,
to continue with the metaphor, the thing about tools like pliers, wrenches,
screwdrivers, and hammers is that they can sometimes work together to do
one and the same job. If I want to remove an old nail from a board I may
end up using a hammer, flat screw driver, and a pair of pliers. Stanford is still
right that having two hammers in such a situation won’t do me any better than
having just one. The picture I want to paint using the toolbox metaphor, is
that what goes into the toolbox is a theoretical matter, i.e., determined by
what biological theory we think governs the use of ‘species.’ However, the




In this section I will examine how different species concepts are used to delin-
eate novel species mainly within the large-spored clade of the Metschnikowia
genus, but also in some related genera. This is not a well-known genus of
yeast, apart from the fact that one species in this genus, M. pulcherrima, has
been investigated for use in wine-making. Nonetheless, for our purposes, in-
vestigating the way systematists demarcate the boundaries between species in
this genus will prove illuminating. Before I begin, I will motivate why focusing
on such an area of systematics provides a worthwhile case study for species
pluralism, rather than say looking at how the boundaries between the eleven
species of the bird genus Agelaius were adjudicated.
First off, we are still finding new species in Metschnikowia. This means
we don’t have to worry too much about the reasons for pragmatism about
the species category, which stem from revising pre-existing classifications that
are used ubiquitously. When it comes to birds, most of the work on species
has already been done, even during Mayr’s original formation of the biological
species concept in the 1940s, and of course many species still have the names
given to them by Linnaeus well before our development of modern species
concepts. This doesn’t mean that there won’t be any further disputes in these
well-trodden areas. Consider for example Cracraft’s (1992) analysis of the
birds of paradise (Paradisaeidae). The point is just that we are at a stage
with many macroscopic organisms where enough data has been collected so
that we can be fairly sure about our classification schemes.
Second, the area of yeast systematics we are about to consider provides an
interesting example for pluralism, because multiple species concepts are often
used to delineate one species. This is important because species pluralists as-
sume that each species concept, when appropriately applied, will yield only
one species. That is, that there is still a one-to-one correspondence between
successful applications of species concepts and species. However, this is not
in keeping with an important way biologists use species concepts. Delineating
new species is a complicated procedure. Though species concepts play a role,
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species are not delineated through a straightforward application of a concept.
Nor, as already noted, are some species concepts even straightforwardly appli-
cable. How does someone actually apply the evolutionary species concept (see
Chapter 1) or the general lineage conception of species (see Chapter 3)? An-
other problem is that systematists are rarely explicit about what their species
concept(s) is (are), so we need to take any rational reconstruction, as always,
with a grain of salt. However, there are many areas of systematics where mul-
tiple concepts are used in particular situations. Yeast systematics is not the
only case out there.
We encounter a similar case with viruses. We have yet to discover all the
viruses, or even have a good sense of how many are out there, and we have to
use multiple species concepts in order to distinguish the real boundaries be-
tween species. The International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV)
in 1991 accepted the following definition of viral species: “A virus species is a
polythetic class of viruses that constitutes a replicating lineage and occupies a
particular ecological niche” (Van Regenmortel 1990). The ICTV also accepted
the use of the usual categories of species, genus and family for viruses. The
definition is important because: “The classification of viruses should not be
confused with the classification of viral genome sequences. Viruses are bio-
logical entities and the notion of ecological niche is a crucial component for
demarcating individual viral species” (Regenmortel, 1997, 18). Van Regenmor-
tel stresses the fact that this definition emphasizes the “polythetic” nature of
viral species. By using the term “polythetic” here, we have the acceptance that
multiple species concepts will be used to recognize viruses. Viral species ought
to be considered as explicitly polythetic because biological species concepts,
ecological species concepts, and phylogenetic species concepts give us either
clear-cut breeding discontinuities or boundaries in time that are impossible to
demarcate.
A further case comes from considering how cultivable bacteria is classi-
fied. For this area of systematics, a phenotypic species concept has often been
used, but given extensive studies of the family Entereobacteriaceae, a genetic
species concept (based on DNA:DNA relatedness) has proved more useful for
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defining the boundaries between different species. Part of this may be because
many estimate that the number of species described so far represent only a
tiny portion of what’s still out there (Bull et al 1992; Embley & Stackebrandt
1997: Ch. 4). For cultivable bacteria, Goodfellow et al. (1997) suggest what
they call a polyphasic species concept that makes integrated use of genotypic
and phenotypic characters. To this end they consider examples of organisms
of medical and industrial importance. They claim that given the small size,
asexual reproduction, and lack of knowledge on the genetics of bacterial pop-
ulations (and Archaea), we should adopt a more pragmatic approach to a
bacterial species concept. They argue that: “It is the pattern of distinctive
properties shown by bacteria not the process which gave rise to them which is
currently seen to be paramount in bacterial systematics” (Goodfellow et al.,
1997, 26). That is, we have good reason to use a non-causal species concept
for classifying bacterial species.
Which species concepts will be relevant for the yeast systematist? In some
cases a biological species concept (BSC) is not relevant because there are asex-
ual forms of yeast, e.g., Kodamaea transpacifica (Lachance et al., 2012; Freitas
et al., 2013; Groenewald and Smith, 2013). But the BSC can be relevant
because, though strains of yeast are often haploid (they have one set of chro-
mosomes), they can be heterothallic (they have sexes that reside in different
individuals), so species ought to be delineated on the basis of reproductive
discontinuity (Lachance and Fedor, 2014, 541). But in practice species assign-
ment can be based on the BSC and DNA sequencing (Lachance and Fedor,
2014, 542), which reflects the use of a different concept, a genetic species con-
cept (GSC), that marks out species on the basis of an empirically determined
degree of genetic difference. When it comes to DNA sequencing, it depends
how the sequences are analyzed. A GSC would be used if one is taking into
consideration the proportion of divergent nucleotides, but a PSC would be
used if one used the tree inferred from the sequences. This, I take to be a
limited form of classificatory consilience. Often mating success is determined
by the sort of spores produced, or even the presence or absence of spores,
which can be interpreted as a morphological species concept (MSC) tailored
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to a particular group, but also as a phylogenetic species concept (PSC) based
on synapomorphies (shared derived traits). However, there is a very limited
sense of spore morphology being used more in tandem with the BSC, that is,
to show whether or not some individuals share a common gene pool. Spore
morphology is more useful for delineating yeast genera and higher taxa. With
yeast there can also be quite a bit of interspecific mating that can lead to
introgression (the introduction of genes from one species into the gene pool of
another species), and this can obscure how we interpret genetic information.
Thus, an ecological species concept (ESC) is also relevant, because, for ex-
ample, the different sorts of flowers or beetles is important for distinguishing
it from other strains. And further, despite those that invoke the ‘Everything
is Everywhere’ model of microbial dispersal, there are plenty of cases to be
made for strong endemism (e.g., in the genera Kodamaea, Metschnikowia, and
Wickerhamiella). Yeast systematists working in this area have a sophisticated
understanding both of the limitations of these concepts for delineating new
species, and of the ways that these concepts can supplement one another.
This sophistication needs to be accounted for if pluralism is to make sense of
how ‘species’ is used in biology. In the remainder of this section I will go into
more detail, and consider some examples of the way these different species
concepts are used to delineate new species of yeast.
5.2.1 The Morphological Species Concept
Consider how a morphological species concept (MSC) is used by yeast system-
atists. According to a MSC, we are basically trying to capture the different
ways things look. Upon close inspection, if two groups of organisms look dif-
ferent enough, they belong to different species. Consider the following dated,
but still relevant characterization of the MSC:
(MSC) The Morphological Species Concept: “Species may be de-
fined as the easily recognized kinds of organisms, and in the case
of macroscopic plants and animals their recognition should rest on
simple gross observation such as any intelligent person can make
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with the aid only, let us say, of a good hand-lens” (Shull, 1923,
221).
In the case of the yeast systematist, a good phase-contrast microscope will have
to substitute for a good hand-lens. Unfortunately, merely looking through a
microscope is not much help when it comes to yeast. As a general rule of
thumb, morphology may help distinguish different genera, but is not much
good at the species level. Like many uses of the MSC it also depends upon
which portion of the life-cycle we are looking at. For example, characteris-
tic asci (the sexual spore-bearing cell produced in ascomycete fungi) and as-
cospores helped place M. cubensis in its genus (Fidalgo-Jiménez et al., 2008).
Lachance et al. (2005), however, describe three new species of yeast in the
large-spored Metschnikowia clade. According to an MSC these three species
(M. hamakuensis sp. nov., M. kamakouana sp. nov. and M. mauinuiana sp.
nov.) are similar to another, already described species, M. hawaiiensis, but
according to other species concepts they should not be lumped together. We
should note that there isn’t always one morpho-type associated with a species.
For example, M. drakensbergensis sp. nov. is noted to be polymorphic accord-
ing to some growth tests results, often termed “phenotype,” though phenotypic
polymorphism can sometimes correspond to a genetic polymorphism (de Vega
et al., 2014).
From this preliminary analysis, a MSC is useful to a yeast systematist,
but not very. Like in many areas of systematics, the MSC is used in the
beginning stages of analysis, α-taxonomy or the discovery stage. For this area
of biodiversity, this concept would pick out groups that are too big, and would
underestimate biodiversity by an order of magnitude.
An extra-evolutionary species pluralist might wish to hold that such mor-
phological distinctions between microbial species are important in their own
right, even if they fail to track the true evolutionary origins of each species.
A MSC might be put to the use of bridging the gap between the important
groups that extra-evolutionary species pluralists argue that we should be in
the business of classifying. How this would work however is unclear, but the
point is that if we need a separate non-evolutionary classification involving
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non-evolutionary species concepts as Dupré and Kitcher have suggested, then
the MSC might be useful in integrating this sort of classificatory scheme with
an evolutionary classification scheme.
5.2.2 The Ecological Species Concept
Let’s consider how an ecological species concept (EcSC) is used by a yeast
systematist. The classic definition of the EcSC characterizes species as follows
(EcSC) A species is a lineage (or a closely related set of lineages)
which occupies an adaptive zone minimally different from that of
any other lineage in its range and which evolves separately from
all lineages outside its range (Van Valen, 1976, 233).
According to this concept, a species is a lineage of organisms that share a
distinct ecological niche. The EcSC often cross-classifies with the BSC as
is evident from its initial formulation involving the study of North American
oaks (Quercus).
How would one apply such a species concept to yeast and other microorgan-
isms? Some hold a cosmopolitan view of microbial ecology: the view that ev-
erything is everywhere (Fenchel and Finlay, 2004). However, typically species
in the Metschnikowia clade are found on islands though not always. For ex-
ample, what has now been delineated as M. (Candida) ipomoeae is unusual
in its ecology in that it ranges across the hemispheres, i.e., from Brazil to
Tennessee, and occurs mostly in the asexual state (Wardlaw et al. 2009). De-
pending on the larger group we are investigating, geographic distribution can
be quite important, and might tell us something about the particular local
ecological niche a yeast occupies. Currently, we do not know much about the
relationship Metschnikowia species have with their vector organisms, the bee-
tles (and other floricolous insects) they are found on. However, one important
case to consider is that M. locheadii and M. hawaiiensis co-exist in the same
locality, and even on the same flowers, but are found in different beetle species
(Lachance et al., 2003). Thus, it seems worth pursuing the relationship further
between the yeast and their vector beetles.
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Before closing the section on ecology, it’s worth considering how Dupré’s
in principle argument for extra-evolutionary species pluralism may apply here.
Recall that this argument involves divorcing the use of ‘species’ from its role in
evolution, to focus on its role as a unit of classification (which of course reflects
its historical use). Dupré argues that ecology may in principle have recourse
to finer grained classifications of organisms. Is there anything like a trend here
in yeast systematics? Though making an argument for a trend would require a
much broader survey, I want to briefly consider what ecological concepts that
survey might encompass.
Consider for example the ecological distinction between what are called
generalist and specialist yeast. A generalist yeast has the ability to utilize
diverse carbon compounds and due to this they can survive and grow in dif-
ferent environments. Specialist yeasts have a simple physiologic profile and
obtain energy solely from few carbon compounds and this limitation restricts
their habitat amplitude (Pimenta et al., 2009, 206-207). Some other examples
of important ecological distinctions are that between cosmopolitan/endemic,
fundamental/realized niche, and commensal/pathogenic. Translating Dupré’s
idea here would involve the creation of a potential taxonomy of yeast that
factors in these distinctions.
First, it is not clear how much finer-grained a taxonomy we could develop
on the basis of such distinctions. At best these concepts are often relative to
various scales of inquiry, from the local population in a pond, to a group of
organisms spread across an entire continent. Some of the distinctions will also
tend to grade in to one another, though this may be no more problematic than
the ways different evolutionary species concepts allow for gradation between
species. However, it is of a different sort of gradation, there is not necessarily
a historical explanation for some of these distinctions. For example, the fact
that a yeast is cosmopolitan will not tell you much about its phylogeny. In
fact, the knowledge that a yeast is cosmopolitan rests on the knowledge of
phylogeny. Though, if a yeast is known to belong to a particular clade, it
might be reasonable to guess at whether or not it is endemic.
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Second, if the extra-evolutionary species pluralists are right, then this sep-
arate taxonomy must be explanatorily distinct from evolutionary accounts
of species. Neither approach is explanatorily fundamental. However, I take
it that this doesn’t mean that there wouldn’t be something informative to be
gained from comparing and understanding the relationships between these two
radically different classification schemes. Knowing which clades evolved which
ecological traits, and how such ecological traits affect evolution are important
avenues of research.
5.2.3 The Biological Species Concept
Let’s consider how a biological species concept (BSC) is used by yeast system-
atists. According to a BSC, the boundaries between species are determined
by an array of mechanisms that allow genes to circulate among members of
the same species, and a further set of mechanisms that keep a species’ gene
pool isolated from those of other species in same environment. An often cited
definition of the BSC is as follows:
(BSC) The Biological Species Concept: “species are groups
of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which
are reproductively isolated from other such groups” (Mayr, 1942,
120)2
According to the BSC gene flow, the transfer of alleles or genes from one pop-
ulation to another, keeps species together, and reproductive isolating mecha-
nisms3 restrict gene flow and keep species apart.4 The BSC, thus puts a great
deal of emphasis on sexual reproduction. So how does this work for yeast?
2Mayr offers this definition after quoting an earlier definition he gives “A species consists
of groups of populations which replace each other geographically or ecologically and of
which the neighboring ones intergrade or interbreed wherever they are in contact or which
are potentially capable of doing so (with one or more of the populations) in those cases
where contact is prevented by geographical or ecological barriers” (1940, 256).
3Mayr (1942, 247-248) gives a taxonomy of four sorts of isolating mechanisms: ecological,
ethological, mechanical, and genetic or physiological.
4See Beurton (1995) for some potential concerns with the standard way of understanding
gene flow associated with the BSC.
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Yeast come in sexual and asexual forms, so in order for a taxonomist to
make use of a BSC, they need to consider yeast that take sexual forms. In
practice this means that they need to first be able to isolate both mating
types. If both mating types are not isolated, this can lead to an erroneous
classification, because another sort of conception of species will be used in this
case. For example, de Oliviera Santos et al. (2015) discovered the second mat-
ing type of what was once referred to as Candida ipomoeae, and so renamed
it Metschnikowia ipomoeae, thus classifying it in an entirely different genus.
This species was initially classified as C. ipomoeae, because it was thought to
be asexual. Thus, the good thing with the BSC is that it can pick up where
theMSC left off, moving from something like α- to β-taxonomy. For example,
the same three Metschnikowia species deemed conspecific with M. hawaiiensis
according to the MSC, were shown to be distinct species as based on BSC,
that is, according to mating compatibility and ascospore formation (Lachance
et al., 2005). Asexual reproduction occurs in yeasts by budding, by fission,
and by the production of conidia on short stalks called sterigmata (Yarrow,
1998, 80). Mating experiments involve the mixture in pairs of active cultures,
often including authentic strains of previously described, and tested species.
These mixtures are examined periodically for zygote, asci, or ascospore forma-
tion. Lachance et al. (2005) assigned strains to the same species only when
compatible crosses gave rise to the formation of abundant asci that contained
pairs of ascospores after 3 days at 18◦C. The groups classified as M. hamakuen-
sis, M. kamakouana, M. mauinuiana, and M. hawaiiensis failed to mate with
each other, and were thus classified as separate species (Lachance et al., 2005).
Mating experiments are not always conclusive and need to be supplemented
“Any questionable identification was verified by rDNA sequencing and then
reconfirmed by mating” (Lachance et al., 2005, 1370). Thus, some yeast tax-
onomists don’t just make use of the BSC, and MSC, they also use a genetic
species concept.
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5.2.4 The Genetic Species Concept
Let’s consider how a genetic species conceptGSC is used by a yeast-systematist.
This is loosley speaking a geneticist’s equivalent to the PhSC. According to
a GSC, individuals with different genetic material are different species. The
boundaries between species are thus set by a degree of genetic difference, which
can vary from species to species. Typically, researchers focus on specific re-
gions of genetic data that they find to be more indicative of species boundaries,
though there is nothing but practical constraints limiting the sequencing of en-
tire genomes.
When yeast systematists apply something like a GSC they have tended
to focus on the number of substitutions in the D1/D2 variable domains of
the large subunit rDNA (roughly 600 bases in size) to yield species bound-
aries (Kurtzman and Robnett, 1998). According to this version of the GSC,
conspecific strains are separated by less than 1% nucleotide substitutions, but
different species are separated by more than 1%. However, this generalization
concerning the degree of genetic difference required for distinct species is often
supplemented by considering differences between other genetic material, clade
structure, or mating experiments. This measure of genetic difference is also
used as a way of telling when two different isolates are of the same species,
and can also tell us how polytypic, genetically speaking, a species is, relevant
to other related species.
For example, Lachance et al. (2005, 1374-1375) found this to correspond
to their own argument for the species delineation of three new large-spored
Metschnikowia species. However, there was one exception, the sequence-based
separation of M. hamakuensis from M. hawaiiensis differed by only one sub-
stitution and one gap in the D1/D2 region, though their ITS1 regions differed
by 5 substitutions and 3 gaps. There was a polymorphism for M. hamakuensis
in the ITS1 region: one strain differed from others by two substitutions and a
five-position gap. When it came to M. mauinuiana and M. hawaiiensis they
were found to differ by 5 substitutions and 2 gaps in the D1/D2 region, but
there was only one gap in their ITS regions. Another use of a GSC is as a
supplement to mating experiments: “Any questionable identification was veri-
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fied by rDNA sequencing and then reconfirmed by mating” (2005, 1370). This
is a clear case of two species concepts being used together to do the same job.
TheGSC is important, but we should be clear that it’s not blind allegiance
to a fixed degree of genetic difference that allows these systematists to delineate
a new species. Genetic difference should be considered in relation to the factors
picked out by other species concepts.
5.2.5 The Phylogenetic Species Concept
Consider how a phylogenetic species concept PSC is used to determine the
boundaries of yeast species. According to one version of this concept species
should form monophyletic groups. This of course only works for currently
existing species that have not themselves speciated. Organisms that belong
to ancestral populations would not belong to any species, making this concept
entirely useless for paleontology. Unfortunately, there is no yeast paleontology.
Let’s consider how the PSC and GSC can work together. At the level of
genera, clade structure is important, as is noted by the reference to part of
the Metschnikowia genus as the large-spored Metschnikowia clade (a group of
organisms that consists of a common ancestor and all its lineal descendants,
those things with large-spores). Now, recall again that many yeast species de-
scriptions are based on generalizations made by Kurtzman and Robnett (1998).
According to their generalizations, the D1/D2 domains of the large subunit
rRNA gene normally exhibit a polymorphism of three or fewer substitutions,
and good species differ by 1% or more substitutions. This is the degree of ge-
netic difference used when applying a GSC to yeast. Thus, based strictly on
this, there would only be marginal support for making these isolates distinct
from M. locheadii. Generalizing from this, de Oliviera Santos et al. claim that:
“Although sequence divergence can inform species delineation, phylogenetic re-
latedness is measured not in units of sequence distance, but rather in terms
of clade structure” (2015). Figuring out clade structure involves considering
the different possible cladograms, which represent the different possible past
histories for some group of organisms, and checking for monophyletic groups.
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Given their analysis, they found that we would get monophyletic groups tak-
ing either of the isolates by themselves, both of them together, and with both
of them and M. locheadii. This sort of structure is seen as a requirement for
species membership (de Oliveira Santos et al., 2015).
But, M. bowlesiae is possibly an intermediate stage in a succession of peri-
patric speciation events between M. dekortorum and M. similis, and may even
hybridize with these two separate species (Lachance and Fedor, 2014). This
is an important case: “In spite of the systematist’s common aversion for para-
phyletic taxa, during early stages of peripatric speciation, the stem ancestral
(stem) (sic) species is bound to remain paraphyletic with respect to the new,
emerging species. The present case is to our knowledge the first suggestion
in yeasts of such a three-species succession” (Lachance and Fedor, 2014, 545).
In this case, descent and reproductive isolation are telling us different stories.
Though these systematists have chosen to pick what they believe to be the
best, a pluralist perspective would allow one to pick both in this instance.
5.3 Whither Consilience?
What are we to make of the ways which the yeast systematists we surveyed
above use species concepts? In this section I will consider whether or not
the way species concepts are used in practice provides evidence for monism.
Many have suggested there is something like ‘consilience’ occurring in the way
different species concepts are used. Consilience in general means reaching
the same conclusion by different approaches. By consilience here I mean the
basic idea that as we refine our understanding of species concepts further and
further, we see that they are approaching the same classificatory goals from
different angles. This consilience has been taken as evidence for monism, but
as we will see, this need not be the case.
In this section I examine Ruse’s (1987) argument for classificatory con-
silience, and Richard’s (2010) argument theoretical consilience, and consider
Ereshefsky’s (2014a) criticisms of both arguments. I want to show that despite
the soundness of his criticisms, there still is something to the notion of con-
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silience worth adding to our pluralist toolkit. Generally speaking, consilience
between different ways of classifying species has been used as a reason for an
in principle, rather than an actual monism. Even though things look grim
now, a small minority of thinkers believe that the different species concepts
will eventually pick out exactly the same groups.5 Conceptual pluralism will
one day resolve itself into conceptual monism. One would think that if this
is the case, then we should see some signs that we are working towards this
brighter monistic future. Thus, pluralists have responded by denying that the
trend is real, pointing out both the legitimacy of different species concepts,
and the fact that different species concepts often pick out overlapping groups,
that is, they cross-classify, and further, that as we investigate more and more,
this cross-classification will be seen as ever more widespread. In response to
this, monists have either sought consilience at some other level, or have stuck
to their guns and have used cross-classification as a reason why competing
concepts are illegitimate.
Ruse has been the biggest advocate of what Ereshefsky refers to as clas-
sificatory consilience: “There are different ways of breaking organisms into
groups, and they coincide! The genetic species is the morphological species
is the reproductively isolated species is the group with common ancestors”
(1987, 238). According to him, consilience is a mark of reality. Thus, if we
have multiple species concepts picking out the same taxa by way of different
biological properties, then we have good reason to believe that those are real
species. Ruse believes that eventually the different classifications of species
according to different species concepts will coincide. They will pick out the
same groups, but by different means. Ruse’s suggestion has been dismissed by
many because it is simply not the case that the different species concepts he
discusses are leading us to the very same classification of organisms. However,
as critics fail to make explicit, this doesn’t mean that there is absolutely no re-
lationship between the different ways of breaking organisms into groups. Even
5Most biologists are certainly aware that biology is the science of exceptions to the rule.
With this in mind, when someone has obtained exactly the same results from different
approaches might be best interpreted as a sign that some of the data has been made up.
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though they do cross-classify, they also can often classify in compatible ways,
as we have seen in our discussion of the large-spored Metschnikowia clade.
Richards (2010) has argued that there is a different sort of consilience
that pertains to species, what Ereshefsky dubs theoretical consilience. His
approach is developed as an interpretation of the hierarchical approaches to
species concepts offered by de Queiroz (1998; 1999; 2005a; 2005c; 2007) and
Mayden (1997; 1999). As we have seen in Chapter 2, these sorts of approaches
end up reducing species concepts to some version of an evolutionary species
concept, which, as Richards notes, coheres well with accepting SAI as our
ontological framework. On this approach the evolutionary species concept lies
at a higher theoretical level in our conceptual framework, while the various
other species concepts are accepted as mere operational variants of it. As
argued for in Chapter 2, this view ends up being a form of quasi-evolutionary
species pluralism, since these hierarchical approaches choose what I call a
minimalist solution to the species category problem. Due to the focus on that
problem the view suffers, because advocates of the hierarchical approach are
unclear or silent about whether or not the different subordinate, operational
species concepts cross-classify one another. Both de Queiroz and Mayden
focus on solving the species category problem to the detriment of determining
the relationship between the different “operational concepts.” On Richards’
account, though, consilience comes not from the different species concepts
aligning (or at least some day aligning), but from considering the history of
systematics, and how over time biologists have generally restricted species to
lineages. That is, numerical taxonomy and the phenetic species concept have
gradually moved out of the picture. This is of course something an evolutionary
species pluralist can accept, but not an extra-evolutionary species pluralist. To
put the point another way, the extra-evolutionary species pluralist is denying
the reduction to, or the fundamentality of the evolutionary species concept.
Ereshefsky (2001; 2014a), however argues against understanding what is
happening in these hierarchical approaches to species concepts as a form of
consilience. We cannot re-frame some species concepts as simply operational,
for they all contain a theoretical component: “Biologists do not think that
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all genealogical lineages are species; they hold that species are a particular
type of genealogical lineage. Moreover, they disagree on which type of lineage
constitutes a species. Consequently, there is no theoretical consilience con-
cerning ‘species’ ” (2014a, 78). The distinction between a theoretical and an
operational concept is not illegitimate, though concepts like the evolutionary
species concept still have no obvious operational consequences. This, again,
is the exact same criticism he has levied against de Queiroz’s general lineage
conception of species (Chapter 2). This is an important criticism of such views.
However, if we abstract from this sort of disagreement, which is one over how
to define the species category, we see that there is much in common between
Ereshefsky, Richards, de Queiroz and Mayden. All are (quasi-)evolutionary
species pluralists who recognize roughly the same sorts of species concepts,
and restrict species to lineages (even though, as Ereshefsky is clear to point
out, not all lineages are species). Thus, the disagreement is about two things.
First, how are we to accommodate the cross-classification that often occurs be-
tween different lineage based species concepts? This is something de Queiroz
and Mayden both fail to give a clear answer to. Second, what is the nature
of the genealogical restriction? Following updated cladistic terminology, there
are two sorts of continuous genealogical entities that may or may not fit the
bill as species: monophyletic and paraphyletic groups. Even if there is some
agreement that species are genealogical entities, we need to know more about
their status.
However, if the extra-evolutionary species pluralists are right about the
state of biology, then Richards is just plain wrong. That is, his argument for
theoretical consilience presupposes some sort of conceptual unification within
biology, but according to extra-evolutionary species pluralism, this conceptual
unification is missing. From this perspective, there is more to biology than
just evolution, and considering species as genealogical units. Unfortunately for
our purposes, seeing how this form of pluralism can make sense of the work of
practicing yeast taxonomists is difficult. Extra-evolutionary species pluralism
stands or falls mainly with in principle arguments that are grounded in the
explanatory demands of other areas of biology. Most practicing biologists
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use species concepts that are grounded in some interpretation of species as
evolutionary units, though they often use non-evolutionary species concepts
in a more secondary fashion. Although there are often no explicit consequences
drawn from arguments for extra-evolutionary species pluralism, it is through
the use of these sorts of species concepts that there may be a place for this
form of pluralism in contemporary biological practice.
Now, despite the problems with these forms of consilience, there is some-
thing to seeking points of agreement between competing species concepts that
is readily seen from an examination of the way species concepts are used by
systematists. This is what we might call local classificatory consilience, as dis-
tinct from Ruse’s global classificatory consilience. The global view is that the
different species concepts (will someday) line up and give us the same global
classification scheme: there is one true Tree of Life waiting out there for us to
discover. Unfortunately, as many have pointed out, this doesn’t seem to be the
case, nor does it seem like it might become the case, on account of the fact that
there is just too much cross-classification between competing species concepts.
As opposed to this global view about where things are headed, the local view
comes from focusing on the significance of the cases where species concepts
line-up. In the next section I will show that local classificatory consilience is
a more profitable understanding of biological practice.
5.3.1 The Toolbox View of Species
Species delineation is not a simple application of species concepts to a data set.
Many species concepts are used to varying degrees and in different capacities,
and the multifaceted inferences drawn from these uses are supported by the
complex relationships between the applications of these concepts.
If species concepts are tools, which of these tools are required for delineating
new species of yeast? As we have seen above, sometimes different species
concepts pick out the same groups, and sometimes they do not. First, what
is the status of the morphological species concept (MSC)? The MSC is a
way of distinguishing between organisms based on their different phenotypic
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forms. The MSC is not very useful in making a final distinction between
different species of yeast, because many “species” according to other species
concepts of yeast look the same. However, this concept is useful to begin
an initial investigation. It says something about relatedness, and we can use
this information to narrow down what a species is by looking at other factors.
However, to a certain extent, we need to study morphological features in a
very limited sense (e.g., the presence or absence of spores) to know whether a
mating experiment is successful.
Second, what about the ecological species concept ESC? The ESC distin-
guishes species on the basis of their status as a lineage occupying an ecological
niche different from any other lineage in its range and evolving separately
from others outside its range. In this particular area of yeast systematics (the
large-spored Metschnikowia clade), the ESC is far more informative than the
MSC. Focusing more on this concept may involve uncovering more about the
relationship between different yeast species and their vector insects. Ecology
is also important at a higher level, but in many ways the biogeography of en-
demic yeast is something we work towards by looking at a number of different
factors that are tied to other species concepts.
Third, let’s consider the BSC. The BSC is a concept that distinguishes
species on the basis of their status as reproductively isolated populations. For
yeast systematics, this concept proves to be an interesting limit case. This
concept is useless for asexual forms of yeast. The BSC is very useful for
sexual yeast, but even there it is not always the most important, or relevant
species concept. This is shown by how it is often supplemented by a genetic
species concept, given that many asexual forms of yeast are delineated by a
certain degree of genetic difference from related sexual and asexual groups of
yeast.
Fourth, what about the genetic species concept GSC, which differentiates
species on the basis of their genetic material? For yeast systematists, the
GSC as applied to the D1/D2 region is a very useful surrogate for delineating
species, but this method is not foolproof. This is shown by how it can be
supplemented by BSC, or by a different degree of genetic difference.
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Fifth, let’s review the phylogenetic species concept (PSC). The PSC is
useful, but is best seen as a supplement the BSC and GSC. Though many
evolutionary trees are given, these are not the ultimate arbiters of what is and
what is not a species. Phylogeny is much more important at higher levels of
organization, when we compare the relationships between the species already
delineated by way of other concepts. This though in turn may have effects on
the way those concepts are applied in the future, especially when a relationship
between phylogeny and geography is established.
This review of how species concepts are applied in yeast systematics is not
meant to be the final word, and of course focuses largely on the large-spored
Metschnikowia clade. Things of course may change somewhat as more and
more yeast species are discovered and methods change, but given the way
current practice is going, how other related areas of systematics are going, it
seems likely that multiple species concepts will continue to be required to judge
the boundaries between species. These concepts come apart in many instances,
and this is well known by biologists, but still some yeast systematists often
argue that they have made a delineation on the basis of cases where multiple
species concepts align. How can current versions of species pluralism account
for this sort of local classificatory consilience? What does a pluralist say about
situations where lineage concepts like the BSC, ESC, and PSC align?
Before we answer these questions, there are two caveats we need to address
from the basis of each major form of species pluralism. First, as we have seen
in previous chapters, an evolutionary species pluralist might wish to rule out
the MSC and GSC as non-evolutionary species concepts. These concepts are
both ‘typological’ in the Mayrian sense. Someone who applies these concepts
is searching for discrete patterns of morphology or discrete clusters of genetic
information, and using these in the absence of any notion of an evolutionary
lineage. Thus, these two concepts simply wouldn’t be considered as proper
tools for making decisions about what is and what is not a species. However,
ruling them out this way doesn’t explain their continued use.
Second, a general problem with trying to see how extra-evolutionary species
pluralism would fit into practice, is that none of the candidate species concepts
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proposed by Kitcher or Dupré that fall on the extra side of the pluralism are
actually used by practicing biologists. This is because, especially for Dupré’s
pluralism, these concepts are best interpreted as in principle additions to the
already existing array of species concepts. But these additions are importantly
different in that they don’t pertain to an evolutionary understanding of species.
I have here and there given some thoughts about how this sort of pluralism
might be put into practice, but this form of pluralism remains under-explored.
Concepts like theMSC andGSC, while used in connection with evolutionarily
informed species concepts, may also be, in principle, used in connection with
concepts informed by an understanding of structural, or perhaps ecological
space.
Despite these two caveats, pluralists need to explain why biologists continu-
ally look for consilience between different species concepts. They don’t always
find consilience, as we saw with M. dektorum, but using multiple species con-
cepts is part of a good general strategy for delineating new species. As this
case study has shown, a pluralist simply cannot relegate only one species con-
cept per some particular area of taxonomy, for example, using the BSC for
sexually reproducing species, and something else for asexual organisms. There
are many areas of taxonomy where one concept is not enough. Investigators
working on the large-spored Metschnikowia clade provide a good example of
this. Pluralism can help here by giving us further options when local classi-
ficatory consilience is not found. However, biological practice is also partly
limited by some pragmatic constraints, which I will now turn to.
Perhaps the yeast systematists we’ve surveyed are looking to avoid instabil-
ity in their classifications, rather than actively seeking out consilience. This is
an important objection to consider, because systematists often are explicit in
following prudence and erring on the side of what they have grounds to perceive
as the more stable classification. Thus, one might argue that using multiple
species concepts to make a delineation can be viewed as a forward-thinking
pragmatic decision that biologists make, which is independent of pluralism
or monism. Given uncertainty about the state of biology, having more than
one way of justifying the delineation of a new species means that when we do
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settle on a classification, it will be more likely to remain stable, even if say,
some of the species concepts used in a particular area fall out of favour. This
connects with similar motivations that lead many to pragmatism about the
species category, which is the idea that we should accept pluralism, but still
retain more or less the traditional divisions of organisms into species because
revising them would be too costly (see Chapter 3).
A further case can be made for a pragmatic classification scheme of yeast
on the basis of estimates about how many species remain to be discovered.
Most research estimates this number as quite high in comparison with those
we have discovered (cf. Lachance, 2006). The reverse would be the case for
birds. A classification based on the use of the PSC, or cladistic methods more
generally, is more stable, the more taxa are analyzed and compared. This is
akin to Hennig’s (1966) notion of ‘reciprocal illumination.’ For this reason, as
more yeasts are discovered this might change the stability level of the larger
classification.
Another way of considering this objection is to think that perhaps “the
yeast species concept,” if there truly is such a thing, is in a transitional phase,
as some have argued of fungi more generally (Brasier, 1997). One, final quasi-
disjunctive species concept for all yeast is on the way! This might suggest that
we could have a classificatory consilience for all yeast, somewhere in between
my local and Ruse’s global classificatory consilience. That is, it could be the
case that Ruse is wrong about all uses of species concepts, but he would be
right about the way species concepts are used in certain areas of classification.
In response to these pragmatic worries, let’s first note that there is nothing
wrong with interpreting biological practice as both aiming at avoiding insta-
bility and at a certain kind of consilience. There is nothing obviously incom-
patible about these two aims, in fact, they complement one another. However,
interpreting current practice as transitional, and in search of a monistic, or
quasi-disjunctive yeast species concept is not warranted. This interpretation
of current practice is problematic for several reasons. First of all, in the face
of all the work that species pluralists have done, it suggests that there is a
such thing as a single optimal species concept, though just one for yeast, as
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opposed to other areas of the Tree or Web of Life. Given that there is no global
consensus in nature or theory about what a species is, there is no reason to
think that there would be a consensus just for yeast. If it’s messy globally,
then there is reason to believe that it would be messy locally. Further, as
the case study shows, it is in fact somewhat messy in the case of the large-
spored Metschnikowia clade (and this probably the least messy clade among
all ascomycetous yeasts). Second, this is the wrong way to think of species
concepts. In many ways it is arbitrary where yeast is divided off from fungi,
plants from animals, etc. Thus, there is no reason to expect that since we have
delineated higher taxa, there will then be one set of criteria for differentiating
species beneath them. Note for example the difference between how species
concepts are applied for Candida and Metschnikowia. In addition to this point
about the vagueness of biological domains, this is not the concern of species
concepts, but what kingdom concepts, phyla concepts, etc., are about. Species
concepts are attempts at demarcating the species from subspecific taxa, and
superspecific taxa in general, not in particular cases. Species pluralism is thus
a claim at this global level: for all of systematic biology, though whether or
not every organism belongs to a species is a slightly different issue. Thus,
for species pluralists, species concepts should be thought of as tools so that
they can be as widely used as possible, across many different types of genera,
phyla, and so on, but then only possibly restricted by the local demands of a
particular genus, clade, and so on.
One last concern about how species pluralism is applied in practice con-
cerns the relationship between pluralism and relativism. As argued for in
earlier chapters, distinguishing pluralism from monism has led us to discuss
the conceptual issues that surround the species category problem. However,
distinguishing pluralism from relativism, will allow us to ask questions about
which sorts of concepts are admissible and how they interact with one another,
that is, how they cross-classify one another and the world. What is clear from
this case is that there is another layer of interaction between concepts that
comes from practice. Focusing on this layer adds a further dimension to the
distinction between relativism and pluralism. As is clear from this case, the
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use of different species concepts is highly context-dependent. However, this
does not mean that species concept use is arbitrary. The choice of a species
concept depends on the case at hand, and the territory already mapped out.
Further, how species concepts are used cannot simply be determined in a top-
down fashion, e.g., by reading off which species concepts are legitimate by the
lights of evolutionary theory.
5.4 Conclusion
As we have seen in this Chapter, there is more to species pluralism than just
making it suitable for biological theory. Pluralists need to account for the
way species concepts are used in practice. The suggestions offered hitherto
fail to account for the sophisticated way that researchers often use different
species concepts together. This doesn’t mean that there is any global con-
silience happening amongst our theoretical tools, i.e., that these tools will in
the end delineate the same species. The lesson pluralism tells us is to mitigate
our search for agreement among species concepts, and to pause when species
concepts lead to conflicting classifications. Even if the world is the way plu-
ralists think it is, we do not need to use whatever species concepts we allow
for independently of one another. There are important lessons to learn from
using them together. What remains to be done in future work is to determine
in more detail the ways in which species concepts interact. It is clear from this
case study that there is a certain degree of going back and forth between differ-
ent concepts, for example between the MSC and BSC. However, determining
how species concepts interact in global terms is a much more sophisticated
task. One could of course continue the piece-meal approach taken here, but a
rigorous survey of taxonomic guidelines and practice are called for.
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General Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation was to provide a multidimensional analysis
of species pluralism along historical, conceptual, ontological, and practical
lines. The ultimate goal of the dissertation that species pluralism is a view
not just about the species category and the ontological status of species, but
also a debate about which species concepts are admissible, and where and how
different species concepts are to be legitimately applied. I ultimately argue
that species pluralism can be further distinguished by determining what degree
of interaction may occur between different species concepts for a particular
case.
In Chapter 2 I examined the relationship between species pluralism and
the history of systematics by drawing connections to two interrelated cases:
the relationship between the essentialism story, and the study of Aristotle’s
theory of classification. I raised four points of comparison: (1) the explanatory
power of taxonomic ranks, (2) the importance of the species category problem,
(3) the question of intrinsicalism, and (4) how to interpret the “cross-cutting”
metaphor endemic to the pluralist literature. The purpose of this chapter was
to provide a foil for comparing the different pluralist solutions to the species
category problem and the species taxon problem.
In Chapter 3 I took a critical stance to what pluralism implies about the
species category problem: eliminativism, disjunctivism, minimalism, and prag-
matism, by showing that there is not a great deal at stake between many of
these views. However, in Chapter 5 I argued against a form of eliminativism.
My purpose in Chapter 2 is to show that pluralism is more than a definitional
problem. One further distinction we need to make is between evolutionary
and extra-evolutionary species pluralism. These aren’t strictly defined views,
because there are different forms of these two different kinds of species plu-
ralism. In order to distinguish between them even further, we need to ask
two questions. First, which concepts, and on what basis, does each form of
species pluralism allow for? Second, how do the admissible concepts (cross-
)cut up the biological world? These questions are separate from what pluralism
entails about the species category, and they are separate from each other, be-
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cause we can allow for multiple species concepts, but not allow for any sort
of cross-classification. I argued that failure to give explicit answers to these
two questions blurs important distinctions between different forms of species
pluralism.
In Chapter 4 I examined the relationship between species pluralism and the
species taxon problem. Adopting species pluralism does not resolve the debate,
but given that pluralism doesn’t tell us that one species concept is correct (it
tells us that some are) this isn’t surprising. In similar fashion, some onto-
logical frameworks may be suitable from a pluralist perspective. This is not
uninformative, because monism tells us absolutely nothing about what species
are, simply that we need to seek a unified concept and ontological framework
for species. Species pluralism, on the other hand, is compatible with multiple
species concepts, but in order to be distinct from relativism, pluralism must be
tied to biological theory. It is this tie to theory that is important. I showed that
extra-evolutionary species pluralism fits with ontological frameworks that can
capture both ‘intrinsic’ and historical properties, and that evolutionary species
pluralism minimally requires an ontological framework that captures historical
properties.
In Chapter 5 I argued that pluralists need to account for the way species
concepts are used in practice. Pluralism needs to be developed to account
for the sophisticated way that researchers often use different species concepts
together. This doesn’t mean that there is any global consilience happening
amongst our theoretical tools, i.e., that these tools will in the end delineate
the same species. The general lesson pluralism tells us is to mitigate our search
for agreement among species concepts, and to pause when species concepts lead
to conflicting classifications. Even if the world is the way pluralists think it is,
we do not need to use whatever species concepts we allow for independently of
one another. There are important lessons to learn from using them together.
What remains to be done in future work is to determine in more detail the ways
in which species concepts interact. The case study I provided and analyzed on
the Metschnikowia genus is only one area of systematics, and one way species
concepts are used together to delineate species, though it is an important area
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to show that pluralists need to account for interaction between concepts.
To some, pluralism seems like giving up, for it seems as if our scientific
practice and theories have become so garbled that we finally throw our hands
up and blame the world for what might be our own conceptual confusions.
But to a pluralist it is even more puzzling to look back on history. Why did
we never question these monistic assumptions, that there should be one single
definition of species, before? This is just as puzzling as the fact that the Earth’s
immovability wasn’t questioned, that the fixity of species wasn’t questioned.
However, only once we truly ask a question for ourselves can we begin to see
the earlier questioners: Aristarchus, Empedocles, and oddly enough in this
case Aristotle. Tracing the development of species pluralism in our era has
an impact on how we look at the past. Just as post-Linnaeans attempted to
force a taxonomic understanding of genos and eidos on Aristotle, so too have
we forced a monistic understanding of classification on him.
Looking at the history of systematics with pluralism in mind can help shed
light on what it is that different pluralists are attempting to achieve today.
It is not a simple matter of giving up. Sorting through the many operational
and theoretical challenges that a systematic understanding of life presents us
with from a pluralistic perspective is an important task. Accepting pluralism
doesn’t mean that anything goes, it just means that the world is a much
messier place than we assumed it to be. It is naive to think that ‘species’ can
have a simple, unified and workable definition, just as it is for many important
theoretical concepts in many different fields. This doesn’t mean that our work
is merely to identify and eliminate these concepts from our theoretical and
practical discourse, for in this too there is a trace of unwarranted monistic
assumptions. There is no need to break down ‘species,’ or any other pluralistic
concept into a fixed hierarchy of sub-concepts, for this will not help us use these
concepts to do the work we need to do. We must strive to be more sophisticated
in our understanding of key concepts in the sciences, as sophisticated as those
who apply the concepts are themselves on a daily basis.
From a philosophical perspective this means that simple-minded arguments
about how concepts are used won’t be nearly enough to determine a workable
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ontology for practicing pluralists. We need to consider not only the theoretical
state of a discipline, but also the sophisticated ways researchers understand
and apply concepts in different situations before we can draw conclusions
about ontology. Philosophical arguments play a role, but these arguments
aren’t separable from what biologists themselves do. If anything this thesis
has showcased the philosophical acumen of the biological field.
However, it is also clear that scientists and philosophers both have been
drawn to unwarranted monistic assumptions. It is only through working on
the philosophical problems and implications that surround pluralism that we
can begin to make progress on old problems in the philosophy of science. This
thesis is one of many first steps down new paths. There is definitely more to
say about the history of pluralism in biology, not just with respect to ‘species,’
but with respect to many other key concepts. Now that we know what to
look for, when has pluralism been used before, and why has it been used? As
looking at Aristotle can help us frame some of the contemporary debates with
regard to species pluralism, so can looking at other figures from the history
of biology help us shed light on other forms of pluralism. Further, progress
on species pluralism can feedback into progress on other forms of pluralism
within contemporary biology and other areas within the philosophy of science.
This piecemeal approach could even help us even rethink the complicated
development of pluralism within the history of the philosophy of science from
the Vienna Circle and before to today. We tend to think pluralism developed
because reductionism and unification failed, but perhaps there is more to this
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